FLIGHT FINDINGSAVIATION OCCURRENCE MAP
Back to map

United Airlines Flight 1175

13 Feb 2018 · Pacific Ocean

Boeing 777 222 · Emergency landing following engine failure in cruise

From San Francisco International Airport (KSFO) to Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (KHNL)

Report a problem

Event

NTSB case
DCA18IA092
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Incident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
Event fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
Occupants
378
Survivors
378
InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
0 serious · 0 minor (NTSB)
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Boeing 777 222

Flight
UA1175
Aircraft type
Boeing 777
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N773UA
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From San Francisco International Airport (KSFO), San Francisco, CATo Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (KHNL), Honolulu, HI
Aircraft age
About 23 years (built 1995)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 121: Air Carrier
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
En route · descent
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Powerplant system/component malfunction/failure
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Minor

Cause areas

  • Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

From the Wikipedia article

On February 13, 2018, around noon local time, a Boeing 777 operating as United Airlines Flight 1175 (UA1175), experienced an in-flight separation of a fan blade in the No. 2 (right) engine while over the Pacific Ocean en route from San Francisco International Airport to the Daniel K. Inouye International Airport, Honolulu, Hawaii. During level cruise flight shortly before beginning a descent from flight level 360 (roughly 36000 ft), and about 120 mi from the destination, the flight crew heard a loud bang, followed by a violent shaking of the airplane, followed by warnings of a compressor stall. The flight crew shut down the failed engine, declared an emergency, and began a drift-down descent, proceeding direct to the Daniel K. Inouye International Airport where they made a single-engine landing without further incident at 12:37 local time. There were no reported injuries to the 378 passengers and crew on board and the airplane damage was classified as minor under National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) criteria.

NTSB investigators traveled to the scene to begin an incident investigation. They found a full-length fan blade fracture in the No. 2 (right) engine, a Pratt & Whitney (P&W) PW4077 turbofan. Its installed set of hollow-core fan blades had undergone two previous overhauls at P&W that included a thermal acoustic imaging (TAI) internal inspection that is intended to prevent this type of failure. The right engine nacelle lost most of the inlet duct and all of the left and right fan cowls immediately after the engine failure. Two small punctures were found in the right side fuselage just below the window belt with material transfer consistent with impact from pieces of an engine fan blade. The damage was eventually repaired and the aircraft returned to service. Improved procedures for TAI inspection were implemented by P&W, increased frequency of TAI inspection was required by regulators, and a redesign of the inlet duct was also initiated by Boeing, all as a result of this incident and investigation.

Incident

The flight departed SFO on time and the push back, taxi, takeoff, and climb were normal. There were three pilots on the flight deck: Captain Christopher Borzu Behnam (57), who was the pilot monitoring, First Officer (FO) Paul Ayers (60), who was the pilot flying, and a jump seat rider, who was off-duty United Airlines 777 First Officer Ed Gagarin. The captain reported a total of 13,592 hours total time, with 360 hours in the Boeing 777. The first officer reported a total of 11,318 hours total time, with 10,087 in the Boeing 777.

At the time of the fan blade out engine failure event, 11:58 Hawaiian standard time (HST), the flight was about 120 mi from HNL at flight level (FL) 360 (roughly 36000 ft) when there was a violent jolt and very loud bang that both pilots stated was followed by extreme airframe vibrations. The pilots reported that immediately after the jolt and loud bang, the autopilot disconnected, and the airplane began to roll to the right. A positive exchange of controls was accomplished with the captain becoming pilot flying. The pilots stated that about 15 to 30 seconds after the jolt and loud bang, the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) showed that there was no engine pressure ratio (EPR), N1, or oil pressure. After completing the Severe Engine Damage checklist, the crew shut down and secured the right engine. The jump seat rider stated that after the right engine was shut down, the vibration subsided although the controllability of the airplane was not normal. The crew declared an emergency and began a drift down descent to FL 230 (roughly 23000 ft).

The captain directed the jump seat rider to go back into the cabin to assess the condition of the engine. The jump seat rider noted that the engine was oscillating and that the cowling was missing. He took a video of the engine to show the captain and the FO the engine's condition. The pilots reported that concurrently, the purser had come to the flight deck and the captain briefed her about the emergency and that they would be landing at HNL. The crew decided the most suitable airport in time, distance, and familiarity was HNL. The airplane continued to HNL and made a visual approach and landed on Runway 8R without further incident. The pilots stated that the aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) personnel inspected the airplane and when the airplane was determined to be safe, they taxied the airplane to the gate where the passengers deplaned normally. The 363 passengers, 3 pilots, and 12 flight attendants board deplaned normally at the gate and there were no injuries.

Investigation and cause

Investigation

The examination of the airplane revealed a small hole along with several dents and gouges in the fuselage adjacent to the No. 2 engine. There were two small dents and punctures in the right side of the fuselage, below the window belt in the vicinity of seat rows 20 and 21. Subsequent laboratory examination of the skin surrounding the puncture found embedded particles of largely titanium and vanadium, which along with aluminum are the alloying elements of the fan blade material. There were also several dents in the right wing and the right-hand horizontal stabilizer.

The majority of the right engine inlet assembly was missing. All the inlet lip skin, the forward bulkhead, most of the inner and outer barrels, and about half of the rear bulkhead were not recovered. The majority of both inner and outer halves on the fan cowl were also missing. The missing parts were lost at sea. The left and right side thrust reversers, and the exhaust cowl were in place and intact.

Final report

On June 30, 2020, more than two years after the incident, the NTSB determined the probable cause(s) of this incident to be:

Text from the Wikipedia article “United Airlines Flight 1175” (revision 1368524621, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article

NTSB narrative

The airplane, a Boeing 777-222, experienced a full length fan blade fracture in the No. 2 (right) engine, a Pratt & Whitney (P&W) PW4077 turbofan, while in cruise flight shortly before top of descent. The examination of the No. 2 engine revealed most of the inlet duct and all of the left and right fan cowls were missing. Two small punctures were found in the right side fuselage just below the window belt with material transfer consistent with impact from pieces of an engine fan blade.

The examination of the engine's fan blades revealed fan blade No. 11 was fractured transversely across the airfoil directly above the fairings that are between the base of each blade. The other fan blade, which was identified as fan blade No. 10 and was the adjacent trailing blade, was fractured across the airfoil at about midspan. Laboratory examination of fan blade No. 11 revealed a low cycle fatigue (LCF) fracture that originated on the interior cavity wall directly below the surface.

The entire fan blade set, including fan blade No. 11 had last been overhauled by P&W's Overhaul & Repair (O&R) facility in July 2015. As part of the overhaul process, the blades underwent a fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) and a thermal acoustic imaging (TAI) inspection. The records for the TAI inspection in July 2015 as well as an earlier TAI accomplished in March 2010 revealed a thermal indication in the same location as where the LCF crack occurred. The records for the fractured fan blade's July 2015 TAI inspection was annotated 'paint' that, according to the inspector, was consistent with him accepting the indication because he thought it was an issue with the paint.

P&W developed the TAI inspection process in about 2005 to be able to inspect the interior surfaces of the hollow core PW4000 fan blade. P&W in keeping with NDI industry practice when implementing a new inspection process classified the TAI as a new and emerging technology and therefore did not have to develop a formal program for initial and recurrent training, certify the TAI inspectors, or have a Level 3 inspector on staff, as is done in other established NDI techniques. But in 2015, and still in 2018 when the incident occurred, P&W was still categorizing the TAI as a new and emerging technology after having inspected over 9,000 fan blades. At one point, P&W did provide training on the TAI, however, neither of the two inspectors were permitted to attend the training so that they could work to clear out a backlog of blades in the shop.

The TAI inspector who worked on the incident fan blade stated that they never got any feedback from the engineers about the blades that they had rejected. When they would reject a blade, it would go to an engineer for further evaluation. However, they never got any feedback from the engineers if the rejection was a valid rejection or if it was a false positive.

After it was determined that the two previous TAIs of the fractured fan blade showed thermal indications at the location of the fatigue crack, P&W initiated an over-inspection of all of the digital images of the TAIs accomplished on PW4000 112-inch fan blades.

Because the aluminum versus the CFRP structure has the ability to yield while absorbing the same amount of energy, it can redistribute the FBO loads between the fan case and the inlet without causing failure to the inlet, or the fan case to inlet interface. The inlet and fan cowl structural analyses showed that the CFRP aft bulkhead design was less capable than the aluminum bulkhead that was tested during engine certification test and determined that multiple possible scenarios could have led to their separation; 1) the inlet aft bulkhead load path damage caused by the unanticipated magnitude of the displacements induced by the displacement wave following the FBO combined with the anticipated inner barrel fragment induced damage progressed under rundown loads, resulting in portions of the inlet departing within one second following the FBO, 2) the departure of portions of the inlet including the lower aft bulkhead caused the static and/or dynamic loads to increase beyond the fan cowls capability, that lead to the departure of large portions of the fan cowl, 3) the fan cowl honeycomb core strength was reduced below its capability to react rundown loads due to moisture ingression at the hinge points leading to large portions of the fan cowl departing prior to the inlets departure.

Probable cause

the fracture of a fan blade due to P&W's continued classification of the TAI inspection process as a new and emerging technology that permitted them to continue accomplishing the inspection without having to develop a formal, defined initial and recurrent training program or an inspector certification program. The lack of training resulted in the inspector making an incorrect evaluation of an indication that resulted in a blade with a crack being returned to service where it eventually fractured.

Contributing to the fracture of the fan blade was the lack of feedback from the process engineers on the fan blades the inspectors sent to the process engineers for evaluation of indications that they had found.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

Wikipedia article: United Airlines Flight 1175
Article
United Airlines Flight 1175
Revision
1368524621 · 2026-08-09 · retrieved 2026-09-18
Wikidata
Q105847369
Licence
Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
NTSB record DCA18IA092
Event ID
20180213X95634
Case number
DCA18IA092
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Where each value comes from
Record
Wikipedia article "United Airlines Flight 1175" (page 56650879, revision 1368524621); merged with NTSB case DCA18IA092 (events / aircraft)
Date
NTSB record DCA18IA092: NTSB API eventDate, eventTimeUtc and eventTimeUtcOffsetHours (local date)
Place and country
Wikipedia infobox: site; country from NTSB record DCA18IA092
Map position
NTSB record DCA18IA092: NTSB API eventLatitude/eventLongitude
Aircraft, operator and route
NTSB record DCA18IA092: aircraft; gaps from Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
Operation
NTSB record DCA18IA092: operated under Part 121: Air Carrier
Fatalities
NTSB record DCA18IA092: NTSB API totalFatal
Ground fatalities
NTSB record DCA18IA092: events.inj_f_grnd
Summary
Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (3)
  • One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "United Airlines Flight 1175" and NTSB case DCA18IA092, matched by the same aircraft registration and date. For this US event the NTSB's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.