Yak-40 crash near Vologda

The Yak-40 crash near Vologda was an aviation accident that occurred on the Friday evening of 16 November 1979 near Vologda. A Yak-40 airliner of the Vologda Joint Aviation Squadron of Aeroflot was completing ferry flight SU-564 on the Veliky Ustyug — Vologda route, but while approaching to land at Vologda Airport in adverse weather conditions the airliner collided with trees, after which it crashed to the ground near Vologda Airport and was completely destroyed. Of the 5 crew members on board, 3 were killed and 2 survived with injuries.

Crash

The aircraft was making an approach on a magnetic heading of 152°. In the left (captain's) seat sat the check pilot, who was doing the flying, while the crew captain himself had initially gone into the passenger cabin. The circuit controller (DPK) was monitoring using the "Ekran D" radar, which had a range of up to 3 kilometres.

At 18:27 the controller of the regional centre of the Unified ATC System (RTs YeS UVD) informed the aircraft crew that at Vologda Airport the horizontal visibility was 1500 metres and the vertical visibility was 120 metres. These data had been given to the controller himself by an observer of the aviation meteorological station (AMSG) and were false, whereas the actual visibility had already dropped to 850 metres. Having reached the transition level (900 metres) at 18:34, the crew set the aerodrome pressure — 761 mm Hg, which it reported to the controller, and then began descending to circuit height (500 metres). In fact, however, the right altimeter was set to 762 mm Hg, and the left one, on the side of the pilot flying, to 759 mm Hg. At 18:37 the crew was again given false weather information, after which the crew made the fourth turn and established itself on final approach. After this the captain entered the cockpit and stood behind the flight engineer. By that time the actual visibility had already decreased to about 700 metres.

The height for passing the outer marker (DPRM) was 200 metres. But because of the incorrect altimeter setting the aircraft had descended to this height a kilometre earlier, and it passed the outer marker at a height of 172 metres. The circuit controller informed the crew that they had passed the outer marker and the crew acknowledged this. The vertical rate of descent was then increased, and the airliner deviated slightly to the left, onto a heading of 152°, as a result of which, 2 kilometres before the runway threshold, it was 150 metres to the left of and 40 metres below the landing glide path. Since no radar (RTS) monitoring was being carried out, the circuit controller did not know about the airliner's premature descent. According to the crew captain, of the check pilot's commands he heard only the instruction to the flight engineer to note the time of passing the outer marker. When the aircraft descended to the decision height, the crew, unable to see the ground, continued the descent, although in such conditions a go-around was required. Instead, a vigorous turn to the right was made in order to return to the extension of the runway centreline, while the engine speed was reduced from 86 to 79 %, and the vertical speed increased to 4.5 m/s.

18 seconds after the start of the turn, when the Yak-40 was 35 metres above the ground, the pilots saw forest beneath them and pulled the control columns back. But a couple of seconds later the airliner, flying on a heading of 169°, struck trees 20 metres above the ground at a speed of 200 km/h and with a right bank of 5°. Colliding with trunks about 30 centimetres in diameter, the Yak-40 began to break up, and at 18:41, 204 metres from the point of first impact and 96 metres from the outer marker, it fell to the ground, was completely destroyed and caught fire. The check pilot, the co-pilot and the flight engineer were killed in the crash. The crew captain and the stewardess were seriously injured. At that time there was fog over the airport, and visibility was 700 metres.