GAA18CA020 · Cessna 150 H
Pocono Mountains Flying Club Cessna 150 H · Accident: flight control system malfunction/failure
From Pocono Mountains Municipal Airport (MPO) to Schuylkill County Joe Zerbey Airport (ZER)
Event
- NTSB case
- GAA18CA020
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- General aviation
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Cessna 150 H
- Aircraft type
- Cessna 150
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N22092
- Operator
- Pocono Mountains Flying Club
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Pocono Mountains Municipal Airport (MPO), Mount Pocono, PATo Schuylkill County Joe Zerbey Airport (ZER), Pottsville, PA
- Aircraft age
- About 50 years (built 1967)
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Unknown
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Flight control system malfunction/failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems
Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
The pilot reported that, during approach, the automatic weather observation station at the destination airport reported that the wind was from 170° at 12 knots. He added that there was "very massive choppy wind, including what could have been windshear, updrafts, and downdrafts." During the landing roll on runway 11, a wind gust blew the airplane off the runway to the left. The pilot attempted to recover, but the airplane impacted a ditch.
The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and right wing.
The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector reported that a postaccident examination revealed that the rudder cable that passed along the left side of the fuselage was separated into three pieces. The rudder cable was covered in debris, which contained red fibers. The rudder cable was splayed and exhibited signatures consistent with tension overload.
The airplane's illustrated parts catalog contained a diagram titled, "Rudder Control System Installation," which displayed the cable along the left side of the fuselage cross over the right side of the airplane, in the tailcone section, and connect to the right side of the rudder horn, which provided right rudder authority.
The airplane's most recent inspection was an annual, which was conducted 6 months before the accident flight. The FAA inspector interviewed the mechanic who performed the most recent annual inspection, and the mechanic reported that, during inspections, he used manufacturer data and FAA Advisory Circular, AC 43.13-1B, "Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and Practices – Aircraft Inspection and Repair." He further reported, multiple times, that he should probably "tighten up" his inspections.
AC 43.13-1B contained a section titled, "Cable System Inspection," which stated the following:
"Aircraft cable systems are subject to a variety of environmental conditions and deterioration. Wire or strand breakage is easy to visually recognize. Other kinds of deterioration such as wear, corrosion, and/or distortion are not easily seen; therefore, control cables should be removed periodically for a more detailed inspection.
At each annual or 100-hour inspection, all control cables must be inspected for broken wire strands. Any cable assembly that has one broken wire strand located in a critical fatigue area must be replaced."
It further stated the following:
"Close inspection in these critical fatigue areas, must be made by passing a cloth over the area to snag on broken wires. This will clean the cable for visual inspection, and detect broken wires if the cloth snags on the cable."
It is likely that the red fibers found on the rudder cable were from a red cloth used to inspect the rudder cable during the annual inspection. It is also likely that, sometime during the flight or landing sequence, the right rudder cable separated, which subsequently restricted the pilot's ability to recover from the loss of control during landing.
Probable cause
The failure of the right rudder cable and subsequent loss of directional control during landing.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record GAA18CA020
- Event ID
- 20171023X81254
- Case number
- GAA18CA020
- Dataset
- full-current
- Source SHA-256
- 5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: cf65ae5edeeb66eb80bce2d04449cc2278d862a9bb22dbf6dd8b65d4db144b4e; retrieved 2026-09-16T05:57:25.181Z.