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Il-18 crash in Alma-Ata (1966)

22 Nov 1966 · Kartabulak River, village of Krasnoye Pole, 127 m to the right of the runway of Alma-Ata Airport, Turksib District of Alma-Ata (Kazakh SSR, USSR)

Alma-Ata United Air Detachment, Kazakh Civil Aviation Directorate Ilyushin Il-18 · Failure of engine No. 3, crew errors

From Alma-Ata (Kazakh SSR, USSR) to Domodedovo, Moscow (RSFSR, USSR)

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Event

Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
Event fatalities
3 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
Occupants
Unknown
Survivors
65
InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline

Ilyushin Il-18

Aircraft type
Ilyushin IL-18
Category
Airplane · from aircraft type
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
CCCP-75665
Onboard fatalities
3
Route
From Alma-Ata (Kazakh SSR, USSR)To Domodedovo, Moscow (RSFSR, USSR)

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision
  • Personnel issues › Task performance

From the investigation findings the Wikipedia article reports, sorted into the NTSB's cause areas with AI assistance.

Approximate · Coordinates from the Wikipedia article; not checked against an investigation report.

From the Wikipedia article

The 1966 Il-18 crash in Alma-Ata was an air disaster that occurred on the morning of Tuesday, 22 November 1966 at Alma-Ata airport. An Il-18B airliner of the Alma-Ata Joint Aviation Detachment of Aeroflot was beginning to operate scheduled passenger flight Kh-19 on the Alma-Ata — Semipalatinsk — Omsk — Moscow route, but during takeoff from Alma-Ata airport the airliner's engine No. 3 (inner right) failed. A yawing moment arose which swung the airliner round, after which it struck a mound, plunged into a river and broke into two parts. Of the 68 people on board — 60 passengers and 8 crew members — three were killed and 65 survived.

Chronology of events

That day the sky over Alma-Ata was covered with cumulonimbus clouds, wet snow was falling and there was haze. The runway was covered with slush about 1—3 centimetres deep, and soon an engineer of the line maintenance workshop contacted the commander of the aviation detachment and reported that during aircraft takeoffs a large amount of spray was observed, which threatened to get into the engines. The commander of the aviation detachment then decided to dispatch the two Il-18 aircraft already prepared (USSR-75882 and USSR-75665), after which the runway would be cleared. The first was aircraft USSR-75882, which took off without remarks.

Next to take off was to be flight Kh-19, which that day was operated by Il-18B aircraft USSR-75665, flying from Alma-Ata to Semipalatinsk and then as flight 102 from Semipalatinsk to Moscow with an intermediate stop in Omsk. In total there were 68 people on board: 60 passengers (with a passenger capacity of 95 seats) and 8 crew members.

Crash

At 10:35 the crew reported ready for takeoff on a heading of 50°. After receiving clearance, at 10:36 the takeoff run was started, and in the course of it engine No. 3 (inner right) shut down and its propeller feathered, but the crew did not detect this. After running 150 metres straight along the runway, the aircraft, owing to the resulting thrust imbalance, deviated to the right at an angle of 1—2°. After another 400 metres, at a speed of 160 km/h, the right bogie ran onto the ground, by which time the aircraft had deviated from the takeoff heading by as much as 7°. But when the aircraft ran onto the ground, the commander decided not to abort the takeoff. At the same time he did not know that one of the propellers on the right wing was feathered, that is, that thrust had fallen by a quarter. The nose gear had been lifted off the ground as the Il-18 continued to accelerate on three engines across grass covered with a 7-centimetre layer of snow.

The crew commander knew that there was a ravine ahead, so at a speed of 180 km/h he pulled the control column back to the stop, hoping to lift the aircraft off the ground. But instead, owing to insufficient speed, 704 metres from the point where it left the runway and 102 metres to the right of the runway, the airliner struck a mound 0.7 metres high with its tail section; the fuselage structure could not withstand the impact and the tail separated. The Il-18 flew over a small river and struck its bank with engine No. 4 (right) and the nose and right landing gear, whereupon the nose gear broke. Next the aircraft struck a mound, broke off part of the right wing with both right engines and the right landing gear, after which it finally came to a stop 127 metres to the side of the runway and 1400 metres from the start of the takeoff run. A small fire broke out at the crash site. In all, 1 passenger and radio operator Ryzhkovsky were killed, and all the others received injuries of varying severity. Later co-pilot Pushkin died in hospital from his injuries.

Investigation and cause

Causes

According to the commission's conclusions, the immediate cause of the crash was the deviation of the aircraft during the takeoff run as a result of the shutdown of engine No. 3 and the feathering of its propeller, on a runway covered with wet snow. In addition, the crash was brought about by:

Underestimation of the difficulty of the takeoff conditions when deciding to dispatch aircraft in conditions of limited visibility.

The captain's wrong decision to continue the takeoff when the aircraft deviated off the runway at a speed below lift-off speed.

The flight engineer's failure to report the feathering of the propeller.

The most probable cause of the shutdown of engine No. 3 was named as the ingestion of wet snow and water from the runway, thrown up by the nose landing gear wheels, into the engine's air intake duct during the airliner's takeoff run.

Translated into English with AI assistance from the Russian Wikipedia article “Катастрофа Ил-18 в Алма-Ате (1966)” (revision 150406895, retrieved 2026-09-19) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out; the translation may contain errors, and long articles were cut to their first 700 words. Read the article

Sources

Russian Wikipedia article: Катастрофа Ил-18 в Алма-Ате (1966)
Article
Катастрофа Ил-18 в Алма-Ате (1966)
Translation
Into English with AI assistance; names of linked operators and aircraft types from Wikidata. It may contain errors.
Revision
150406895 · 2025-12-02 · retrieved 2026-09-19
Wikidata
Q16488145
Licence
Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
Where each value comes from
Record
ru Wikipedia article "Катастрофа Ил-18 в Алма-Ате (1966)" (page 4494519, revision 150406895), translated into English with AI assistance
Date
Wikipedia infobox: date
Place and country
Wikipedia infobox: site
Map position
Wikipedia article coordinates
Aircraft, operator and route
Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
Operation
"scheduled passenger flight" in the article's opening paragraph
Fatalities
Wikipedia infobox: aircraft fatalities
Ground fatalities
not stated in the Wikipedia infobox
Summary
Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (1)
  • Wikipedia · Facts from the Russian Wikipedia article's infobox, translated into English with AI assistance, not checked against an investigation report. Independent review pending.