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Total Linhas Aéreas Flight 5561

14 Sept 2002 · 38 km SW Of Paranapanema

ATR 42-312 · Loss of control

From São Paulo/Guarulhos–Governor André Franco Montoro International Airport (GRU) to Governor José Richa Airport (LDB)

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Event

Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
Event fatalities
2 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
Occupants
2
Survivors
0
InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline

ATR 42-312

Flight
L15561
Aircraft type
ATR 42
Category
Airplane · from aircraft type
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
PT-MTS
Onboard fatalities
2
Route
From São Paulo/Guarulhos–Governor André Franco Montoro International Airport (GRU)To Governor José Richa Airport (LDB)

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems
  • Organizational issues › Development
  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge

From the investigation findings the Wikipedia article reports, sorted into the NTSB's cause areas with AI assistance.

Not plotted · Not plotted: the Wikipedia article gives no coordinates, and its site names no town or airport that matches exactly.

From the Wikipedia article

Total Linhas Aéreas Flight 5561 was a domestic cargo flight from São Paulo, Brazil to Londrina, Brazil that crashed near Paranapanema 47 minutes after takeoff on 14 September 2002. The crew of the ATR 42 regional turboprop lost control of the aircraft's pitch and were both killed in the accident.

The accident was investigated by the Brazilian Air Force's Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center (Centro de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos (CENIPA)), with a final report issued in March 2007. Investigators concluded that the most likely cause of the accident was a pitch trim control system failure.

Accident

The flight took off from São Paulo at 04:52 local time and at 05:12:30 the crew asked for permission to climb to flight level (FL) 160 i.e. 16,000 feet. At 05:13:18 the co-pilot commented "Damn, it's the wiring harness." The meaning of this statement remains undetermined. At 05:16:03 the aircraft was cleared to climb to FL180 (18000 ft). At 05:29:14 the pilot informed the co-pilot he was going to change his clothes and removed himself from his cockpit seat. At 05:37:32 the "event" button located on the center console was pushed. Five seconds later the autopilot disengaged and the pitch trim control system began moving the trim tabs to a nose down attitude. As the airliner began descending, at 05:37:38 and 05:37:46 the pilot asked the co-pilot what was happening, and he responded that he did not know. Eight seconds later at 05:37:54 the co-pilot exclaimed that the pitch trim control system was running the trim nose down, then the sound of a seat belt buckling was recorded indicating the pilot had returned to his seat. Between 05:37:40 and 05:37:46 one of the crew members attempted to arrest the descent by pulling back on the control column.

At 05:37:55 the pilot told the co-pilot to "Pull the trim" for the first time, meaning pull the circuit breaker (CB) that powers the pitch trim system. This CB is located in a panel behind the co-pilot and is not reachable by the pilot. The co-pilot did not initially understand the pilot's request and the pilot repeated it several times as the pitch trim continued to trim down, eventually reaching and staying at its full down stop of five degrees. At 05:38:05 the co-pilot stated "I pulled, I pulled" and a CB was deactivated.

Flight 5561 was now at 16,000 feet and descending and had accelerated from its cruising speed of 180 to 260 kn. At 05:38:07 the over speed alarm sounded indicating the aircraft had exceeded the maximum operating limit speed (Vmo) and the crew reduced power from the cruise setting to 10%. From 05:38:29 until 05:38:49 the pilot requested of the co-pilot to pull the trim as he continued to pull the control column. The CVR recorded sounds of the aircraft continuing to accelerate, then at 05:39:10 the recording ended. The aircraft collided with the ground in a 30 degrees left bank angle, pitched down approximately 45 degrees at 366 kn. The aircraft was completely destroyed and both crew members perished.

Investigation and cause

Investigation

On 30 March 2007 CENIPA released its final report on the accidents cause. At take off the aircraft had a gross take-off weight of 16,649 kg including 4,720 kg of cargo, 51 kg less than the maximum takeoff weight. The center of gravity was within allowable limits and weather was found not to have been a factor in the accident.

Investigators determined from conversation on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) that the pilot never left the cockpit area, but the fact that he left his seat and that communication between the crew was poor during the accident sequence cost the crew time to search for a solution and may have been a factor in the crash. The crew was not trained for a "runaway trim" scenario and no procedure for dealing with this were found in the manuals written by the aircraft manufacturer. This may have been a factor in the cause of the accident.

The activation of the event button was most likely inadvertent because no abnormalities were found on the FDR and neither pilot mentioned pushing it. The stand by trim switch is located close to the event button and it is possible that it too was activated without the crews knowledge causing the autopilot to disengage. Activation of the stand by trim switch is not one of the parameters recorded by the FDR.

Examination of the ATR 42's history shows several reports of trim control concerns that the Federal Aviation Administration issued Airworthiness Directive(s) (AD) for. An incident in 2001 led the Civil Aviation of France to issue an AD for ATR 42 type aircraft as well.

The investigating bureau stated in part that problems involving system relays, switches, wires and connectors was "considered the most likely to have occurred, giving rise to the firing of the elevator compensator (pitch trim system)". Also stated in the report was that the "systems (pitch trim) normal and reserve (stand by) were not independent and the system had low error tolerance".

Text from the Wikipedia article “Total Linhas Aéreas Flight 5561” (revision 1355275080, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article

Sources

Wikipedia article: Total Linhas Aéreas Flight 5561
Article
Total Linhas Aéreas Flight 5561
Revision
1355275080 · 2026-05-20 · retrieved 2026-09-18
Wikidata
Q65078081
Licence
Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
Where each value comes from
Record
Wikipedia article "Total Linhas Aéreas Flight 5561" (page 60081442, revision 1355275080)
Date
Wikipedia infobox: date
Place and country
Wikipedia infobox: site; country from Wikidata (P17)
Map position
none
Aircraft, operator and route
Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
Operation
airline flight number in the infobox
Fatalities
Wikipedia infobox: aircraft fatalities
Ground fatalities
not stated in the Wikipedia infobox
Summary
Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (1)
  • Wikipedia · Facts from the Wikipedia article's infobox and coordinates, not checked against an investigation report. Independent review pending.