USAir Flight 405
Fokker 28-4000 · Runway excursion after icing
From LaGuardia Airport (LGA) to Cleveland Hopkins International Airport (CLE)
Event
- NTSB case
- DCA92MA025
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- Event fatalities
- 27 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- 0
- Occupants
- 51
- Survivors
- 24
- InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
- 21
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Airline
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Instrument Meteorological Cond
Fokker 28-4000
- Flight
- US405
- Aircraft type
- Fokker 28
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N485US
- Operator
- USAir
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From LaGuardia Airport (LGA)To Cleveland Hopkins International Airport (CLE), Cleveland, OH
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 121: Air Carrier
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Initial climb
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Loss of control in flight
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Destroyed
Cause areas
- Company/operator management › Information insufficient
- Faa(other/organization) › Information insufficient
- Pilot in command › Ice/frost removal from aircraft, not identified
Approximate · Coordinates from the Wikipedia article; not checked against an investigation report.
From the Wikipedia article
USAir Flight 405 was a regularly scheduled American domestic passenger flight between LaGuardia Airport in New York City and Cleveland, Ohio. On March 22, 1992, the Fokker 28 operating the flight crashed in poor weather in a partially inverted position in Flushing Bay, shortly after liftoff from LaGuardia. The undercarriage lifted off from the runway, but the airplane failed to gain lift, flying only several meters above the ground. The aircraft then veered off the runway and hit several obstructions before coming to rest in Flushing Bay, just beyond the end of the runway. Of the 51 people on board, 27 were killed, including the captain and a member of the cabin crew.
A similar accident had happened three years before, when Air Ontario Flight 1363 crashed shortly after takeoff at Dryden Regional Airport after ice had accumulated on the wings and airframe.
The subsequent investigation revealed that due to pilot error, inadequate deicing procedures at LaGuardia, and several lengthy delays, a large amount of ice had accumulated on the wings and airframe. This ice disrupted airflow over the wing, increasing drag and reducing lift, which prevented the jet from lifting off the runway. The National Transportation Safety Board concluded that the flight crew was unaware of the amount of ice that had built up after the jet was delayed by heavy ground traffic taxiing to the runway. The report also listed as a contributing factor the fact that the aircraft had begun its takeoff rotation too early at a lower speed than was standard.
Investigators also found that the deicing procedures at LaGuardia were substandard. While the jet encountered a delay up to 35 minutes, they found that the deicing fluid that was being used at the airport, and by the majority of commercial airlines across the United States, was effective for only 15 minutes. The accident led to a number of studies into the effect of ice on aircraft, and several recommendations into prevention techniques.
Flight history
The aircraft involved in the accident was a Fokker 28 airplane manufactured in the Netherlands. A two-engined, medium-range jet, the Fokker 28-4000 is designed for transporting up to 85 passengers. The jet involved in the accident was registered in the United States as N485US. It was first delivered to Piedmont Airlines in August 1986, and was acquired by USAir (US Airways) three years later in August 1989 when Piedmont and USAir merged. N485US had amassed a total of 12,462 flying hours at the time of the accident.
Captain Wallace J. Majure II, 44, who was fully qualified to pilot the F28 and four other commercial aircraft types, had accumulated about 9,820 total flying hours, of which 2,200 hours were in the F28. Majure was initially hired as an F28 first officer by Piedmont Airlines in 1985. He was later reassigned to serve as a first officer and then a captain on a Boeing 737, but finally returned to an F28 captain because of company cutbacks. He previously served for United States Navy from 1969 until 1985.
First Officer John Rachuba, 30, was hired by Piedmont in 1989. At the time of the accident, company records indicate that he had accumulated around 4,507 flying hours, of which 29 hours were in the F28. Rachuba held a flight engineer certificate with ratings for turbojet-powered aircraft and an expired instructor certificate issued on August 16, 1987. He also held a Federal Aviation Administration license for non federal control towers. Previously, he had served as a flight engineer on Boeing 707s and Boeing 727s.
Crash
Following permission for takeoff from controllers, the flight crew initiated the takeoff procedure and the first officer made a callout of 80 kn, and several seconds later, a V1 callout, followed shortly after by a VR callout. Approximately 2.2 seconds after the VR callout, the nose gear left the ground. The final report read, "the first officer described the takeoff as normal through the rotation. He stated that no problem was evident with vibration, rate of acceleration, ambient noise, [or] directional control". However, The New York Times reported that "several passengers sensed that [the airplane] was not going fast enough."
The first officer said it was "just like we lost lift." As the captain attempted to level the wings, the crew used right rudder to maneuver the aircraft back toward the ground and avoid the water below. The accident report found, "the first officer said that they seemed to agree that the airplane was not going to fly and that their control inputs were in unison." Rachuba and Majure continued to try to hold the nose up to impact in a flat attitude, although Rachuba later stated that they made no "heavy control inputs." The final report further noted, "first officer stated that he did not touch the power levers." The first officer later told investigators that the flight crew's primary focus was to find a safe place to land.
Just under five seconds after the undercarriage left the ground, the plane's left wing scraped against the asphalt for 110 ft, and the stick shaker activated. The crew received six stall warnings, before the jet began banking to the left, then to the right, and then to the left again, still only several meters above the ground. The aircraft struck two visual approach slope-indicator posts, touched down again for about 100 ft, before lifting off again and striking an instrument landing system beacon and a water pump house.
The left wing then separated from the body of the airplane, before the fuselage struck the edge of Flushing Bay and came to rest in a partially inverted position. Parts of the fuselage and cockpit were submerged in water. Confusion, disorientation, or entrapment most likely caused the drowning of passengers who otherwise sustained only minor injuries and injuries that were not life-threatening. The final report read:
Prior to impact, passengers did not assume the brace position. When the airplane came to rest, many of the passengers in the forward portion of the cabin were upside down; others, who were upright, were submerged in water over their heads. Some passengers tried to move from their seats while their seatbelts were still buckled, and other passengers had difficulty locating and releasing their seatbelt buckles because of disorientation. Following the accident, passengers reported fires in the forward left and aft portions of the airplane, including many small fires on the water. Passengers stated that they escaped through large holes in the cabin. The lead flight attendant and first officer escaped through a hole in the cabin floor near the flight attendant's position. Several passengers reported assisting others out of the cabin and into the knee-deep water. Many of them walked in the water to the dike, climbed up the wall and over an embankment, and slid down a steep hill to the runway. Others were assisted out of the water by ground personnel.
Investigation and cause
Investigation
The NTSB sent a team to the crash site to investigate the accident. They concluded that, unknown to the crew, ice had collected on the wings, which disrupted airflow and reduced lift. The inquiry lasted just under one year.
Conclusion
The final report, published by the NTSB, cited the probable cause of the accident to be:... the failure of the airline industry and the Federal Aviation Administration to provide flight crews with procedures, requirements, and criteria compatible with departure delays in conditions conducive to airframe icing and the decision by the flight crew to take off without positive assurance that the airplane's wings were free of ice accumulation after 35 minutes of exposure to precipitation following deicing. The ice contamination on the wings resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of control after lift-off. Contributing to the cause of the accident were the inappropriate procedures used by, and inadequate coordination between, the flight crew that led to a takeoff rotation at a lower than prescribed air speed.
Text from the Wikipedia article “USAir Flight 405” (revision 1367003759, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article
NTSB narrative
THE AIRPLANE HAD BEEN DEICED 2 TIMES BEFORE LEAVING THE GATE. HOWEVER, 35 MINUTES HAD ELAPSED BETWEEN THE 2ND DEICING & TAKEOFF DURING WHICH TIME ICE ACCUMULATED ON THE WING. THIS TIME PERIOD EXCEEDED THE TYPE I DEICING FLUID SAFE HOLDOVER TIME (11 MIN). THE 1ST OFFICER CALLED VR 11 KTS EARLY, AND THE CAPT ROTATED ABOUT 5 KTS EARLY. AFTER LIFTOFF THE AIRPLANE STALLED AND CAME TO REST PARTIALLY INVERTED AND SUBMERGED IN THE BAY. AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, THE OPERATOR DID NOT REQUIRE A SPECIFIC EXTERIOR INSPECTION FOR ICE CONTAMINATION OF F-28 AIRPLANES DURING PERIODS OF FREEZING PRECIPITATION. ACCIDENT HISTORY SHOWS THAT NONSLATTED, TURBOJET, TRANSPORT-CATEGORY AIRPLANES HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN A DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF TAKEOFF ACCIDENTS WHERE UNDETECTED UPPER WING ICE CONTAMINATION HAS BEEN CITED AS THE PROBABLE CAUSE OR SOLE CONTRIBUTING FACTOR.
Probable cause
THE FAILURE OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION TO PROVIDE FLIGHTCREWS WITH PROCEDURES, REQUIREMENTS, AND CRITERIA COMPATIBLE WITH DEPARTURE DELAYS IN CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO AIRFRAME ICING AND THE DECISION BY THE FLIGHTCREW TO TAKE OFF WITHOUT POSITIVE ASSURANCE THAT THE AIRPLANE'S WINGS WERE FREE OF ICE ACCUMULATION AFTER 35 MINUTES OF EXPOSURE TO PRECIPITATION FOLLOWING DEICING. THE ICE CONTAMINATION ON THE WINGS RESULTED IN AN AERODYNAMIC STALL AND LOSS OF CONTROL AFTER LIFTOFF. CONTRIBUTING TO THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WERE THE INAPPROPRIATE PROCEDURES USED BY, AND INADEQUATE COORDINATION BETWEEN, THE FLIGHTCREW THAT LED TO A TAKEOFF ROTATION AT A LOWER THAN PRESCRIBED AIRSPEED. (NTSB REPORT AAR-93/020)
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
Wikipedia article: USAir Flight 405
- Article
- USAir Flight 405
- Revision
- 1367003759 · 2026-07-31 · retrieved 2026-09-18
- Wikidata
- Q1093598
- Licence
- Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
NTSB record DCA92MA025
- Event ID
- 20001211X14270
- Case number
- DCA92MA025
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Where each value comes from
- Record
- Wikipedia article "USAir Flight 405" (page 1918787, revision 1367003759); merged with NTSB case DCA92MA025 (events / aircraft)
- Date
- NTSB record DCA92MA025: NTSB API eventDate, eventTimeUtc and eventTimeUtcOffsetHours (local date)
- Place and country
- Wikipedia infobox: site; country from NTSB record DCA92MA025
- Map position
- Wikipedia: Wikipedia article coordinates
- Aircraft, operator and route
- NTSB record DCA92MA025: aircraft; gaps from Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
- Operation
- NTSB record DCA92MA025: operated under Part 121: Air Carrier
- Fatalities
- NTSB record DCA92MA025: NTSB API totalFatal
- Ground fatalities
- NTSB record DCA92MA025: NTSB API ongroundFatal
- Summary
- Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (3)
- One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "USAir Flight 405" and NTSB case DCA92MA025, matched by the same aircraft registration and date. For this US event the NTSB's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: local date, investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date; the NTSB stores the UTC date 1992-03-23.