CEN21LA104 · Piper PA-24-250

As the airplane approached the destination, the pilot requested VFR (visual flight rules) flight following and was issued a discrete beacon code. He asked if there were any pilot reports (PIREPs) for icing in the area and was told there had not been any in the last hour. The pilot then requested the VOR-A approach into Y47. The pilot stated that if he missed the approach, he would divert to another airport. The pilot was vectored to intercept the VOR-A final approach course and was given a pilot report from a pilot who landed at a nearby airport who reported the cloud base to be 300 ft with no ice descending through the layers. The accident pilot said he would “give it (the approach) a shot.”

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data showed the airplane approach the airport at an altitude of about 2,000 ft and 100 knots (kts). It passed over the airport and began to decelerate in a left descending turn to 1,475 ft and 85 kts. The airplane entered a second tighter turn and descended to 1,150 ft and 60 kts. Track data was lost at 1541:20. The last recorded altitude and airspeed were 975 ft and 71 kts. near the accident location.

A residential security camera captured the accident. The sound of an aircraft engine is audible on the recording. The sound goes away and returns, but is louder. Once again, the sound disappears and is heard again with the airplane coming into view in a left wing low, nose low descent. The wings and nose level off just before the airplane impacts the ground in a flat attitude. The airplane slides across the ground, impacts a house, and a fire erupts. The airplane was destroyed during the postimpact fire.

A pilot who was in a hangar at the airport reported hearing the airplane fly over the airport twice. He thought the airplane was trying to land and he reported hearing the engine power increase both times as if the pilot was performing a go-around. This pilot reported that the weather conditions at the time consisted of a low ceiling, “heavy clouds”, light mist, and rain.

A NOTAM (Notice to Air Missions) was issued for the VOR-A approach at the destination airport. Although the NOTAM stated the VOR portion of the approach was unavailable it is unlikely that this played a role in the accident as the pilot had overflown the airport on the approximate approach course and was circling the area when the accident occurred. There was no record that the non-instrument rated pilot obtained a weather briefing or filed a flight plan for his flight.

The pilot had logged 41.5 hours of simulated instrument flight time, 15.2 of those hours were with an instructor. Additionally, he had logged 99.6 hours under actual instrument conditions, 4.8 hour of which were with an instructor, for a total of 141.1 instrument hours. The pilot was not instrument rated and was not trained to fly in the weather conditions that existed during the accident flight.

An examination of the airplane, engine, and related systems revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operations. It is likely that while maneuvering in instrument meteorological conditions while trying to locate the runway, the non-instrument rated pilot failed to maintain the proper airspeed, which resulted in the exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack and the airplane experiencing an aerodynamic stall.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset