Vnukovo Airlines Flight 2801

Vnukovo Airlines Flight 2801 was an international charter flight from Vnukovo International Airport in Moscow, Russia, to Svalbard Airport on Spitsbergen, in the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard. On 29 August 1996 at 10:22:23 CEST, a Tupolev Tu-154M operating this flight crashed into the ground in Operafjellet during the final approach to Svalbard Airport. All 141 people (11 crew members and 130 passengers, of whom three were children) aboard the plane were killed, making it the deadliest aviation accident in Norwegian history. The accident was the result of a series of small navigational errors causing the aircraft to be 3.7 km from the approach centerline at the time of impact.

The Vnukovo Airlines aircraft, with the registration number RA-85621, had been chartered by Arktikugol, a Russian state-owned coal-mining company, to fly Russian and Ukrainian workers to the towns of Barentsburg and Pyramiden in Svalbard. The accident was a contributing cause for Arktikugol's closure of Pyramiden two years later. The accident was investigated by the Accident Investigation Board Norway with assistance from the Interstate Aviation Committee and became known as the Operafjell accident (Operafjell-ulykken). After the accident, a series of lawsuits determined compensation for the victims' families.

Flight

Flight 2801 was chartered on behalf of Arktikugol, which operated mines at the two company towns of Barentsburg and Pyramiden in Svalbard. The aircraft was a Tupolev Tu-154M, with registration RA-85621, and serial number 86A 742, manufactured on 14 January 1987. The crew consisted of captain Evgeny Nikolaevich Nikolaev (aged 44), co-pilot Boris Fedorovich Sudarev (aged 58), navigator Igor Petrovich Akimov (aged 50), flight engineer Anatoly Matveevich Karapetrov (aged 38), five cabin crew members, and two technicians to service the plane during the stopover. The captain and navigator had previously landed at Svalbard Airport, but only runway 10; the co-pilot had not.

On board were 130 passengers, Arktikugol employees and their families including three children. Waiting at the airport for the return flight were 120 people. The aircraft left Vnukovo Airport at 04:44 UTC (08:44 MSD). Estimated flight time was three and a half hours, and alternative airports were Murmansk Airport and Severomorsk-3 in Murmansk Oblast. The flight proceeded normally until descent, following the routing W 29 from Moscow to Padun (west of Murmansk), before crossing to Bodø Flight Information Region over the Barents Sea cruising at FL 350, approximately 35,000 ft at an average airspeed of 500 km/h. It then proceeded over non-directional beacons over Bjørnøya, Isfjorden, and Adventdalen.

Longyear is the main airport serving the Svalbard archipelago. It is located on the south shore of Isfjorden at an elevation of 28 m above mean sea level, with high terrain to the south, southeast, and east. It has a single, 2140 m 10/28 runway, running roughly east–west. The airport is regarded as uncontrolled and does not provide approach service; it has an aerodrome flight information service (AFIS), subordinate to Bodø Air Traffic Control Center (ATCC)-

On that day, all aircraft had used runway 28 due to the wind, favorable climb-up conditions, and short distance from the terminal at the eastern end. The weather at the accident area was dominated by a low pressure trough, causing rain showers and wind 15 to 30 kn from 240–270°. Between 08:00 and 09:00, a weak trough passed, reducing visibility to 6 km with cloud base at 1300 to 1500 m. Afterward, it improved back to over 10 km and 3000 to 4000 ft.

Accident

At 07:55 UTC (09:55 local Central European Summer Time, CEST), the crew requested clearance to start their descent. Because of lack of communication with Bodø ATCC, this was not obtained. At 07:56, information from Longyear AFIS was given that it had no conflicting traffic, allowing a descent to 1800 m. The crew tried to request use of Runway 10, but this was, due to language problems, not understood as such by AFIS. Instead, Longyear communicated the actual weather and informed that Runway 28 was in use. An additional request for use of Runway 10 was again not understood, because of the misunderstanding of the term "runway in use". Because of this, the crew decided to instead use Runway 28.

The crew used Jeppesen charts dated 21 January 1994. It was LOC/DME approach with offset localizer. According to airline procedures, both horizontal situation indicators (HSIs) were set to magnetic runway heading 283°, but the magnetic localizer course of 300° was not used. A global positioning system (GPS) was used as a back-up and also set to magnetic runway heading 283°. Aircrew was probably not aware of VHF direction finding available at the airport and have not used it to confirm aircraft position. From 3000 m until impact, the flight was carried out in instrument meteorological conditions and the flight controlled by automatic stabilization mode, with lateral navigation controlled by the navigator.

At 08:10 UTC, the aircraft reached 1524 m, which is the minimum altitude to Advent and the initial approach altitude. At 08:15:32 UTC, it reached Advent and entered a base turn, reaching a magnetic heading of 160° at 08:16:28 UTC. The turn was started late and resulted in aircraft flying northeast (left) of correct outbound track. While the crew had adjusted for the wind drift, they did not attempt to intercept the magnetic course 155° outbound from Advent. During this turn, a malfunction in the electric trimming mechanism caused the piloting pilot to deactivate the aircraft flight control systems' servogear in the pitch channel at 08:15:58. This was again activated at 08:16:42 UTC.

At 08:17:08 UTC, the crew started the inbound turn; however, the lateral deviation from the outbound magnetic course 155° was 3.7 km to the left and combined with tailwind, caused airplane to pass through the localizer and roll out of turn to the right of localizer centerline. At 08:17:57 UTC, the navigator said "Ah, abeam eight miles 2801 inbound", to which AFIS replied two seconds later "Correct". This was the last radio communication between the crew and Longyear. At 08:18:30 UTC, the piloting pilot turned off the autopilot pitch channel. For the rest of the flight, the plane continued with autopilot only in roll.

Following the aircraft rolling out on 290° heading, a discussion arose among the crew if the turn had been made at the right time. The initial comment about this was made by the first officer at 08:19:06 UTC. The crew disagreed if the course correction should be made to left or to right. This resulted in series of corrective turns in opposing directions, first to magnetic heading 306°. At this time, the aircraft was 27.4 nmi from the airport and 2.8 km right of the centerline at 1520 m with an airspeed of 330 km/h. Instead of intercepting the centerline, the crew continued to track on the right side of localizer.

At 08:20:17 UTC, the pilot in command ordered the aircraft turned to 291°, which, when adjusted for drift, resulted in a course close to 300°, nearly paralleling the localizer course. At this time, the aircraft had a lateral deviation from the approach centerline of 3.7 km. The aircraft started descending at 08:20:24 UTC. A corrective turn was made at 08:21:13 UTC and completed 11 seconds later at magnetic heading 300°. At the time, the aircraft was descending 900 to 1260 ft/min. The aircraft started turning left at 08:22:05 UTC, and immediately entered an area of turbulence created by the surrounding mountains.

During initial approach, the radio altimeter warning had been activated several times, which indicated less than 750 m from the aircraft to the terrain. During final approach, the ground proximity warning system was activated nine seconds before impact, which lasted until impact. Six seconds before impact, the radio altimeter warning was activated. The crew initiated climb in reaction to GPWS activation, but it was too late to avoid terrain. At 08:22:23 UTC (10:22:23 local CEST) the aircraft collided with the top of Operafjellet at 907 m elevation, located 14.2 km from Svalbard Airport and 3.7 km right of the approach centerline. The aircraft was destroyed and all occupants perished. It is the single deadliest plane crash to have occurred on Norwegian soil.