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United Airlines Flight 232

19 Jul 1989 · Sioux Gateway Airport, Sioux City, Iowa, U.S.

McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 · Uncontained engine failure due to fan disk separation resulting in loss of hydraulics and loss of control

From Denver International Airport (DEN) to Philadelphia International Airport (ORD)

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Event

NTSB case
DCA89MA063
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
Event fatalities
112 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
0
Occupants
296
Survivors
184
InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
171
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10

Flight
UA232
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N1819U
Onboard fatalities
112
Route
From Denver International Airport (DEN), Denver, COTo Philadelphia International Airport (ORD), Chicago, IL
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 121: Air Carrier
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
En route · cruise
First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Airframe, component or system failure
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Destroyed

Cause areas

  • Company maintenance personnel › Maintenance, overhaul, major, inadequate
  • Compressor assembly, forward fan › Failure, total
  • Compressor assembly, forward fan › Fatigue
  • Manufacturer › Inadequate quality control

Approximate · Coordinates from the Wikipedia article; not checked against an investigation report.

From the Wikipedia article

United Airlines Flight 232 was a regularly scheduled United Airlines flight from Stapleton International Airport in Denver to O'Hare International Airport in Chicago, continuing to Philadelphia International Airport in Philadelphia, United States. On July 19, 1989, the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 serving the flight crash-landed at Sioux Gateway Airport in Sioux City, Iowa, after suffering a catastrophic failure of its tail-mounted engine due to an unnoticed manufacturing defect in the engine's fan disk, which resulted in the loss of all flight controls. Of the 296 passengers and crew on board, 112 died, while 184 people survived. Thirteen passengers were uninjured.

Despite the fatalities, the accident is considered a good example of successful crew resource management, still a relatively new concept at the time. Contributing to the outcome was the crew's decision to recruit the assistance of a company check pilot, on board as a passenger, to assist controlling the aircraft and troubleshooting of the problem the crew was facing. A majority of those aboard survived; experienced test pilots in simulators were unable to reproduce a survivable landing. It has been termed "The Impossible Landing" as it is considered one of the most impressive landings performed in the history of aviation.

Crash landing

As the crew began to prepare for arrival at Sioux Gateway Airport, they questioned whether they should deploy the landing gear or belly-land the aircraft with the gear retracted. They decided that having the landing gear down would provide some shock absorption on impact. The complete hydraulic failure left the landing gear lowering mechanism inoperative. Two options were available to the flight crew. The DC-10 is designed so that if hydraulic pressure to the landing gear is lost, the gear will fall down slightly and rest on the landing gear doors. Placing the regular landing gear handle in the down position will unlock the doors mechanically, and the doors and landing gear will then fall down into place and lock due to gravity. An alternative system is also available using a lever in the cockpit floor to cause the landing gear to fall into position. This lever has the added benefit of unlocking the outboard ailerons, which are not used in high-speed flight and are locked in a neutral position. The crew hoped that there might be some trapped hydraulic fluid in the outboard ailerons and that they might regain some use of flight controls by unlocking them. They elected to extend the gear with the alternative system. Although the gear deployed successfully, no change of the controllability of the aircraft resulted.

Landing was originally planned for 9000 ft Runway 31. Difficulties in controlling the aircraft made alignment with the runway almost impossible. While dumping some of the excess fuel, the airplane executed a series of mostly right-hand turns (turning the airplane in this direction was easier) with the intention of aligning with Runway 31. When they finished they were instead aligned with the closed 6888 ft Runway 22, and had little ability to maneuver. Runway 22 had been closed permanently a year earlier. Fire trucks had been placed on Runway 22, anticipating a landing on nearby Runway 31, so all the vehicles were quickly moved out of the way before the airplane touched down.

ATC also advised that a four-lane Interstate highway ran north and south just east of the airport, which they could land on if they did not think they could make the runway. Captain Haynes replied that they were passing over the interstate at that time and they would try for the runway instead.

Fitch continued to control the aircraft's descent by adjusting engine thrust. With the loss of all hydraulics, the flaps could not be extended, and since flaps control both the minimum required forward speed and sink rate, the crew was unable to control either the airspeed or the sink rate. On final approach, the aircraft's forward speed was 220 kn and it had a sink rate of 1850 ft/min, while a safe landing would require 140 kn forward speed and 300 ft/min sink rate. Moments before landing, the roll to the right suddenly worsened significantly and the aircraft began to pitch forward into a dive; Fitch realized this and pushed both throttles to full power in a desperate, last-ditch attempt to level the plane. It was now 16:00. The CVR recorded these final moments:

The engines were not able to respond to Fitch's controls in time to stop the roll, and the airplane struck the ground with its right wing, spilling fuel which ignited immediately. The tail section broke off from the force of the impact, and the rest of the aircraft bounced several times, shedding the landing gear and engine nacelles and breaking the fuselage into several main pieces. At final impact, the right wing was torn off and the main part of the aircraft skidded sideways, rolled over onto its back, and slid to a stop upside-down in a corn field to the right of Runway 22. Witnesses reported that the aircraft "cartwheeled" end-over-end, but the investigation did not confirm this. The reports were due to misinterpretation of the video of the crash that showed the flaming right wing tumbling end-over-end and the intact left wing, still attached to the fuselage, rolling up and over as the fuselage flipped over.

Flight 232 Memorial

The Flight 232 Memorial was built along the Missouri River in Sioux City, Iowa, to commemorate the heroism of the flight crew and the rescue efforts the Sioux City community undertook after the crash. It features a statue of Iowa National Guard Lt. Col. Dennis Nielsen from a news photo that was taken that day while he was carrying a three-year-old to safety.

Investigation and cause

Investigation

The rear engine's fan disk and blade assembly – about 8 ft across – could not be located at the accident scene despite an extensive search. The engine's manufacturer, General Electric, offered rewards of $50,000 for the disk and $1,000 for each fan blade. Three months after the crash, a farmer discovered most of the fan disk, with several blades still attached, in her cornfield, thereby qualifying her for a reward, as a General Electric lawyer confirmed. The rest of the fan disk and most of the additional blades were later found nearby.

The NTSB determined that the probable cause of this accident was the inadequate consideration given to human factors limitations in the inspection and quality control procedures used by United Airlines' engine overhaul facility. These resulted in the failure to detect a fatigue crack originating from a previously undetected metallurgical defect located in a critical area of the titanium-alloy stage-1 fan disk that was manufactured by General Electric Aircraft Engines. The uncontained manner in which the engine failed resulted in high-speed metal fragments being hurled from the engine; these fragments penetrated the hydraulic lines of all three independent hydraulic systems aboard the aircraft, which rapidly lost their hydraulic fluid. The subsequent catastrophic disintegration of the disk resulted in the liberation of debris in a pattern of distribution and with energy levels that exceeded the level of protection provided by design features of the hydraulic systems that operate the DC-10's flight controls; the flight crew lost its ability to operate nearly all of them.

Text from the Wikipedia article “United Airlines Flight 232” (revision 1374050874, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article

NTSB narrative

The Safety Board's full report on this investigation is provided as Aviation Accident Report number AAR-90/06. To obtain a copy of this report, or to view the executive summary online, please see the Web site at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm

UNITED AIRLINE FLT 232 WAS CRUISING AT FL 370, WHEN THERE WAS A CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF THE # 2 (TAIL MOUNTED) ENG. THIS WAS DUE TO SEPN, FRAGMENTATION & FORCEFUL DISCHARGE OF THE STAGE 1 FAN ROTOR ASSEMBLY PARTS FM THE #2 ENG (UNCONTAINED FAILURE), WHICH LED TO LOSS OF THE 3 HYD SYSTEMS THAT POWERED THE FLT CTLS. THE FLIGHTCREW EXPERIENCED SEVERE DIFFICULTIES CTLG THE ACFT, WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY CRASHED DRG AN EMERG LNDG AT SIOUX CITY. AN INV REVEALED EVIDENCE CONCERNING LIMITATIONS IN INSPN & QUALITY CTL PROC USED DRG ENG OVERHAUL, WHICH RESULTED IN A FAILURE TO DETECT A FATIGUE CRACK, ORIGINATING FM A PREVIOUSLY UNDETECTED METALLURGICAL DEFECT IN A CRITICAL AREA OF THE STATE 1 FAN DISK. (SEE: NTSB/AAR-90/06)

Probable cause

THE INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO HUMAN FACTORS LIMITATIONS IN THE INSPECTION AND QUALITY CONTROL PROCEDURES USED BY UNITED AIRLINES' ENGINE OVERHAUL FACILITY WHICH RESULTED IN THE FAILURE TO DETECT A FATIGUE CRACK ORIGINATING FROM A PREVIOUSLY UNDECTECTED METALLURGICAL DEFECT LOCATED IN A CRITICAL AREA OF THE STAGE 1 FAN DISK THAT WAS MANUFACTURED BY GENERAL ELECTRIC AIRCRAFT ENGINES. THE SUBSEQUENT CATASTROPHIC DISINTEGRATION OF THE DISK RESULTED IN THE LIBERATION OF DEBRIS IN A PATTERN OF DISTRIBUTION AND WITH ENERGY LEVELS THAT EXCEEDED THE LEVEL OF PROTECTION PROVIDED BY DESIGN FEATURES OF THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEMS THAT OPERATED THE DC-10'S FLIGHT CONTROLS.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

Wikipedia article: United Airlines Flight 232
Article
United Airlines Flight 232
Revision
1374050874 · 2026-09-09 · retrieved 2026-09-18
Wikidata
Q580343
Licence
Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
NTSB record DCA89MA063
Event ID
20001213X28786
Case number
DCA89MA063
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Where each value comes from
Record
Wikipedia article "United Airlines Flight 232" (page 426865, revision 1374050874); merged with NTSB case DCA89MA063 (events / aircraft)
Date
NTSB record DCA89MA063: NTSB API eventDate, eventTimeUtc and eventTimeUtcOffsetHours (local date)
Place and country
Wikipedia infobox: site; country from NTSB record DCA89MA063
Map position
Wikipedia: Wikipedia article coordinates
Aircraft, operator and route
NTSB record DCA89MA063: aircraft; gaps from Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
Operation
NTSB record DCA89MA063: operated under Part 121: Air Carrier
Fatalities
Reviewed (2026-09-19): NTSB final report AAR-90/06, https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR-90-06.pdf
Ground fatalities
Reviewed (2026-09-19): NTSB final report AAR-90/06, https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR-90-06.pdf
Summary
Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (4)
  • One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "United Airlines Flight 232" and NTSB case DCA89MA063, matched by the same aircraft registration and date. For this US event the NTSB's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
  • Death toll settled: the NTSB record (DCA89MA063) gives 111 and the Wikipedia article 112; NTSB final report AAR-90/06 gives 112. NTSB's injury table lists 111 fatal (1 flight attendant, 110 passengers), but its footnote says one more passenger died 31 days after the accident. Under 49 CFR 830.2 (death within 30 days) he was classed as seriously injured. Wikipedia's 112 counts that later death.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.