Tower Air Flight 41
Boeing 747-136 · Runway excursion on takeoff caused by pilot error; aggravated by inadequate procedures and airline management issues
From John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) to Miami International Airport (MIA)
Event
- NTSB case
- DCA96MA029
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- Event fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- 0
- Occupants
- 468
- Survivors
- 468
- InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
- 25
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Airline
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Instrument Meteorological Cond
Boeing 747-136
- Flight
- FF41
- Aircraft type
- Boeing 747
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N605FF
- Operator
- Tower Air
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK)To Miami International Airport (MIA), Miami, FL
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 121: Air Carrier
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Takeoff · roll/run
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Loss of control on ground/water
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Pilot in command › Aborted takeoff, delayed
Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.
From the Wikipedia article
Tower Air Flight 41 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York City, to Miami International Airport (MIA) in Florida. On December 20, 1995, the Boeing 747-100 operating the flight veered off the runway during takeoff from JFK. All 468 people on board survived, but 25 people were injured. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair and written off, making the accident the 25th hull loss of a Boeing 747. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded that the captain had failed to reject the takeoff in a timely manner.
Accident
The flight crew was given a weather briefing by the airline's dispatchers. At 10:36 AM Eastern Standard Time (EST) Flight 41 pushed back from the gate and was subsequently de-iced. At 11:16 the flight began to taxi to runway 4L. The ramp had packed snow and patches of ice. Six minutes later, the captain stopped taxiing in order to clear additional ice by performing an engine run-up. Noting the outside conditions, he told the first officer, "If we start to move let me know."
The captain then started to increase engine thrust, only for the aircraft to start slipping in the process. The captain stopped the procedure and told the crew, "It's an ice rink here." After crossing runway 31L, the captain asked the flight engineer to go into the cabin and visually inspect the wings. The flight engineer left the cockpit at 11:30 and returned one minute later, confirming that the wings were not contaminated with ice.
At 11:32, Flight 41 lined up on runway 4L. The captain attempted the engine runup a second time, again to clear additional ice, this time without any incidents. Four minutes after lining up, at 11:36, Flight 41 was cleared for takeoff. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the following:
Only five seconds after the flight engineer's callout and just before reaching 80 kn (according to the captain in a post accident interview), the aircraft began to veer to the left of the runway centerline. At this time an unidentified crew member said "Watch it. Watch it." The captain responded by applying right rudder input and attempted to steer the aircraft to the right by using the tiller, neither of which worked. At 11:37:37 the captain rejected the takeoff:
The captain pulled the thrust levers back to idle and applied maximum braking, but did not apply the thrust reversers because of the aircraft's low speed and the large amount of runway remaining. The aircraft departed the left side of runway 4L at 11:37:19, skidding across taxiway Kilo and runway 13R/31L, striking three signs in the process. In the cabin, the overhead compartments and side bins both opened and their contents fell out. In the aft galley, two service carts dislodged and rolled down the aisle; one struck a flight attendant's left shoulder, breaking it. Only three flight attendants called "Grab ankles! Stay down!" to the passengers, as required in an emergency. At 11:37:21 the aircraft struck an electrical transformer owned by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and came to a stop 4800 ft from the threshold of runway 4L. On impact with the transformer, the number four (outer right) engine separated from the aircraft and the nose landing gear collapsed, damaging the wiring for the public address (PA) and interphone systems.
After the aircraft stopped, the flight engineer told all passengers over the PA system to remain seated, though the announcement was only heard in the forward section of the aircraft. The purser unsuccessfully attempted to call the flight crew on the interphone, and then ran upstairs to the cockpit. The first officer had radioed air traffic control (ATC) of their situation and performed the engine shutdown checklist. The flight crew considered initiating an evacuation, but given the aircraft had remained mostly intact with no signs of fire or any other danger reported and the low wind chill factor outside the captain decided not to do so. Once emergency responders arrived at the aircraft, the purser unsuccessfully attempted to open doors L1 and R1. He and a rescue worker managed to open door L2 and the passengers and crew were deplaned via the air stairs. There were no fatalities, and the flight attendant's broken right shoulder was the only serious injury. One of the passengers on board was rabbi Moshe Teitelbaum.
Investigation and cause
Investigation
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was informed of the accident just 13 minutes after it occurred and sent a "go-team" to JFK Airport. This was Tower Air's fourth accident/incident.
Analysis of the flight data recorder (FDR) revealed data that "lacked orderliness and reflected random values not resembling any type of flight operation." This was later determined to be caused by several malfunctioning components within the FDR that had gone unnoticed by Tower Air maintenance. Without data from the FDR, the NTSB had to rely on the CVR and statements from the crew for the investigation.
A sound spectrum study was performed on the CVR, during which investigators calculated engine fan speeds by analyzing the frequencies of tones associated with aircraft engines. The study revealed the following events:
Tower Air had gone through several management changes before Flight 41. At the time it occurred, the airline's General Operations Manual (GOM) did not provide the director of operations to supervise training and operations.
The airline's flight manual stated that using the rudder pedals during the takeoff roll was allowed until the airplane reached 80 knots. It also stated that takeoffs must be rejected if the aircraft began to deviate off the runway before the effect of the rudder. The manual required takeoffs on slippery runways were to be performed with slow thrust application and pilots to keep in mind the lag of nosewheel steering as well as optimizing directional control. One of the airline's chief pilots also stated if there was less than half rudder pedal available, the takeoff should be aborted. He also stated that the tiller was to be guarded by the pilot flying during takeoff. The NTSB determined that these procedures were inadequate for the Boeing 747. The sound spectrum study also revealed that the captain attempted to reapply engine thrust before rejecting the takeoff, when he should have rejected it at the first sign of the loss of directional control. The NTSB could not determine why the captain made excessive tiller inputs.
On August 8, 1996, pilots who worked for the NTSB, FAA, and/or Tower Air, performed simulated takeoffs on icy runways in a Boeing 747 simulator. All parties agreed that Boeing's simulator had a more realistic performance of ground handling characteristics (both in general and on slippery runways), while Tower Air's simulators were inaccurate in their performance of this simulation.
Tower Air's flight attendant training was inadequate as it did not specify communication and coordination, indicating why only three flight attendants had instructed passengers to take the brace position during the accident. The airline's management had failed to test FDR's before a flight, did not report management and organizational changes to the FAA, and experienced delays in revising its GOM. The FAA's oversight of Tower Air was inadequate due to their unfamiliarity with the inappropriate management changes. The NTSB even urged the federal government and the airline industry to re-examine aircraft stopping performance.
The NTSB released its final report on December 2, 1996, blaming the captain for rejecting the takeoff in an untimely manner along with applying inappropriate nosewheel steering tiller inputs. The inadequate slippery runway procedures for the Boeing 747 and the inaccuracies in the simulators of that aircraft were also contributing factors in the accident.
Text from the Wikipedia article “Tower Air Flight 41” (revision 1342382932, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article
NTSB narrative
The captain initiated a takeoff on runway 4L, which was covered with patches of ice and snow. The wind was from 330 degrees at 11 knots. Before receiving an 80-knot call from the 1st officer, the airplane began to veer to the left. Subsequently, it went off the left side of the runway and collided with signs and an electric transformer. Investigation revealed evidence that the captain had overcontrolled the nosewheel steering through the tiller, then applied insufficient or untimely right rudder inputs to effect a recovery. The captain abandoned an attempt to reject the takeoff, at least temporarily, by restoring forward thrust before the airplane departed the runway. The current Boeing 747 operating procedures provide inadequate guidance to flightcrews regarding the potential for loss of directional control at low speeds on slippery runways with the use of the tiller. Current Boeing 747 flight manual guidance was inadequate about when a pilot should reject a takeoff following some indication of a lack of directional control response. Improvements in the slippery runway handling fidelity of flight simulators used for Boeing 747 pilot training were considered to be both needed and feasible. (See: NTSB/AAR-96-04 for detailed information.)
Probable cause
the captain's failure to reject the takeoff in a timely manner when excessive nosewheel steering tiller inputs resulted in a loss of directional control on a slippery runway. Inadequate Boeing 747 slippery runway operating procedures developed by Tower Air, Inc., and the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group and the inadequate fidelity of B-747 flight training simulators for slippery runway operations contributed to the cause of this accident. The captain's reapplication of forward thrust before the airplane departed the left side of the runway contributed to the severity of the runway excursion and damage to the airplane.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
Wikipedia article: Tower Air Flight 41
- Article
- Tower Air Flight 41
- Revision
- 1342382932 · 2026-03-08 · retrieved 2026-09-18
- Wikidata
- Q109237429
- Licence
- Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
NTSB record DCA96MA029
- Event ID
- 20001207X04988
- Case number
- DCA96MA029
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Where each value comes from
- Record
- Wikipedia article "Tower Air Flight 41" (page 68994504, revision 1342382932); merged with NTSB case DCA96MA029 (events / aircraft)
- Date
- NTSB record DCA96MA029: NTSB narrative opening date, consistent with the API date and time (local date)
- Place and country
- Wikipedia infobox: site; country from NTSB record DCA96MA029
- Map position
- NTSB record DCA96MA029: events decimal coordinates
- Aircraft, operator and route
- NTSB record DCA96MA029: aircraft; gaps from Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
- Operation
- NTSB record DCA96MA029: operated under Part 121: Air Carrier
- Fatalities
- NTSB record DCA96MA029: NTSB API totalFatal
- Ground fatalities
- NTSB record DCA96MA029: NTSB API ongroundFatal
- Summary
- Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (3)
- One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "Tower Air Flight 41" and NTSB case DCA96MA029, matched by the same aircraft registration and date. For this US event the NTSB's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.