WPR24LA296 · Cessna 182C

The pilot reported that, while on an approach to land, he set the fuel selector lever to the left tank and maintained a leaned mixture condition with the carburetor heat on; he then performed a brief slip to quickly lose altitude. As the airplane was about 3 miles from the runway, he reduced engine power and extended the flaps to 40°. Before reaching short final, the engine stumbled and lost all power. The pilot was unable to restart the engine and initiated a forced landing onto an open field. During the off-airport landing, the airplane landed hard, which resulted in substantial damage to the engine truss. An examination of the engine did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation and that there was no evidence of a breach in the fuel system. Local law enforcement officers who responded to the accident stated that they did not see any fuel in the left tank. The pilot reported that his practice was to switch fuel tanks every 30 minutes to maintain a fuel balance between tanks and used the onboard fuel computer to determine fuel consumption. NTSB fuel performance calculations showed that the calculated fuel consumption from the airplane’s onboard fuel computer was consistent with the pilot’s operating handbook (POH) performance charts for the accident flight. The calculation and the pilot’s recount revealed that he likely departed with 55 gallons onboard and the LEFT fuel tank selected. Fuel calculations showed that after about 2 hours of flight he would have had about 10.5 gallons of fuel in the left tank and 15.5 gallons in the right tank. However, the pilot reported that he also had the left fuel tank selected for the remaining 80 minutes of flight. Additional calculations from available ADS-B data showed that the engine would have consumed approximately 7 gallons in the last 34 minutes of cruise flight and another 8 gallons during the pilot’s subsequent 36 minute descent. At the time of the power loss following the descent, the airplane would have had 0 gallons remaining in the left fuel tank, and 9.5 remaining in the right fuel tank. The pilot’s statement noted that he had planned to switch fuel tanks during the descent, but was delayed as he was not yet established on final approach. The evidence in the investigation showed that had he set the fuel selector lever to BOTH during the descent, as required in the “Before Landing” section of the POH, the engine likely would not have encountered fuel starvation and a loss of power. Thus, the accident was the result of the pilot’s improper in-flight fuel management and delay in configuring the fuel selector for landing as recommended by the airplane manufacturer, which resulted in fuel starvation and a total loss of engine power.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset