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British Airways Flight 5390

10 Jun 1990 · Didcot, England, United Kingdom

BAC One-Eleven 528FL · Explosive decompression of cockpit window due to poor maintenance procedures

From Birmingham Airport (BHX) to Málaga-Costa del Sol Airport (AGP)

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Event

Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
Event fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
Occupants
87
Survivors
87
InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
2
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline

BAC One-Eleven 528FL

Flight
BA5390
Aircraft type
Bac One Eleven 528
Category
Airplane · from aircraft type
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
G-BJRT
Onboard fatalities
0
Route
From Birmingham Airport (BHX)To Málaga-Costa del Sol Airport (AGP)

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft handling/service
  • Aircraft › Aircraft structures
  • Organizational issues › Management
  • Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring

From the investigation findings the Wikipedia article reports, sorted into the NTSB's cause areas with AI assistance.

Approximate · Coordinates from the Wikipedia article; not checked against an investigation report.

From the Wikipedia article

British Airways Flight 5390 was a scheduled international passenger flight from Birmingham Airport in England to Málaga Airport in Spain. On 10 June 1990, the BAC One-Eleven suffered an explosive decompression. While the aircraft was flying over Didcot, England, an improperly installed windscreen panel separated from its frame, causing the captain to be partially ejected from the aircraft. He was held in place through the window frame for 20 minutes until the first officer landed at Southampton Airport.

Accident

Aitchison handled a routine take-off at 08:20 local time (07:20 UTC), then handed control to Lancaster as the plane continued to climb. Both pilots released their shoulder harnesses and Lancaster loosened his lap belt. At 08:33 (07:33 UTC), the plane had climbed through about 17,300 ft over Didcot, and the cabin crew were preparing for meal service.

Flight attendant Nigel Ogden was entering the cockpit when a loud bang occurred and the cabin quickly filled with condensation. The left windscreen panel, on Lancaster's side of the flight deck, had separated from the forward fuselage; Lancaster was propelled out of his seat by the rushing air from the decompression and forced headfirst out of the flight deck. His knees were caught on the flight controls and his upper torso remained outside the aircraft, exposed to extreme wind and cold. The autopilot disengaged, causing the plane to descend rapidly. The flight deck door was blown inward onto the control console, blocking the throttle control (causing the aircraft to gain speed as it descended), flight documents and check lists were blown out of the cockpit, and debris blew in from the passenger cabin. Ogden rushed to grab Lancaster's belt, while the other two flight attendants secured loose objects, reassured passengers, and instructed them to adopt brace positions in anticipation of an emergency landing.

The plane was not equipped with oxygen for everyone on board, so Aitchison began a rapid emergency descent to reach an altitude with sufficient air pressure. He then re-engaged the autopilot and broadcast a distress call, but he was unable to hear the response from air traffic control (ATC) because of wind noise; the difficulty in establishing two-way communication led to a delay in initiation of emergency procedures.

Ogden, still holding on to Lancaster, was by now becoming exhausted, so Chief Steward John Heward and flight attendant Simon Rogers took over the task of holding on to the captain. By this time, Lancaster had shifted several centimetres farther outside and his head was repeatedly striking the side of the fuselage. The crew believed him to be dead, but Aitchison told the others to continue holding onto him, out of fear that letting go of him might cause him to strike the left wing, engine, or horizontal stabiliser, potentially damaging it.

Eventually, Aitchison was able to hear the clearance from ATC to make an emergency landing at Southampton Airport. The flight attendants managed to free Lancaster's ankles from the flight controls while still keeping hold of him. At 08:55 local time (07:55 UTC), the aircraft landed at Southampton and the passengers disembarked using boarding steps.

Lancaster survived with frostbite, bruising, shock, and fractures to his right arm, left thumb, and right wrist. Ogden had frostbite in his face, a dislocated shoulder, and later suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. There were no other injuries.

Investigation and cause

Investigation

Police located the blown-off windscreen panel and many of the 90 screws used to secure it near Cholsey. Investigators determined that when the windscreen was installed 27 hours before the flight, 84 of the screws used were 0.026 in too small in diameter (British Standards A211-8C vs A211-8D, which are #8–32 vs #10–32 by the Unified Thread Standard) and the remaining six were A211-7D, which is the correct diameter, but 0.1 in too short (0.7 inch vs. 0.8 inch). The previous windscreen had also been fitted using incorrect screws, which were replaced by the shift maintenance manager on a like-for-like basis without reference to maintenance documentation, as the plane was due to depart shortly. The undersized screws were unable to withstand the force due to the air pressure difference between the cabin and the outside atmosphere during flight.

(The windscreen was not of the "plug" type – fitted from the inside so that cabin pressure helps to hold it in place, but of the type fitted from the outside so that cabin pressure tends to dislodge it.)

Investigators from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch found that the shift maintenance manager responsible for installing the incorrect screws had failed to follow British Airways policies. They recommended that staff with prescription glasses should be required to wear them when undertaking maintenance tasks. They also faulted the policies themselves, which should have required testing or verification by another individual for this critical task. Finally, they found the local Birmingham Airport management responsible for not directly monitoring the shift maintenance manager's working practices.

Text from the Wikipedia article “British Airways Flight 5390” (revision 1363524070, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article

Sources

Wikipedia article: British Airways Flight 5390
Article
British Airways Flight 5390
Revision
1363524070 · 2026-07-10 · retrieved 2026-09-18
Wikidata
Q435572
Licence
Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
Where each value comes from
Record
Wikipedia article "British Airways Flight 5390" (page 1347221, revision 1363524070)
Date
Wikipedia infobox: date
Place and country
Wikipedia infobox: site
Map position
Wikipedia article coordinates
Aircraft, operator and route
Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
Operation
airline flight number in the infobox
Fatalities
Wikipedia infobox: aircraft fatalities
Ground fatalities
not stated in the Wikipedia infobox
Summary
Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (1)
  • Wikipedia · Facts from the Wikipedia article's infobox and coordinates, not checked against an investigation report. Independent review pending.