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2025 Potomac River mid-air collision

29 Jan 2025 · Potomac River, Washington, D.C., U.S.

PSA Airlines Bombardier Inc CL-600-2C10 and Army Department of Defense Sikorsky UH60 L · Mid-air collision due to FAA route design and oversight failures

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Event

NTSB case
DCA25MA108
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
Event fatalities
67 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
Occupants
67
Survivors
0
InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
0 serious · 0 minor (NTSB)
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Military
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Aircraft 1 · Bombardier Inc CL-600-2C10

Flight
OH5342/AA5342
Aircraft type
Bombardier CL-600
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N709PS
Operator
PSA Airlines
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Occupants
64
Survivors
0
InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
None · no survivors
Route
From Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport (ICT), Wichita, KSTo Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Washington, DC
Aircraft age
About 21 years (built 2004)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 121: Air Carrier
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Approach
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Midair collision
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Destroyed

Aircraft 2 · Sikorsky UH60 L

Aircraft type
Sikorsky UH60
Category
Helicopter
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
UNREG
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Davison Army Air Field (DAA), Fort Belvoir, VATo not recorded
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Armed Forces
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
En route
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Midair collision
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Destroyed

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems
  • Environmental issues › Operating environment
  • Organizational issues › Development
  • Organizational issues › Management
  • Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring
  • Personnel issues › Psychological
  • Personnel issues › Task performance

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

From the Wikipedia article

On January 29, 2025, a Bombardier CRJ700 airliner operating as American Airlines Flight 5342 (operated by PSA Airlines as American Eagle) and a United States Army Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter operating as Priority Air Transport 25 collided in mid-air over the Potomac River in Washington, D.C. The collision occurred at 8:47 p.m. at an altitude of about 300 ft and about one-half mile (800 m) short of the threshold of runway 33 at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in Arlington, Virginia. All 67 people aboard both aircraft were killed in the crash, 64 passengers and crew on the airliner and the three crew of the helicopter. It was the first major US commercial passenger flight crash since Colgan Air Flight 3407 in 2009, and the deadliest US air disaster since the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 in 2001. This was also the third hull loss and first fatal accident involving the CRJ700 series.

The jet was on final approach into Reagan National Airport after flying a scheduled route from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport in Wichita, Kansas, to D.C., while the helicopter crew was performing a required annual flying evaluation with night vision goggles and had left from Davison Army Airfield in Fairfax County, Virginia. Both aircraft communicated with air traffic control before they collided. The helicopter crew reported twice that they had visual contact with the airliner and would maintain separation from it, although it is unknown whether they were monitoring the correct aircraft. The crew of the Black Hawk may not have heard parts of the tower communication due to a mic press.

On March 11, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released a preliminary report along with urgent safety recommendations, highlighting the dangerously narrow vertical separation between the runway approach path and the helicopter route. The NTSB chair also expressed anger that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) did not act on data showing the number of near-miss alerts over the previous decade.

The final report, released on February 17, 2026, concluded that the probable causes of the crash included the FAA's placement of the helicopter route, failures in the agency's oversight, and an overreliance on visual separation. Also causal was helicopter pilot error, loss of situational awareness by air traffic control due to high workload, and the United States Army's failure to ensure pilot understanding of altimeter error tolerances.

Accident

At 8:43 p.m. EST (2025-01-30T01:43 UTC), as American Airlines Flight 5342 was flying a visual approach to runway 1, it made initial contact with the Reagan National control tower. The controller asked if the crew could switch to runway 33. The crew accepted the request and were subsequently cleared to land on runway 33. The helicopter was about 1.1 nmi west of the Key Bridge following Helicopter Route 1 to Helicopter Route 4. At 8:46 p.m., around two minutes before the collision, the controller called the helicopter crew, advising them of a CRJ700, at an altitude of 1200 ft south of the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge, circling runway 33. The part of the transmission advising that the CRJ was "circling" was not captured by the helicopter's cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and may not have been heard by the helicopter crew. The helicopter crew acknowledged that they had the jet in sight and requested visual separation—meaning that they could see and maintain separation from the aircraft on their own—which the controller approved. However, it remains unclear if they had acknowledged the correct aircraft.

At 8:47 p.m. EST, 20 seconds before the collision, the controller asked the helicopter crew if they had the CRJ in sight. An audible air traffic radar conflict alert in the background of the transmission was present. One second later, the airliner crew received an automatic traffic advisory from their traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS) which was accompanied by an audible announcement in the cockpit, "traffic; traffic." However, TCAS resolution advisories with audible instructions like "climb; climb" or "descend; descend" are automatically disabled when an aircraft is below 900 ft above ground level to avoid guiding an aircraft into potential collisions with terrain or other aircraft in congested terminal airspace. TCAS traffic advisories are disabled below 400 ft.

Seventeen seconds before the collision, the controller instructed the helicopter to pass behind Flight 5342. One of the helicopter crew members depressed a mic for 0.8 seconds to communicate with the controller during this transmission, which may have caused the "pass behind" part of the transmission to be missed by the helicopter crew. The helicopter crew again confirmed they had an airplane in sight and requested visual separation from the airliner, which the controller approved again.

Fifteen seconds before the crash, flight instructor and co-pilot Chief Warrant Officer 2 Andrew Loyd Eaves asked the pilot, Capt. Rebecca M. Lobach, to change course by making a sharp left to the east river bank. Capt. Lobach acknowledged the request and attempted to execute it, but failed. Seven seconds before the collision, the airliner "rolled out on final" (finished its turn) to line up with runway 33. One second before the crash, the airliner increased its pitch with its elevators deflected close to their maximum nose-up travel.

The two aircraft collided at 8:47:59. The recorded radio altitude of the Black Hawk at the time of the collision was 278 ft. The helicopter exploded and both aircraft crashed into the Potomac River. The airliner's airspeed was 128 mph. The CRJ700's radio transponder ceased transmitting about 2400 ft short of Runway 33.

The collision was captured by a webcam at the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, and another video showed a brief trail of fire. Other videos showed that the collision may have damaged the rotor blades of the Black Hawk and the left wing of the CRJ700 as the airliner fell in a left-hand spiral into the water. Witnesses reported that the airliner "split in half" upon impact, while the helicopter crashed upside down near the airliner. A pilot in another aircraft confirmed seeing the crash to an air traffic controller and reported seeing flares from the opposite side of the Potomac as his flight was on short final.

Within three hours of the collision, authorities confirmed fatalities. By 2:50 a.m. the following morning, no survivors had been reported, and the search and rescue operations were described as "becoming more grim". By the afternoon, all 67 people on board both aircraft were presumed dead.

It was the first major commercial passenger flight accident in the US in nearly 16 years, following Colgan Air Flight 3407 in February 2009. It was also the first fatal crash involving American Airlines since Flight 587 in November 2001, as well as the first fatal crash of a CRJ700 series aircraft. It was the first crash in the Potomac River since Air Florida Flight 90 in January 1982.

Investigation and cause

Investigation

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the FAA, the US Department of Defense, and the US Army announced they would launch investigations into the collision. The NTSB prepared an investigation team to send to the accident site. To retain needed personnel after the crash, the agency acquired an exemption from the "Fork in the Road" memo which purported to allow all of its agents to quit with severance paid through September 2025.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also stated it would help with the response. However, there were no indications of terrorism or criminal activity. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) deployed two investigators to help the investigation, since the Bombardier CRJ700 was designed and manufactured in Canada.

On the evening of January 30, the flight recorder ("black box") of Flight 5342 was recovered from the wreckage and brought to the NTSB lab for evaluation. The helicopter's flight recorder was recovered on January 31.

According to the NTSB, at the moment of impact, the helicopter was at a radio altitude of 278 ft. Reagan National requires helicopters on that route to stay at or below 200 ft above mean sea level. The altitude that the barometric altimeter displayed to the helicopter crew was not recorded by the flight recorder. Investigators would normally calculate the barometric altitude displayed to the crew using pressure altitude recorded by the flight recorder, but investigators determined that the data was not valid.

Senators Ted Cruz and Tammy Duckworth addressed questions about the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast system (ADS-B) which was reportedly turned off on the Black Hawk. Some flight data was being sent from the aircraft but the safety system sends what is considered the most-accurate data. The NTSB confirmed ADS-B was not broadcasting from the helicopter and said they would investigate if there was an equipment malfunction or it was turned off.

A single air traffic controller was managing both aircraft at the time of the crash, an arrangement deemed "not normal" for that time of day at the airport. According to the helicopter's cockpit voice and data recorder, the helicopter crew may have missed parts of two transmissions made by the air traffic controller regarding the jet. Two minutes before the collision, the part of the transmission which said that the plane was "circling" to runway 33 was not heard on the recording. Seventeen seconds before the crash, the part of the transmission stating "pass behind the" was interrupted by the helicopter crew keying their mic to communicate with the air traffic controller.

About nineteen seconds before impact, the crew of Flight 5342 received an automated traffic advisory alert from the TCAS system. Data from the flight recorder showed the PSA jet pitched up about one second before impact, but investigators did not say whether this was an attempted evasive maneuver by the PSA pilots.

Findings and recommendations

The NTSB held a three-day investigative hearing from July 30 to August 1, 2025, and a public meeting on this investigation on January 27, 2026. It published 74 findings and 50 recommendations to prevent similar accidents in the future.

The probable cause of the accident, according to the NTSB, was the placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path by the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA). The FAA did not regularly evaluate route safety data and did not implement recommendations proposed to reduce risk of midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. Also, the air traffic system was overreliant on visual separation for efficiency, discarding the inherent limitations of this "see-and-avoid" concept, and the helicopter crew did not apply visual separation, causing the collision.

Significant additional factors included:

Air traffic control tower team's loss of situation awareness and degraded performance due to the high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions. The absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate real-time operational risk factors, which resulted in misprioritization of duties, inadequate traffic advisories, and the lack of safety alerts to both flight crews;

The failure of the US Army to ensure pilots' awareness of the effects of error tolerances on barometric altimeters in their helicopters, which resulted in the crew flying above the maximum published helicopter route altitude.

Text from the Wikipedia article “2025 Potomac River mid-air collision” (revision 1372180277, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article

NTSB narrative

On January 29, 2025, about 2048 eastern standard time, a Sikorsky UH 60L, operated by the US Army under the callsign PAT25 (Priority Air Transport Flight 25), and an MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) RJ Aviation (formerly Bombardier) CL-600-2C10 (CRJ700), N709PS, operated by PSA Airlines as American Airlines flight 5342, collided in flight about 0.5 miles southeast of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia, and impacted the Potomac River in southwest Washington, DC. The 2 pilots, 2 flight attendants, and 60 passengers on board the airplane and all 3 crewmembers on board the helicopter died. Both aircraft were destroyed as a result of the accident. Flight 5342 was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport, Wichita, Kansas, to DCA. PAT25 originated from Davison Army Airfield, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the purpose of the pilot’s annual standardization evaluation flight with the use of night vision goggles. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area of DCA at the time of the accident.

Probable cause

The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path; their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA); as well as the air traffic system’s overreliance on visual separation in order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see-and-avoid concept. Also causal was the lack of effective pilot-applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a midair collision. Additional causal factors were the tower team’s loss of situation awareness and degraded performance due to the high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions and the absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate real-time operational risk factors, which resulted in misprioritization of duties, inadequate traffic advisories, and the lack of safety alerts to both flight crews. Also causal was the Army’s failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of error tolerances on barometric altimeters in their helicopters, which resulted in the crew flying above the maximum published helicopter route altitude. Contributing factors include: · the limitations of the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crews; · an unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix, and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strained the DCA air traffic control tower workforce and degraded safety over time; · the Army’s lack of a fully implemented safety management system, which should have identified and addressed hazards associated with altitude exceedances on the Washington, DC, helicopter routes; · the FAA’s failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast In, and to follow and fully integrate its established safety management system, which should have led to several organizational and operational changes based on previously identified risks that were known to management; and · the absence of effective data sharing and analysis among the FAA, aircraft operators, and other relevant organizations.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

Wikipedia article: 2025 Potomac River mid-air collision
Article
2025 Potomac River mid-air collision
Revision
1372180277 · 2026-08-30 · retrieved 2026-09-18
Wikidata
Q131936357
Licence
Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
NTSB record DCA25MA108
Event ID
20250130199620
Case number
DCA25MA108
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Where each value comes from
Record
Wikipedia article "2025 Potomac River mid-air collision" (page 79052729, revision 1372180277); merged with NTSB case DCA25MA108 (events / aircraft)
Date
NTSB record DCA25MA108: NTSB narrative opening date, consistent with the API date and time (local date)
Place and country
Wikipedia infobox: site; country from NTSB record DCA25MA108
Map position
NTSB record DCA25MA108: NTSB API eventLatitude/eventLongitude
Aircraft, operator and route
NTSB record DCA25MA108: aircraft; gaps from Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
Operation
operator named as an armed force or military unit in the infobox
Fatalities
NTSB record DCA25MA108: NTSB API totalFatal
Ground fatalities
NTSB record DCA25MA108: events.inj_f_grnd
Summary
Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (3)
  • One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "2025 Potomac River mid-air collision" and NTSB case DCA25MA108, matched by the same aircraft registration and date. For this US event the NTSB's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: local date, investigation status, coordinates, cause areas. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date; the NTSB stores the UTC date 2025-01-30.