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Independent Air Flight 1851

8 Feb 1989 · Pico Alto, Santa Maria Island, Azores, Portugal

Independent Air on behalf of Dominair Boeing 707-331B · Controlled flight into terrain during descent

From Il Caravaggio International Airport (BGY) to Punta Cana International Airport (PUJ)

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Event

NTSB case
DCA89RA023
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Unknown · led by another country; figures from NTSB notifications
Event fatalities
144 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
Occupants
144
Survivors
0
InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
0 serious · 0 minor (NTSB)
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Not recorded

Boeing 707-331B

Flight
ID1851 / YU1851
Aircraft type
Boeing 707
Category
Airplane · from aircraft type
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N7231T
Onboard fatalities
144
Route
From Il Caravaggio International Airport (BGY)To Punta Cana International Airport (PUJ)
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 121: Air Carrier
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Not recorded
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Not recorded
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Not recorded

Cause areas

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision
  • Environmental issues › Operating environment
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge

From the investigation findings the Wikipedia article reports, sorted into the NTSB's cause areas with AI assistance.

Approximate · Coordinates from the Wikipedia article; not checked against an investigation report.

From the Wikipedia article

On 8 February 1989, Independent Air Flight 1851, a Boeing 707 on an American charter flight from Bergamo, Italy, to Punta Cana, Dominican Republic, struck Pico Alto while on approach to Santa Maria Airport in the Azores for a scheduled stopover. The aircraft was destroyed, with the loss of all 144 people on board, resulting in the deadliest plane crash in Portugal's history. All of the passengers on board were Italian and all of the crew were Americans. The crash is also known as "The disaster of the Azores" (Il disastro delle Azzorre).

Accident

Flight 1851 had communication difficulties with air traffic controllers at high frequencies (HF), although it worked without failures on the ground. At 12:46:33, the crew contacted the Santa Maria Air Traffic Control center and reported on the passage point. Flight 1851 was handled by a trainee air traffic controller. As the investigators later noted, phraseology was violated during the communications. The controller also used the word "point" instead of "decimal", meaning a decimal point. Radio communication with the land was conducted mainly by first officer Adcock, with the exception at 13:43:57 when flight engineer Gonzalez requested a weather report. At 13:44:20 the controller transmitted: "One eight five one wind two six zero... Fourteen ah fourteen knots maximum two four knots visibility more than ten kilometers one octa at one two zero zero feet six octa at three thousand feet ah temperature one seven QNH one zero one niner." During the transmission, the controller used non-standard terminology "at" in the sentence, "one octant for one two zero zero." Due to the communication difficulties, the crew heard the message as "one octant two two zero zero," from which they falsely determined that there were no clouds below 2,000 feet.

At 13:56:47, when flight 1851 was performing a descent to the airfield and passing 6705 m, the controller dispatched: "Independent Air one eight five one roger you're cleared to three thousand feet on QNH one zero two seven and ah runway will be one niner." The controller made a major error during this transmission. He had reported to the crew the pressure of 1027 hPa, when it was actually 1018.7, (rounded 1018), which is 9 hPa lower. The instructor noticed this and wanted to transmit the correct information to the crew, but he was distracted by a phone call. Also, the crew members themselves failed to notice the transfer of high pressure, which 12 minutes earlier was much lower. This could have been facilitated by the presence of a flight attendant in the cockpit, whose voice was recorded by the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) at 13:48:30 and at 14:04:09.

At 13:56:59 the co-pilot told the controller: "We're cleared to two thousand feet and ah...," but paused mid-sentence at 13:57:02. At that same time Daugherty said, "Make it three [thousand]." Then 13:57:07 Adcock continued his radio transmission: "one zero two seven." This was the last transmission from Flight 1851, but the controller did not hear the first part, as he continued to say that the flight would be landing on runway 19, and therefore did not know that the plane continued to descend to 2000 ft. As this was below the minimum safe altitude of 3,000 ft, the aircraft was flying straight to the mountain.

At 14:02, at a speed of 260 kn, the plane passed a height of 5000 ft and got into a zone of light turbulence. At 14:03 Adcock stated, "Ah after two thousand yeah we'll get below these clouds." At 14:06 at a speed of 250 kn, and at a height of 2000 ft the aircraft encountered heavy turbulence near Santo Espírito, with Daugherty saying at 14:07:52, "Can't keep this son of a bitch thing straight up and down." Adcock asked Daugherty if he needed help, but he replied, "no." Then at 14:08:00 due to the turbulence, the aircraft climbed sharply from 1751 ft to 1869 ft. As a result radio altimeter then gave a warning signal and then the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) activated, sounding several "whoop whoop pull up" audible alarms, but the crew did not respond to warnings.

At 14:08:12, at an actual altitude of 1795 ft above sea level, the aircraft crashed into a wall by a road, skidded through trees with trunks about 30 - 40 cm in diameter, and exploded. The impact occurred on the east side of the mountain. The majority of debris was on this side of the mountain, though several portions of debris were also found on the western slope of the mountain as the initial impact site was near the summit. All 144 people (7 crew members and 137 passengers) on board were killed. This is the deadliest aviation disaster to occur in Portugal and the fourth deadliest involving a Boeing 707.

Investigation and cause

Investigation

The altimeters found at the crash site had an exhibited pressure of 1028 and 1026 hPa, and their height read 2000 ft. The overestimation of pressure by 9 hPa led to an overestimation of readings by 240 ft, but taking into account the distance to the summit and the height of trees growing on the mountain, it was concluded that this difference did not contribute to the accident.

The official investigation determined that during approach to Santa Maria Airport, the air traffic controller instructed the crew to descend to 3000 ft for an ILS approach to runway 19.

During that transmission, a trainee controller had also transmitted an incorrect QNH (barometric altimeter setting) that was 9 hPa too high. The approach instructions were not fully heard since the pilot had re-keyed his microphone to acknowledge the new QNH, and likely did not hear the second repeat of the 3,000 ft safe altitude, declaring: "We're re-cleared to 2,000 feet..." (610 m). Although the first officer questioned the barometric altitude, the captain agreed that the first officer had heard the read-back correctly.

After having been cleared to the ILS approach, the crew failed to accomplish the approach briefing, missing an opportunity to notice the 3,000 ft minimum safe altitude and the presence of Pico Alto.

Leveling off at 2000 ft, the airliner experienced heavy turbulence near Santo Espírito and subsequently impacted the ridge of Pico Alto in a level attitude at an altitude of 1795 ft. There was no evidence of any in-flight emergency and the altimeter was found correctly set to 1027 mb.

Conclusions

The Board of Inquiry concluded that the accident was due to non-observance by the crew of established operating procedures which led to the deliberate descent of the aircraft to 2000 ft when the published minimum sector altitude was 3000 ft. It also found that the controller had put the aircraft 240 ft below that indicated on board the aircraft, exacerbating the original error by the first officer.

Bad communications techniques on the part of the co-pilot and controller, including the non-adherence to standard phraseology in some of the ground communication.

Neglecting aerodrome control tower procedures in not requesting a readback of the descent clearance.

The limited international flying experience of the crew and the airline's deficient crew training that did not include emergency maneuvering techniques for terrain avoidance.

Non-compliance with the National Institute of Civil Aviation of Portugal Aeronautical Information Publications (flight plan procedures and authorized routes).

Text from the Wikipedia article “Independent Air Flight 1851” (revision 1357261309, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article

Sources

Wikipedia article: Independent Air Flight 1851
Article
Independent Air Flight 1851
Revision
1357261309 · 2026-06-01 · retrieved 2026-09-18
Wikidata
Q613025
Licence
Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
NTSB record DCA89RA023
Event ID
20001213X27706
Case number
DCA89RA023
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Where each value comes from
Record
Wikipedia article "Independent Air Flight 1851" (page 11980566, revision 1357261309); merged with NTSB case DCA89RA023 (events / aircraft)
Date
Wikipedia infobox: date
Place and country
Wikipedia infobox: site
Map position
Wikipedia: Wikipedia article coordinates
Aircraft, operator and route
Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports); gaps and aircraft details from NTSB record DCA89RA023
Operation
airline flight number in the infobox
Fatalities
Wikipedia: Wikipedia infobox: aircraft fatalities
Ground fatalities
Wikipedia: not stated in the Wikipedia infobox
Summary
Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (2)
  • One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "Independent Air Flight 1851" and NTSB case DCA89RA023, matched by the same aircraft registration and date. For this event outside the United States Wikipedia's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
  • No bulk values were replaced by the NTSB case API.