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One-Two-Go Airlines Flight 269

16 Sept 2007 · Phuket International Airport, Phuket, Thailand

McDonnell Douglas MD-82 · Loss of control after a failed go-around attempt

From Don Mueang International Airport (DMK) to Phuket International Airport (HKT)

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Event

NTSB case
DCA07RA063
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Unknown · led by another country; figures from NTSB notifications
Event fatalities
90 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
0
Occupants
130
Survivors
40
InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
40
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Not recorded

McDonnell Douglas MD-82

Flight
OG269
Category
Airplane · from aircraft type
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
HS-OMG
Onboard fatalities
90
Route
From Don Mueang International Airport (DMK)To Phuket International Airport (HKT)
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Non-U.S., Commercial
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Not recorded
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Not recorded
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Not recorded

Cause areas

  • Personnel issues › Task performance
  • Personnel issues › Physical
  • Personnel issues › Miscellaneous
  • Organizational issues › Management
  • Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring

From the investigation findings the Wikipedia article reports, sorted into the NTSB's cause areas with AI assistance.

Approximate · Coordinates from the Wikipedia article; not checked against an investigation report.

From the Wikipedia article

One-Two-Go Airlines Flight 269 (OG269/OTG269) was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Bangkok to Phuket, Thailand. On 16 September 2007, about 15:41 ICT, the McDonnell Douglas MD-82 operating the flight crashed into an embankment beside runway 27 at Phuket International Airport (HKT) bursting into flames upon impact during an attempted go-around after an aborted landing, killing 90 of the 130 people on board (including one person who died of burn injuries several days after the crash). It is the third deadliest aviation incident to occur in Thailand.

The crash report was published by the Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee (AAIC) of the Ministry of Transport. A separate two-year report done by the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was incorporated into the AAIC report. Both reports found that the captain and first officer had worked hours in excess of the legal flight limits; that the first officer attempted to transfer control to the captain during the go-around; that neither pilot initiated a go-around and that the training and safety programs at the airline were deficient.

Between 2009 and 2010, One-Two-Go Airlines was prohibited from operating in European Union nations due to safety concerns. At the time of the accident, the airline was owned by Orient Thai Airlines and in July 2010, it fully re-branded as Orient Thai Airlines.

Flight

On the day of the crash, the McDonnell Douglas MD-82 departed Bangkok's Don Mueang International Airport, Thailand, at 14:31 en route to Phuket International Airport as flight number OG269. The flight crew consisted of Captain Arief Mulyadi (57), an Indonesian national and the Chief Pilot of One-Two-Go Airlines, a former Indonesian Air Force pilot; and First Officer Montri Kamolrattanachai (30), a Thai national who had recently completed his flight training with One-Two-Go's ab initio program. Arief had 16,752 flight hours, including 4,330 hours on the MD-82, while Montri had 1,465 hours, 1,240 of them on the MD-82. The aircraft was carrying 123 passengers and seven crew members. OG269 was the fourth of six flights between Bangkok and Phuket that Arief and Montri were scheduled to fly that day.

On approach to Phuket, Captain Arief made several radio communications errors including read-back/hear-back communications and misstating their flight number. First Officer Montri was the pilot flying.

Another aircraft landed immediately prior to Flight 269 and experienced wind shear. That aircraft's captain contacted the tower and reported wind shear on final approach and cumulonimbus clouds over the airport, a report audible to all incoming aircraft. Air traffic control (ATC) requested Flight 269 acknowledge the weather information provided and re-state intentions. Captain Arief acknowledged the transmission and stated his intention to land.

Crash

OG269 conducted an instrument landing system (ILS) approach just north of the centerline on runway 27. As the landing proceeded, ATC reported increasing winds at 240 degrees from 15 - 30 kn, then to 40 kn. Captain Arief acknowledged the reports. ATC requested intentions again. Captain Arief said, "Landing".

As the aircraft descended to 115 ft above threshold level (ATL), its airspeed dropped. Captain Arief repeatedly called for more power as First Officer Montri attempted the landing. The aircraft continued to descend and fell below 50 ft ATL, causing the autothrottle to reduce engine thrust to idle. One second later, First Officer Montri called "Go around". This was acknowledged by the captain. The first officer then attempted to transfer control of the aircraft to Captain Arief. There was no verbal acknowledgement of this from Captain Arief.

The pilots retracted the landing gear and set flaps for go-around. The aircraft pitch changed from 2 degrees to 12 degrees as the aircraft climbed, its engines still at idle. Airspeed fell and the aircraft climbed to a maximum altitude of 262 ft ATL before beginning to descend. For 13 seconds the engines remained at idle. The aircraft pitch angle decreased to near zero and then the throttle was manually increased two seconds before impact with an embankment along the runway at 15:40. The aircraft was destroyed on impact along with a post-crash fire.

Investigation and cause

Investigation

According to Vutichai Singhamany, a safety director at Thailand's Department of Civil Aviation and the lead crash investigator, the pilot had deployed the landing gear on approach to Phuket airport runway 27, but had retracted it when attempting a go-around. Singhamany added that the wheels had not touched the runway and that the accident had happened moments after the pilot raised the nose of the aircraft to abort the landing.

At the time of the crash, speculation rested on the pilot's decision to land in poor weather conditions and on the airport's wind shear detection system, which was not operational that day. In the weeks after the crash, Vutichai continued to indicate wind shear as the likely cause.

As the accident involved a U.S. manufactured aircraft, the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) participated in the accident and arrived on site within days. The NTSB inspected the aircraft and the crash scene, and interviewed survivors and witnesses. They took information obtained from the flight data recorder ("black box") to the United States for analysis. The flight data recorder immediately yielded significant facts about the flight, including:

Wind shear was not a factor in the crash

First Officer Montri was the pilot flying

Captain Arief's radio communications with ATC were error prone

Many crew resource management (CRM) issues occurred in the cockpit

There was no conversation between the pilots during the final 18 seconds of flight

The takeoff/go-around switch (TO/GA), used to configure the aircraft for go-around, had not been pushed

The throttle was pushed to take-off power only two seconds before impact

Conclusions

After completing the inspection of the aircraft, the NTSB found it to have functioned properly and to have remained fully controllable until impact. The cause of the crash was found to be due to a combination of human performance and operational issues, including:

CRM issues, including attempted transfer of control of the aircraft at a critical moment

Failure of either pilot to apply power while attempting to regain altitude

Fatigue issues as both pilots had worked excessive hours for the week and the month

Lack of governance in the corporate culture at One-Two-Go airlines

Failure of One-Two-Go to complete pilot proficiency checks as required by law

Training on a simulator that did not include wind shear alerting and did not match the configuration of One-Two-Go's MD-82s.

The NTSB noted that, "although the weather deteriorated in the later stages of this flight, wind shear was not a factor in this accident" and "It is understood that during the accident sequence, the pilots were potentially distracted by the weather conditions; however, that distraction should not cause a loss of control of the airplane."

The NTSB stated that the possible causes of this accident, consistent with available evidence, are that: The crew did not properly perform the go-around and failed to activate the TO/GA switch. Although the throttles remained available to the crew to advance power, they did not, nor did they monitor the throttles during the go-around. A transfer of controls, from the copilot to the pilot, occurred at a critical point in the go-around. The airplane's flight management system automatically retarded the throttles, since the approach slat/flap logic for landing was met. Lacking power application, the airplane slowed and descended until contact with the terrain.

The Thai Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee (AAIC) added that the flight crew did not follow the standard operating procedure of a stabilized approach, call outs, and emergency situations as specified in the airline's flight operation manual. Their co-ordination was insufficient, they had heavy workloads and accumulated stress, had insufficient rest, and were fatigued. The weather conditions changed suddenly prompting the go-around attempt.

Text from the Wikipedia article “One-Two-Go Airlines Flight 269” (revision 1375250125, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article

Sources

Wikipedia article: One-Two-Go Airlines Flight 269
Article
One-Two-Go Airlines Flight 269
Revision
1375250125 · 2026-09-16 · retrieved 2026-09-18
Wikidata
Q460476
Licence
Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
NTSB record DCA07RA063
Event ID
20070921X01426
Case number
DCA07RA063
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Where each value comes from
Record
Wikipedia article "One-Two-Go Airlines Flight 269" (page 13290956, revision 1375250125); merged with NTSB case DCA07RA063 (events / aircraft)
Date
Wikipedia infobox: date
Place and country
Wikipedia infobox: site
Map position
Wikipedia: Wikipedia article coordinates
Aircraft, operator and route
Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports); gaps and aircraft details from NTSB record DCA07RA063
Operation
airline flight number in the infobox
Fatalities
Reviewed (2026-09-19): Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee of Thailand final report on HS-OMG, sec. 1.2, https://asn.flightsafety.org/reports/2007/20070916_MD82_HS-OMG.pdf
Ground fatalities
Reviewed (2026-09-19): Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee of Thailand final report on HS-OMG, sec. 1.2, https://asn.flightsafety.org/reports/2007/20070916_MD82_HS-OMG.pdf
Summary
Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (3)
  • One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "One-Two-Go Airlines Flight 269" and NTSB case DCA07RA063, matched by the same aircraft registration and date. For this event outside the United States Wikipedia's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
  • Death toll settled: the NTSB record (DCA07RA063) gives 89 and the Wikipedia article 90; Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee of Thailand final report on HS-OMG, sec. 1.2 gives 90. AAIC table: fatal 5 crew + 85 passengers = 90. The NTSB figure of 89 leaves out one occupant who died of burns several days after the crash.
  • No bulk values were replaced by the NTSB case API.