WPR16FA059 · Piper PA 24-260 260C

The commercial pilot and his wife departed on a visual flight rules cross-country flight to their home airport. About 46 nautical miles from the destination airport, the pilot requested an instrument flight rules clearance and was subsequently cleared for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach at the destination airport.

GPS data indicated that the airplane followed a straight course with minimal variation during its cruise flight in a manner consistent with use of the autopilot. The airplane's course movements became more erratic when the airplane neared the destination airport, which suggests that the pilot began to hand-fly the airplane. A combination of radar data, GPS data, and air traffic control audio showed that the pilot complied with the controller's instructions. After the pilot intercepted the glideslope, he maintained a shallow descent rate until the final approach fix. The pilot subsequently crossed the final approach fix 1,000 ft above the intercept altitude on a heading track to the right of the localizer. The tower controller reported multiple deviations over the radio to the pilot, but the pilot did not make appropriate corrections. Radar data showed the airplane enter progressively steeper descent rates after passing the final approach fix, and the airplane began to deviate to the left of the localizer. In the final moments of the flight, the airplane turned to the right about 50°, crossed the localizer, and then immediately began a 60° steep left turn at an approximate 1,200-fpm descent rate. Debris path signatures indicated the airplane was in a high-speed, steep left turn with a nose-down attitude when it impacted a field about 1.5 nautical miles south of the runway approach end. The proximity of the accident site to the final GPS data point and the similarity between the impact signatures and the track shown by the last few GPS data points indicates that the last data points closely represent the airplane's final movements before impact.

Examination of the wreckage and of engine analyzer data did not reveal any evidence of preimpact anomalies with the airframe or engine. Circumferential scoring from the gyros was found on the case of the heading indicator and both attitude indicators, which indicates that these instruments were likely functioning normally at the time of impact.

The pilot obtained weather information from an online service about 24 hours before the flight; however, the forecasts he received were not valid at the time of his departure. In his communication to an Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) controller, the pilot asked, "what are they doing for approaches?" which indicated that he was aware of possible instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) at the destination airport. The pilot's audio transmissions to ARTCC did not indicate that he had received current Airport Terminal Information System weather. Further, the ARTCC controller did not provide the pilot with the current weather as required by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) procedure, and the airport tower controller had not been disseminating pilot reports, also required by FAA procedure. The pilot's flight instructors commended his aeronautical decision-making skills; however, the investigation was unable to confirm if the pilot obtained current weather and if knowledge of the low-visibility weather conditions would have altered his decision to continue the flight despite his desire to return home that night.

Two months before the accident, the pilot completed an instrument proficiency check and made a night flight to fulfill the night currency requirement. Other than these two events, the pilot had no recent instrument or night flight experience. Further, the pilot's flight records did not show any evidence that he had completed a flight in night IMC in nearly 3 years. Given the pilot's lack of recent experience in night IMC, he was most likely overwhelmed by the complexity of hand-flying the airplane on an ILS approach in night IMC. Once the pilot crossed the final approach fix, he doubled his descent rate to correct for his high crossing altitude and then deviated from the localizer course line. The airplane's final movements suggest that the pilot likely lost control of the airplane during the large heading adjustment he made to correct his course and was not able to regain control.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset