Air Florida Flight 90

Air Florida Flight 90 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight operated from Washington National Airport (now Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport) to Fort Lauderdale–Hollywood International Airport, with an intermediate stopover at Tampa International Airport, that crashed into the 14th Street Bridge over the Potomac River just after takeoff from Washington National Airport on January 13, 1982. The Boeing 737-200 that executed the flight, registered as N62AF, struck the bridge, which carries Interstate 395 between Washington, D.C., and Arlington County, Virginia, hitting seven occupied vehicles and destroying 97 ft of guard rail before plunging through the ice into the Potomac River.

The aircraft was carrying 74 passengers and five crew members. Only four passengers and one crew member (flight attendant Kelly Duncan) were rescued from the crash and survived. Another passenger, Arland D. Williams Jr., assisted in the rescue of the survivors, but drowned before he could be rescued. Four motorists on the bridge were killed. The survivors were rescued from the icy river by civilians and professionals. President Ronald Reagan commended these acts during his State of the Union speech 13 days later.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the cause of the accident was pilot error. The pilots failed to switch on the engines' internal ice protection systems, used reverse thrust in a snowstorm prior to takeoff, tried to use the jet exhaust of a plane in front of them to melt their ice, and failed to abandon the takeoff even after detecting a power problem while taxiing and ice and snow buildup on the wings.

Flight

The plane had trouble leaving the gate when the ground-services tug could not get traction on the icy ramp. For roughly 30 to 90 seconds, the crew attempted to back away from the gate using the reverse thrust of the engines (a powerback), which proved futile. Boeing operations bulletins had warned against using reverse thrust in those kinds of conditions.

Eventually, a ground tug unit properly equipped with snow chains was used to push the aircraft back from the gate. After leaving the gate, the aircraft waited in a taxi line with many other aircraft for 49 minutes before reaching the takeoff runway. The pilot apparently decided not to return to the gate for reapplication of deicing, fearing that the flight's departure would be even further delayed. More snow and ice accumulated on the wings during that period, and the crew was aware of that fact when they decided to take off. Heavy snow was falling during their takeoff roll at 3:59 pm EST.

Though the outside temperature was well below freezing and snow was falling, the crew did not activate the engine anti-ice systems. This system uses heat from the engines to prevent sensors and the engine intake cowl from accumulating ice or snow, ensuring accurate readings.

While running through the takeoff checklist, the following conversation snippet took place (CAM-1 is the captain, CAM-2 is the first officer):

As a result, this caused the engine pressure ratio (EPR) thrust indicators to provide false readings. The correct engine power setting for the temperature and airport altitude of Washington National at the time was 2.04 EPR, but analysis of the engine noise recorded on the cockpit voice recorder indicated that the actual power output corresponded with an engine pressure ratio of only 1.70.

Neither pilot had much experience flying in snowy, cold weather. The captain had made only eight takeoffs or landings in snowy conditions on the 737, and the first officer had flown in snow only twice.

Adding to the plane's troubles was the pilots' decision to maneuver closely behind a DC-9 that was taxiing just ahead of them prior to takeoff, due to their mistaken belief that the warmth from the DC-9's engines would melt the snow and ice that had accumulated on Flight 90's wings. This action, which went specifically against flight-manual recommendations for an icing situation, actually contributed to icing on the 737. The exhaust gases from the other aircraft melted the snow on the wings, but instead of falling off the plane during takeoff, this slush mixture froze on the wings' leading edges and the engine inlet nose cone.

As the takeoff roll began, the first officer noted several times to the captain that the instrument panel readings he was seeing did not seem to reflect reality (he was referring to the fact that the plane did not appear to have developed as much power as it needed for takeoff, despite the instruments indicating otherwise). The captain dismissed these concerns and let the takeoff proceed. Investigators determined that plenty of time and space on the runway remained for the captain to have abandoned the takeoff, and criticized his refusal to listen to his first officer, who was correct that the instrument panel readings were wrong. The pilot was told not to delay because another aircraft was 2.5 NM out on final approach to the same runway. The following is a transcript of Flight 90's cockpit voice recorder during the plane's acceleration down the runway.

As the plane became briefly airborne, the voice recorder picked up the following from the cockpit, with the sound of the stick-shaker (a device that warns that the plane is in danger of stalling) in the background:

The aircraft traveled almost half a mile (800 m) farther down the runway than is customary before liftoff was accomplished. Survivors of the crash indicated the trip over the runway was extremely rough, with survivor Joe Stiley—a businessman and private pilot—saying that he believed that they would not get airborne and would "fall off the end of the runway". When the plane became airborne, Stiley told his co-worker (and survivor) Nikki Felch to assume the crash position, with some nearby passengers following their example.

Although the 737 did manage to become airborne, it attained a maximum altitude of just 352 ft before it began losing altitude. Recorders later indicated that the aircraft was airborne for just 30 seconds. At 4:01 pm EST, it crashed into the 14th Street Bridge across the Potomac River, 0.75 nmi from the end of the runway. The plane hit six cars and a truck on the bridge, and tore away 97 ft of the bridge's rail and 41 ft of the bridge's wall. The aircraft then plunged into the freezing Potomac River. It fell between two of the three spans of the bridge, between the I-395 northbound span (the Rochambeau Bridge) and the high-occupancy vehicle lane north- and southbound spans, about 200 ft offshore. All but the tail section quickly became submerged.

Of the people on board the aircraft:

Four of the crew members (including both pilots) died.

One crew member was seriously injured.

Seventy of the 74 passengers died.

Nineteen occupants were believed to have survived the impact, but their injuries prevented them from escaping.

Of the motorists on the bridge involved:

Four sustained fatal injuries

One sustained serious injuries

Three sustained minor injuries

Clinging to the tail section of the broken airliner in the ice-choked Potomac River were flight attendant Kelly Duncan and four passengers: Patricia "Nikki" Felch, Joe Stiley, Arland D. Williams Jr. (strapped and tangled in his seat), and Priscilla Tirado. Duncan inflated the only flotation device they could find, and passed it to the severely injured Felch. Passenger Bert Hamilton, who was floating in the water nearby, was the first to be pulled from the water.

Crash response

Many federal offices in downtown Washington had closed early that day in response to quickly developing blizzard conditions. Thus, significant backups of traffic existed on almost all of the city's roads, which made it unusually difficult for ambulances to reach the crash site. The Coast Guard's 65 ft harbor tugboat Capstan (WYTL 65601) and its crew were based nearby; their duties include icebreaking and responding to water rescues. The Capstan was considerably farther downriver on another search-and-rescue mission. Emergency ground response was hampered by ice-covered roads and gridlocked traffic; ambulances dispatched at 4:07 pm took 20 minutes to reach the crash scene. Ambulances attempting to reach the crash site were even driven down the sidewalk in front of the White House. Rescuers who reached the site were unable to assist survivors in the water because they did not have adequate equipment to reach them. Water temperature, about 34 F, and heavy ice made swimming out to the victims impossible. Multiple attempts to throw a makeshift lifeline (made of belts and other items which could be tied together) out to the survivors proved ineffective. The rescue attempts by emergency officials and witnesses were recorded and broadcast live by area news reporters, and because the accident occurred in the nation's capital, large numbers of media personnel were on hand to provide quick and extensive coverage.

Roger Olian, a sheet-metal foreman at St. Elizabeths Hospital, a Washington psychiatric hospital, was on his way home across the 14th Street Bridge when he heard a man yelling that an aircraft was in the water. He was the first to jump into the water to attempt to reach the survivors. At the same time, several military personnel from the Pentagon—Steve Raynes, Aldo De La Cruz, and Steve Bell—ran to the water's edge to help Olian.

At this point, air traffic controllers and flight controllers were aware only that the plane had disappeared from radar and was not responding to radio calls, and had no idea what had happened or where the plane was located.

Around 4:20 pm EST, Eagle 1, a United States Park Police Bell 206L-1 Long Ranger helicopter, based at the "Eagles Nest" at Anacostia Park in Washington, arrived and began attempting to airlift the survivors to shore. At great risk to themselves, the crew worked close to the water's surface, at one time coming so close to the ice-clogged river that the helicopter's skids dipped beneath the surface. At this point, survivors had been in the 34-degree water for over 20 minutes.

The helicopter crew lowered a line to survivors to tow them to shore. First to receive the line was Bert Hamilton, who was treading water about 10 ft from the plane's floating tail and closest to the helicopter. The pilot pulled him across the ice to shore, while avoiding the sides of the bridge. By then, some fire and rescue personnel had arrived to join the military personnel and civilians who pulled Hamilton (and the next, last three survivors) from the water's edge up to waiting ambulances; rescuers and civilians on the banks had to duck to avoid the helicopter's rotors. The helicopter returned to the aircraft's tail, and this time Arland D. Williams Jr. (sometimes referred to as "the sixth passenger") caught the line. Williams, not able to unstrap himself from the wreckage, passed the line to flight attendant Kelly Duncan, who was airlifted to shore. On its third trip back to the wreckage, the helicopter lowered two lifelines, fearing that the remaining survivors had only a few minutes before succumbing to hypothermia. Williams, still strapped into the wreckage, passed one line to Joe Stiley, who was holding on to panic-stricken Priscilla Tirado, who had lost her husband and baby. Stiley's co-worker, Nikki Felch, took the second line. As the helicopter pulled the three through the water and blocks of ice toward shore, both Tirado and Felch lost their grip and fell back into the water. While being dragged through the ice to the riverbank by the helicopter, Stiley broke multiple ribs.

Tirado, seriously injured and blinded by jet fuel, was too weak to grab the line when the helicopter returned to her. A watching bystander, Congressional Budget Office assistant Lenny Skutnik, stripped off his coat and boots, and in short sleeves, dove into the icy water and swam out to successfully pull her to shore. The helicopter then proceeded to where Felch had fallen, and paramedic Gene Windsor stepped onto the helicopter skid and grabbed Felch's clothing to lift her onto the skid and bring her to shore. Ten minutes passed from the time the helicopter arrived on scene until Felch's rescue.

When the helicopter crew returned for Williams, the wreckage he was strapped into had rolled slightly, submerging him; according to the coroner, Williams was the only passenger to die by drowning. His body and those of the other occupants were recovered later.

The inclement weather had caused an early start to Washington's rush-hour traffic, frustrating the response time of emergency crews. The early rush hour also meant that trains on the Washington Metro were full when, just 30 minutes after Flight 90 crashed, the Metro suffered its first fatal crash at Federal Triangle station. This meant that Washington's nearest airport, one of its main bridges in or out of the city, and one of its busiest subway lines were all closed simultaneously, paralyzing much of the metropolitan area.