Collision over Natalyin Yar

Investigation

In the course of the investigation it was established that the squadron commander A. I. Sapelkin, who was acting as the senior officer of the group, and the flight commander V. I. Retsky, who was the leader of the group, decided to fly at the calculated altitude without properly analysing the weather forecast they had received. Meanwhile, the weather forecast clearly stated that the minimum height of the continuous cloud on the route would be down to 200 metres, while the group's weather minimum was 250 metres, that is, under such conditions visual flight was no longer permitted. When the group flew into cloud, the pilots did not return to the departure aerodrome but continued on towards Penza. At the same time the crews changed their flight altitude on their own initiative, without coordinating with the controller and without informing him, after which two aircraft ended up at the same point at an altitude of 500 metres and crashed into each other.

Violations were noted not only on the part of the crews of the Urgench aviation detachment. Thus the duty navigator in Uralsk did not properly supervise the crews' pre-flight preparation and did not check their knowledge, nor whether each of them had the radio data for the flight route. The duty foreman of the Uralsk Joint Aviation Detachment, based at the same airport, had data that the weather conditions in the areas of flights and on the local air line routes were already at the limit for visual flight, but did not try to influence the commander of the group of Uzbek An-2s when he decided to take off. The aerodrome service controller did not analyse the weather situation on the route and gave permission for the group to take off, and the local air lines controller directing the air traffic in turn did not know about the weather situation in the region. As for the weather forecast issued by the meteorological service, it actually proved correct.

Causes

According to the commission's conclusion, the direct culprits of the crash were the aircraft crews themselves, who grossly violated the established visual flight rules in that, periodically entering cloud, they did not return to the departure aerodrome and continued the flight, although the actual weather conditions no longer allowed visual flight not only at the chosen altitude but even at the safe altitude. The following factors contributed to the crash:

The group commander decided to take off without having grounds for doing so.

The air traffic controllers permitted the flight, although the weather conditions did not allow flying below the minimum permissible flight level.

The duty commander of the Uralsk aviation detachment did not supervise the situation when the decision was made for the group to fly.