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ERA26FA252 · Piper PA24 250

28 Jun 2026 · Hazen, ND, United States

Piper PA24 250 · Accident: loss of control in flight during initial climb

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Event

NTSB case
ERA26FA252
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Ongoing
API-reported fatalities
1 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
0
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Piper PA24 250

Aircraft type
Piper PA24
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N6852P
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From not recordedTo not recorded
Aircraft age
About 66 years (built 1960)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Initial climb
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Loss of control in flight
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Destroyed

Cause areas

No findings designated as a cause are recorded in the NTSB data yet.

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

On June 28, 2026, about 1317 central daylight time, a Piper PA-24-250, N6852P, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Hazen, North Dakota. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. According to a witness, who lived near the Mercer County Regional Airport (HZE), Hazen, North Dakota, he was walking from his barn to his house when he saw the accident airplane taking off from runway 15. He said it looked normal and after takeoff he watched as the pilot retracted the landing gear and he climbed up a couple hundred feet and leveled off. After the airplane crossed over the departure end of runway 15, he watched the landing gear come back down, then saw the airplane bank left and he thought the pilot was trying to return to the runway. He further stated that the airplane was banking left and started descending to the ground. He heard the engine rpm increase as the airplane was descending. The airplane impacted the ground behind a small hill, and he did not see the impact but heard it. Airport security video showed the airplane land and taxi to the self-serve fuel tank. The pilot fueled the airplane, but he did not put the left fuel cap back on or closed the fuel door after the fueling was complete. The pilot then pushed the airplane back about 15 ft, boarded the airplane, and started the engine with no preflight inspection observed on the video. As soon as the engine started, the video showed the left fuel cap falling off the back of the wing. The airplane then started to taxi, and the unsecured fuel door on top of the wing could be seen flopping up. The security video then showed the airplane taxi back to runway 15 and depart. The video did not show the airplane after departure. The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. He reported 1,223 total hours of flight experience on his most recent application for an FAA medical certificate, dated June 4, 2024. At that time, he also reported that of the total flight experience, 18 hours were accrued during 6-month period preceding the date of the medical application. The recorded weather, at HZE, at 1315, included wind from 220° at 9 knots, gusting to 15 knots. The reported wind was consistent with a right gusting crosswind during takeoff and initial climb, transitioning to a tailwind when the pilot extended the landing gear and banked the airplane to the left, just prior to the descent to the ground. The accident site was compact and all major components of the airplane were identified. The wreckage was located about 300 yards off the departure end of the runway, and it came to rest oriented on a 030° magnetic heading and to the left of extended runway centerline about 200 yards. The initial impact point was 63 ft away from where the airplane came to rest. The initial impact point contained the wing tip fairing and the red navigation light lens remained in the ground about 1 ft deep. Leading edge impact scars from the left and right wing leading edges were also observed on the ground. The right wing exhibited accordion crushing back to the flap and aileron. The propeller and engine impressions were about 3 ft deep. The airplane ultimately came to rest inverted and a postimpact fire ensued. The fuselage was mostly consumed by the fire. The cabin area from the front seat area to the aft baggage area, including the main cabin door, baggage door, and structure, were all destroyed by the fire. The instrument panel was impact damaged, fractured, and detached from the fuselage. One section remained attached to the impact separated front fuselage and one section was observed lying near the main wreckage. The throttle and propeller control were in the full forward position, and the mixture control was out about 2 in from full forward. The fuel primer control was in and locked. Flight control continuity was established from all primary flight control surfaces to their respective controls in the forward cabin. The pitch trim cable continuity was established from the pitch trim actuator in the tail section to an area that was crushed and melted in the cabin area. The fuel selector valve and handle exhibited thermal damage and the position of either was not able to be determined. The fuel strainer and bowl were not located. Two electric fuel pumps were observed in the engine compartment area. They were opened and examined, and they were observed to have thermal damage inside and outside. The labels to the cockpit switches were consumed in the postimpact fire and the position of the electric fuel pump switch was not determined. The seats were reduced to steel components by the fire and were detached from the structure. One seatbelt buckle assembly was located and both ends observed to be buckled together. The left forward inboard seat belt attachment hardware remained attached to the thermally damaged structure. The outboard attachment was not located. The empennage was impact separated just aft of the baggage compartment. It exhibited fire damage along its lower structure. The right stabilator would have been suspended over the postimpact fire area and was not observed during the examination. The inboard section remained attached and exhibited thermal damage along the remaining edge. The left side of the stabilator was impact and thermally damaged. It was folded downward about midspan. The impact damaged vertical stabilizer remained attached to the empennage structure. The impact damaged rudder remained attached at both hinges. The upper portion of the rudder was fractured, and the rudder counterweight was observed lying near the wreckage. The stabilator trim actuator shaft extension was measured to be about 0.9” with about 9 threads exposed, which correlates to about a 70% nose-up trim setting (0.35” is a neutral setting and 1.3” is a full nose-up trim setting). The inboard section of the left wing, including the fuel tank, was mostly consumed in the postimpact fire. The fuel filler opening and fairing were also damaged by the fire. The filler opening port was observed to have no fuel cap installed. The outboard section of the wing was impact separated just outboard of the inboard aileron hinge area. The left wing tip was impact separated and was located in the initial impact ground scar. The outboard section of the aileron was impact separated and lying near the left wing in the main wreckage area. The inboard section of the aileron remained attached to the wing at the inboard hinge and control rod. The flap remained attached at both hinges and was observed in the retracted position. The inboard section of the right wing, including the fuel tank, was mostly consumed in the postimpact fire. The fuel filler opening and fairing were also damaged by the fire. The fire damaged fuel cap was observed installed into the tank opening port. The outboard section of the wing exhibited accordion crushing along the leading edge, and the outboard section was fractured along the skin seam but remained attached to the wing inboard section structure. The wing tip was fractured and sections of it remained attached to the wing. The aileron remained partially attached at the inboard hinge and detached at the outboard hinge. It was bent downward about midspan. The flap was observed in the retracted position and attached at both hinges. The right landing gear was down and locked and the left landing gear was consumed by fire. The nose landing gear was fractured off and located about 10 ft away from main wreckage. The engine and propeller remained attached to engine mounts and firewall. The engine, firewall and instrument panel fractured off the cabin and angled about 30°. The engine was partially fire damaged. The engine cowling was removed, and the engine was hoisted for examination. The propeller remained attached to the crankshaft flange, all three propeller blades were bent backwards. One blade was fractured at the hub. One propeller blade was cut to facilitate rotation of the crankshaft. The top spark plugs were removed and the electrodes showed normal wear when compared to a Champion Check-A-Plug chart. The propeller was rotated by hand and thumb compressions was established on all cylinders. Mechanical continuity was established through the engine and accessory case. A borescope examination of all the cylinders, and valves did not show any anomalies. The oil suction screen was removed and free of debris and contaminates. The magnetos were secured in place, and timing was verified on both magnetos to be at 25°. The magnetos were removed and spark was obtained on all leads. The carburetor was fractured from the mounting pad and displayed fire damage. The carburetor mixture and throttle cables were secured to their perspective control arms. The fuel screen was clear of debris. The fuel pump remained secure on the mounting pad. The fuel pump was removed and disassembled and the rubber diaphragm remained intact and pliable. The fuel pump internal check valves remained intact. No anomalies were noted that would have precluded normal operation.

Verbatim NTSB factual narrative from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record ERA26FA252
Event ID
20260628203269
Case number
ERA26FA252
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 0022e7d1144bd5435eb7865564add2750b86dadb1e4bd5ae496f050554983de9; retrieved 2026-09-15T09:17:38.116Z.