Vauxhall helicopter crash

Investigation

The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), the body responsible for air accident investigation in the UK, announced an inquiry into the incident. The Civil Aviation Authority announced that the crash was the first fatal helicopter crash in central London since records began in 1976.

A preliminary report published by the AAIB on 23 January indicated that Caring, the client Barnes was to collect, had expressed concerns about the weather and twice suggested he delay take-off. But Barnes stated that he had already started his engine, and chose to proceed with the flight across London in weather later described by the Met Office as prone to widespread low cloud, poor visibility and patches of freezing fog. After being unable to land at Elstree at 07:46, Barnes decided to return to Redhill. After being put under radar control, having entered the London CTR at 07:55, at 07:56 Barnes asked ATC for clearance to divert to the London Heliport. The ATC controller placed Barnes in a hold over the River Thames between Vauxhall Bridge and Westminster Bridge, while checking with controllers at Battersea as to whether they could accept the helicopter.

The report stated that at 07:59, just 15 seconds before hitting the crane, the final exchange between ATC and the helicopter, callsign Rocket 2, was:

ATC: Rocket 2, yeah Battersea diversion approved; you're cleared to Battersea.

Barnes: Lovely thanks; Rocket 2.

ATC: Rocket 2, contact Battersea 122.9.

Barnes: 229, thanks a lot.

After the exchange ended at 07:59:18, when the helicopter was approximately 150 m south-west of Vauxhall Bridge, it immediately afterwards began to turn right. At 07:59:25, it struck the crane on the south side of the river 275 m from the south-west end of Vauxhall Bridge.

The AAIB report also stated that:

Calculations suggest that the collision happened at about 682 ft above ground level. The total height from the ground to the top of the crane's jib was 719 ft.

The main rotor head, gearbox, and a section of one of the four rotor blades from the helicopter, which had all separated from the fuselage as an immediate result of the initial collision with the jib, landed in the loading bay of New Covent Garden Market in Nine Elms, where they hit a delivery van.

The solar-powered red warning lights on top of the crane were not switched on during the crash, because the official requirement was that "the obstacle be lit at night only." An official Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) warning had been issued about the structure.

In March 2013, BBC London report indicated that the crash could have been prevented, based on a study written in 2005 to which "19 experts contributed, from organisations including National Air Traffic Services (NATS), the MoD, the Metropolitan Police Air Support Unit and the British Helicopter Advisory Board". A number of safety issues had been raised by the study – particularly relating to visibility, meteorology and flying in a crowded and complex urban environment – but the CAA had not yet made any changes to the air rules. However, the studies and commentary were claimed to be productive.

The final report was published on 9 September 2014. The report identified two causal factors:

1. The pilot turned onto a collision course with the crane attached to the building and was probably unaware of the helicopter’s proximity to the building at the beginning of the turn.

2. The pilot did not see the crane or saw it too late to take effective avoiding action.

Ten recommendations were made.

An inquest determined that the deaths of Barnes and Wood were accidental.