CommuteAir Flight 4339
Embraer EMB-145XR · Incident: landing area overshoot
From Washington Dulles International Airport (KIAD) to Roanoke–Blacksburg Regional Airport (KROA)
Narrative check · The NTSB narrative appears to contradict this record's damage. Values are shown as recorded, not corrected; compare with the narrative.
Event
- NTSB case
- DCA25LA339
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Incident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Ongoing
- Event fatalities
- Unknown
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Airline
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Instrument Meteorological Cond
Embraer EMB-145XR
- Aircraft type
- Embraer EMB-145
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N21129
- Operator
- CommuteAir
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Washington Dulles International Airport (KIAD), Dulles, VATo Roanoke–Blacksburg Regional Airport (KROA), Roanoke, VA
- Aircraft age
- About 22 years (built 2003)
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 121: Air Carrier
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Landing · landing roll
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Landing area overshoot
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Minor Possible conflict
Cause areas
No findings designated as a cause are recorded in the NTSB data yet.
Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
On September 24, 2025, at 2117 eastern daylight time (EDT), CommuteAir (dba United Express flight 4339), Embraer EMB-145XR, N21129, experienced a runway excursion while landing at Roanoke-Blacksburg Regional Airport (ROA), Roanoke, Virginia (VA). The airplane overran the end of runway 34 and came to rest in the engineered materials arresting system (EMAS). There were no injuries to the 3 crew and 50 passengers onboard and there was no damage to the airplane. The scheduled domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD), Dulles, VA to ROA. According to the flight crew, this was the second leg of day four, of a four-day rotation, and the first leg on the incident airplane. Prior to departure, the airplane had to be deplaned twice for maintenance related anomalies. After boarding for a third time, the flight crew reviewed the weather and briefed the thunderstorms approaching ROA. The airplane pushed back approximately two and a half hours after the scheduled departure time. En route, the flight crew reviewed the Automatic Terminal Information Services (ATIS) weather information for ROA. The ATIS reported calm winds, no precipitation, a cloud ceiling of 15,000 feet, and that runway 6 was in use. The captain, pilot flying, briefed the localizer approach to runway 6. The first officer (FO), pilot monitoring, suggested reviewing the landing performance details for a wet runway, or a runway condition code (RCC) of 5, but the captain declined due to the ATIS not reporting precipitation. During descent, the flight crew checked in with approach control and was informed of precipitation along the approach path to runway 6 and that other aircraft were using runway 34 for landing. The captain requested the FO set up for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 34 and to brief the approach. The FO set up the ILS runway 34 approach, briefed the approach changes, and monitored the weather radar.
Figure 1. Jeppesen instrument approach plate for ILS runway 34 approach. After turning on final approach, the flight crew observed the runway and heard the previous landing aircraft report marginal visibility and bumpy conditions. During the approach, the rain intensity increased, and the captain requested that the FO run the performance calculation for landing on a wet runway with a RCC of 5. The FO ran the performance calculations and determined that they would have a margin of approximately 200 feet more than was required, without thrust reverser usage. The captain briefed the go-around procedures and that they would divert to Piedmont Triad International Airport (GSO), Greensboro, North Carolina if they executed a go-around. On short final, the rain intensity increased, and the captain requested windshield wipers at high. As the airplane descended below 500 feet, the FO observed that they were high on the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) and then observed the captain correcting the flight path, but recalled they were still high as the airplane crossed the threshold. After crossing the runway markings, the FO called for a go-around, but the captain continued. About halfway down the runway, the FO called for a go-around a second time, but the captain continued. The airplane touched down and the flight crew applied maximum braking and deployed the engine thrust reversers. The airplane overran the end of the runway and came to rest in the EMAS. The FO attempted to communicate with air traffic control (ATC), but the communications button had disengaged. After engaging the communications button, the FO coordinated with ATC and contacted the flight attendant (FA). The FA verified that there were no injuries. The flight crew completed the emergency evacuation checklist and prepared for an evacuation. Airport rescue firefighting (ARFF) personnel boarded the airplane and assisted with evacuating passengers down a ladder.
Figure 2. Airplane main landing gear witness marks in the EMAS at ROA. (Source: ROA) As part of the investigative process, the NTSB invited the qualified parties to participate in the investigation. These included the Federal Aviation Administration, CommuteAir, and the Air Line Pilots Association. In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, an Accredited Representative from the Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center of Brazil, the State of Manufacture for the airplane, was appointed to support the investigation with Embraer as their technical advisor. The flight data and cockpit voice recorder were sent to the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC. The following NTSB specialists were assigned: Cockpit Voice Recorder, Flight Data Recorder, Airports, Meteorology, Air Traffic Control, and Operational and Human Factors. The investigation is ongoing.
Verbatim NTSB factual narrative from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record DCA25LA339
- Event ID
- 20250925201709
- Case number
- DCA25LA339
- Dataset
- full-current
- Source SHA-256
- 5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: local date, investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date; the NTSB stores the UTC date 2025-09-25.
- API snapshot SHA-256: f44161bb07afbe002335278bba11e3b939c6ffb30fe4d08848350f315a2b885a; retrieved 2026-09-16T20:22:53.659Z.