Air Transport International Boeing 767 319 incident
Boeing 767 319 · Incident: flight control system malfunction/failure en route
From Ontario International Airport (ONT) to Lihue Airport (LIH)
Event
- NTSB case
- ENG25LA053
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Incident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Ongoing
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- 0
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Airline
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Boeing 767 319
- Aircraft type
- Boeing 767
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N347AZ
- Operator
- Air Transport International
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Ontario International Airport (ONT), Ontario, CATo Lihue Airport (LIH), Lihue, HI
- Aircraft age
- About 31 years (built 1994)
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 121: Air Carrier
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- En route · descent
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Flight control system malfunction/failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- None
Cause areas
No findings designated as a cause are recorded in the NTSB data yet.
Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
On April 25, 2025, about 1814 Hawaii standard time, an Amazon Prime Air Boeing 767-319 operated by Air Transport International departed from Ontario International Airport (ONT), Ontario, California and intended to land at Lihue Airport (LIH), Lihue, Hawaii but diverted to Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL), Honolulu, Hawaii due to an inoperative horizontal stabilizer and the need for a longer runway. The airplane landed at HNL without issue. There were two flight crew members on board, and the flight was conducted as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 cargo flight. History of Flight On descent into LIH, the autopilot repeatedly disconnected. The crew ran the autopilot disconnect checklist, which did not resolve the issue. The crew started hand-flying the airplane at about 10,000 feet and reported that “noticeable down pressure on [the] yoke [was required] to keep [the] airplane descending.” The crew noticed the horizontal stabilizer was inoperative at 3.4 units on the stabilizer position indicator. They tried to use the alternate electric trim switches, but the stabilizer remained stuck. The crew leveled off the airplane at 3,000 feet. They selected flaps 5 to reduce the control column force required to maintain the desired pitch. Next, they performed the stabilizer trim checklist per the quick reference handbook (QRH), but the issue persisted. The crew also performed the unscheduled stabilizer trim checklist, with no improvement. The crew reported that they did not receive a “STAB TRIM” engine indicating and crew alerting system (EICAS) message or the associated cockpit warning light at any point during the flight. The crew declared an emergency and diverted to HNL, where they landed safely with flaps 25 selected. Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Control System Description The horizontal stabilizer is a moveable airfoil at the back of the airplane which trims the airplane longitudinally. Its overall function is to alter its angle of attack during flight, as necessary, to keep the airplane in a condition of maneuvering and speed stability. The stabilizer control system on the incident airplane is controlled by electrical inputs. These inputs are received by two Stabilizer Trim Control Modules (STCMs). The STCMs direct left and center hydraulic system pressure to the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator (HSTA). The HSTA is located forward and above the stabilizer center section and is attached to bulkhead structure at the top and to stabilizer structure at the bottom (figure 1). The HSTA includes two drive hydraulic motors and two hydraulically released secondary brakes. These work together to rotate the ballscrew, thereby moving the horizontal stabilizer about its center section pivot points and changing its angle of attack.
Figure 1. HSTA location and components labeled (Source: Boeing, modified. Image copyright © Boeing. Reproduced with permission).
Investigation The NTSB was notified of this incident on April 29, 2025, and it was originally graded as a class 5 investigation. After initial investigation, it was upgraded to a class 3 investigation on September 8, 2025. The airplane had undergone scheduled maintenance about one month before the incident flight during which an overhauled HSTA was installed. At the time of the incident flight, the overhauled HSTA had been installed on the aircraft for 11 cycles and 31 flight hours. The HSTA was removed after landing and sent to the component manufacturer for examination under the direction of the NTSB. The flight data from the incident is being reviewed, and the investigation is ongoing.
Verbatim NTSB factual narrative from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record ENG25LA053
- Event ID
- 20250501200090
- Case number
- ENG25LA053
- Dataset
- full-current
- Source SHA-256
- 5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (5)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: local date, investigation status, coordinates, damage. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date; the NTSB stores the UTC date 2025-04-26.
- API snapshot SHA-256: e5a31ee6071404863e587c87ee609f65270523fdcf1a642a7d6df876d728b88b; retrieved 2026-09-16T19:51:34.712Z.
- Corrected after a review of the NTSB narrative, which states these values explicitly: destination. Narrative names the intended destination as Lihue Airport (LIH), Lihue, Hawaii.