Avianca Flight 052

25 Jan 1990 · Cove Neck, New York, United States

Boeing 707-321B · Crashed following fuel exhaustion

From El Dorado International Airport (MEO) to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK)

Show on map NTSB source dataset Read the Wikipedia article

Narrative check · The NTSB narrative appears to contradict this record's registration. Values are shown as recorded, not corrected; compare with the narrative.

Event

NTSB case: DCA90MA019
Event type: Accident
Investigation: Completed
Event fatalities: 73 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities: 0
Occupants: 158
Survivors: 85
Injuries: 85
Operation: Airline
Weather: Instrument Meteorological Cond

Boeing 707-321B

Flight: AV052
Aircraft type: Boeing 707
Category: Airplane
Registration: HK201 Narrative disagrees
Operator: Avianca
Onboard fatalities: Unknown
Route: From El Dorado International Airport (MEO), MEDELN,COLUMBIATo John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), JAMACIA, NY
Aircraft age: Not recorded
Flight rules: Part 129: Foreign
Phase of flight: Approach
First occurrence: Miscellaneous/other
Also coded: Fuel exhaustion
Damage: Destroyed

Cause areas

Copilot/second pilot › Monitoring, inadequate
Fluid, fuel › Exhaustion
Fuel supply › Inadequate
Pilot in command › In-flight planning/decision, improper
Pilot in command › Unsafe/hazardous condition warning, inadequate

Approximate · Coordinates from the Wikipedia article; not checked against an investigation report.

From the Wikipedia article

Avianca Flight 052 was a regularly scheduled flight from Bogotá, Colombia, to New York City, United States, via Medellín, Colombia, that crashed on January 25, 1990, at 21:34 (UTC−05:00). The Boeing 707 flying this route ran out of fuel after a failed attempt to land at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), causing the aircraft to crash onto a hillside in the small village of Cove Neck, New York, on the north shore of Long Island. Eight of the nine crew members and 65 of the 149 passengers on board were killed. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the crash occurred due to the flight crew failing to properly declare a fuel emergency, failure to use an airline operational control dispatch system, inadequate traffic flow management by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the lack of standardized understandable terminology for pilots and controllers for minimum and emergency fuel states.

The flight left Medellín with more than enough fuel for the journey and progressed toward JFK normally. While en route, the flight was placed in three holding patterns. Due to poor communication between the air crew and the air traffic controllers, as well as an inadequate management of the fuel load by the pilots, the flight became critically low on fuel. This dire situation was not recognized as an emergency by the controllers because of the failure of the pilots to use the word "emergency". The flight attempted to make a landing at JFK, but bad weather, coupled with poor communication and inadequate management of the aircraft, forced it to abort and attempt a go-around. The flight ran out of fuel before it was able to make a second landing attempt. The airplane crashed about 20 mi from JFK. Hundreds of emergency personnel responded to the crash site and helped save victims. Many of those who survived were severely injured and required months or years to physically recover.

NTSB investigators looked at various factors that contributed to the crash. The failures of the flight crew were cited as the probable cause of the crash, but the weather, air traffic controller performances, and FAA traffic management were also cited as contributing to the events that led to the accident. This conclusion was controversial, with disagreement between investigators, passengers, and Avianca as to who was ultimately responsible. Eventually, the U.S. government joined with Avianca and settled to pay for the damages to the victims and their families. The crash has been portrayed in a variety of media.

Background

The aircraft involved was a Boeing 707-321B, registration HK-2016. The aircraft was manufactured in June 1967, and was purchased by Avianca from Pan Am in 1977. By the time of the crash, the aircraft was 22 years old and had over 61,000 flight hours. The 707 was equipped with four Pratt & Whitney JT3D-3B engines modified with a hush kit to reduce noise pollution. Avianca personnel reported that they factored in a 5% fuel overburn into the performance calculations due to the hush kit, along with an additional 5% overburn due to the age of the aircraft. Additionally, maintenance crews had noted recurring issues with the aircraft's autopilot, including the altitude hold function. These same issues were reported on the aircraft's penultimate flight, but maintenance was unable to fix the autopilot, and it was disabled as a result.

The flight was staffed by a crew of nine, including six flight attendants and three flight crew. The flight crew in the cockpit consisted of 51-year-old Captain Laureano Caviedes Hoyos, 28-year-old first officer Mauricio Klotz and 45-year-old flight engineer Matias Moyano. At the time of the crash, Captain Caviedes had been employed with Avianca for over 27 years and had logged over 16,000 hours of flight time, including over 1,500 in the 707. Caviedes had 478 hours of night flying experience in the 707 (and 2,435 hours of night flying experience in total) and had no record of any prior accidents. Co-pilot Klotz had been employed with Avianca for three years and had 1,837 hours of flight time, with 408 hours at night. Klotz had transitioned to the 707 the previous October and had logged 64 flight hours in the airframe, including 13 at night. Flight engineer Moyano had been employed with Avianca for over 23 years and had over 10,000 hours of flight time, including over 3,000 hours in the 707 and over 1,000 hours of night flying in the same airframe (and 2,986 hours of night flying regardless of airframe).

All three flight crew members had previous experience in landing at JFK.

Accident

Avianca Flight 052 was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from El Dorado International Airport in Bogotá, Colombia, to JFK in Queens, New York, with an intermediate stop at José María Córdova International Airport near Medellín, Colombia.

Crash

The JFK tower controller asked the flight to climb to 2000 ft and make a left turn. At 21:24:06, the captain asked the first officer to "tell them we are in [an] emergency". The first officer told the JFK tower controller that "we'll try once again[;] we're running out of fuel", to which the controller replied, "okay". A few seconds later, the captain again told the first officer to "advise him we are [in an] emergency" and asked if he did so. The first officer replied, "Yes sir, I already advised him." The JFK controller directed the flight to contact the NY TRACON approach controller once more at 21:24:39. The TRACON controller asked the flight to climb once more to 3000 ft. The captain asked the first officer again to "advise him we don't have fuel". The first officer replied, "Climb and maintain three thousand and ah we're running out of fuel sir." The captain once again asked whether the first officer had advised the controller of their emergency, and the first officer replied, "Yes sir. I already advise him[;] hundred and eighty on the heading[;] we are going to maintain 3000 feet and he's going to get us back."

A minute later, the controller instructed the flight to turn to the northeast and asked the flight crew if they had enough fuel to be directed 15 mi from the airport. First Officer Klotz replied, "I guess so thank you very much." At 21:29:11, Klotz asked the controller if he "can give us a final now...?" The controller said, "affirmative sir[;] turn left heading zero four zero". At 21:30:12, the controller cleared another aircraft for landing. Klotz briefly thought the clearance was directed at Avianca and began to tell Captain Caviedes to change course before the controller corrected him. The controller then asked Avianca to climb to 3000 ft. Klotz replied, "negative sir we just running out of fuel we okay three thousand now okay". The controller continued to direct the flight northward, away from the airport. At 21:31:01, the controller said, "Okay and you're number two for the approach[;] I just have to give you enough room so you make it without ah having to come out again."

At 21:32:38, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded a temporary interruption in power. A second later, Flight Engineer Moyano exclaimed, "Flame out[;] flame out on engine number four." The CVR recorded another interruption in power one second after that, and Moyano said, "Flame out on engine number three[;] essential on number two or number one." The captain acknowledged. At 21:32:49, Klotz radioed the controller, informing him that the flight had "just ah lost two engines[,] and... we need priority please". The controller instructed the flight to fly southwest to intercept the localizer. Klotz acknowledged this. The flight crew selected the ILS. At 21:33:04, the controller informed the flight that they were 15 mi from the outer marker and cleared them for an ILS approach on runway 22L. Klotz acknowledged. That was the final radio transmission from Flight 052. Caviedes asked if the ILS had been selected. Klotz replied, "It is ready on two" at 21:33:23. One second later, the CVR stopped recording. At 21:34:00, the controller tried to radio the flight, asking, "You have enough fuel to make it to the airport?" There was no response.

The NTSB report estimates that around this time, the flight crashed. The aircraft descended without power, clipped several trees and posts, and crashed onto a hill with a 24° slope in Cove Neck, New York. The fuselage partially fragmented into three distinct pieces. The cockpit and forward cabin separated from the rest of the airframe and were hurled over the crest of the hill, coming to a stop 90 ft from the rest of the wreckage. The rest of the fuselage stopped within 25 ft after impact. The main fuselage came to rest on the upslope of the hill, facing south, with the forward end extending over the crest of the hill. The right side of the forward end of the fuselage fractured a residential wooden deck.

Investigation and cause

Investigation

The NTSB commenced an investigation, which began shortly after the crash, and concluded with the issuance of its final report on April 30, 1991. Because it involved a Colombian airline, Colombia's Departamento Administrativo de Aeronáutica Civil (DAAC) also conducted an investigation into the accident.

A survey of the wreckage revealed that the tail was mostly intact, and all control surfaces were connected to the pilots' controls. Both wings had been severely damaged on impact and fractured into several pieces. The flaps and slats were found in their extended positions, with the flaps set at 14°. As with the tail, all wing control surfaces were found to have been connected to the pilots' controls. No evidence was found of any control surface failure prior to the crash. Investigators realized that none of the four engines had been under power at the time of impact. As the first responders worked to rescue the passengers, investigators recovered the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) from the wreckage, and brought them to the NTSB laboratory in Washington, DC. The FDR was an older oscillographic foil model. In 1989, the FAA began requiring domestic carriers to change to digital FDRs to minimize the errors that foil models produced. This requirement did not apply to international carriers. The Avianca FDR foil was found to have been taped down at some point prior to the flight, and thus was inoperative. The NTSB recommended in the Avianca report that the FAA take an "active role in ensuring upgraded international standards" for flight recorders. The CVR and ATC recordings became vital sources of evidence for the crash. The investigators also looked at meteorological factors that led to flight problems.

The NTSB investigators found that the weather data which the flight crew received in Medellín were 9–10 hours old. Additionally, the alternate airport on the flight plan, Logan International Airport in Boston, was forecast to be below the minimum for safe landing. The NTSB also stated that the flight crew should have been more aware of these problems and cited these deficiencies as evidence of inadequacies in the dispatch of the airplane. The NTSB also found no evidence that the flight crew ever requested weather information en route or communicated with Avianca dispatchers about their fuel status and intents as other flights did. Flight 052 did not make contact with FAA flight service stations or flight watch en route, and the NTSB was unable to determine why. The flight did not express any concern to ATC about their fuel situation during the first two holding patterns that the flight made. The first indication of worry came at 20:09 when the flight crew inquired about delays at Boston. The NTSB posited that the flight crew might have become confused about the "expect further clearance" (EFC) times they were given. This confusion may have been the reason that the flight continued to hold, burning up its reserve fuel to the point where it could no longer divert to Boston.

Investigators also cited the flight engineer for failing to calculate the "minimum approach/landing fuel quantity". The report references the 360° turn that the flight was ordered to make at 20:54 as evidence that the crew should have known that they were being treated routinely and not given any emergency priority. Instead, the CVR revealed that the flight crew was convinced that they were being given priority. Additionally, the NTSB criticized the first officer for failing to use the word "emergency" as the captain had insisted he do. Compounded with the apparent inability of the captain to hear or understand the radio communications, the NTSB called the situation a "total breakdown in communications by the flight crew". Summarizing, the investigators cited "the flight crew's failure to notify ATC of their fuel situation while holding at CAMRN in order to ensure arrival at the approach fix with an adequate approach minimum fuel level and a breakdown in communications between the flight crew and ATC, and among the flight crewmembers" as the two main factors that led to the crash.

Investigators asserted that the performances by the traffic controllers were proper and that the misunderstandings that were made were reasonable. None of the controllers involved considered the word "priority" or the assertions by the flight crew that they were running out of fuel to be indicative of an emergency. The report provided various examples of the flight crew failing to convey the danger of their situation, even moments before the engines flamed out. Although the investigators felt that the communications from the ATC personnel were "proper", the NTSB voiced concern over the controllers not placing significance on the word "priority". At a public hearing, it was revealed by an unrelated pilot that the emphasis on the word "priority" by the Avianca crew might have come from training and bulletins from Boeing that used the word in relation to fuel emergencies. Avianca also used the word "priority" in its publications on low-fuel status procedures. ATC controllers testified that "Mayday", "pan-pan", and "emergency" were the three phrases that they would respond to immediately. The report also stated that "priority" was defined in the ATC Handbook as "precedence, established by order of urgency or importance". As a result of this linguistic confusion, the NTSB recommended that the FAA work with the International Civil Aviation Organization to develop a standard glossary of clearly defined terms, as well as notify foreign carriers that they must be knowledgeable of ATC rules and procedures.

The NTSB also cited the captain's inability to land on his first attempt as contributing to the crash. The investigation revealed that wind shear was a significant factor in the failed approach, but that other factors probably contributed. The report cited recurring maintenance problems with the airplane's autopilot as a possible factor. Since the pilots had been forced to fly manually from Medellín, investigators believed this might have added to exhaustion and stress in the cockpit. For evidence, the NTSB pointed to nine instances where the captain asked the copilot to repeat the ATC instructions or to confirm the aircraft configuration. This stress, investigators asserted, would have degraded the flight crew's performance on final approach. Investigators also looked at the traffic management by the Central Flow Control Facility (CFCF). The CFCF, in communication with NY TRACON, established an airport acceptance rate of 28 aircraft landings per hour that morning. Later, a CFCF supervisor contacted NY TRACON and requested a higher rate of 33 landings per hour. This acceptance rate, investigators concluded, was based on inaccurate weather conditions. The report concluded that these traffic-management problems contributed to the conditions that led to the accident but did not lead directly to the accident.

Text from the Wikipedia article “Avianca Flight 052” (revision 1361070104, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article

NTSB narrative

ON 1/25/90 AT APRX 2134 EST, AVIANCA AIRLINES FLT 052 (AVA052), A BOEING 707-321B WITH COLOMBIAN REGISTRATION HK-2016, CRASHED IN A WOODED RESIDENTIAL AREA IN COVE NECK, LONG ISLAND, NY. AVA052 WAS A SCHEDULED INTL PSGR FLT FM BOGOTA, COLOMBIA, TO JOHN F KENNEDY INTL ARPT, NY, WITH AN INTERMEDIATE STOP AT JOSE MARIA CORDOVA ARPT, NEAR MEDELLIN, COLUMBIA. OF THE 158 PERSONS ABOARD, 73 WERE FATALLY INJURED. BECAUSE OF POOR WX CONDS IN THE NORTHEASTERN PART OF THE UNITED STATES, THE FLIGHTCREW WAS PLACED IN HOLDING 3 TIMES BY ATC FOR A TOTAL OF ABOUT 1 HR & 17 MIN. DRG THE 3RD PERIOD OF HOLDING, THE FLIGHTCREW RPRTD THAT THE ACFT COULD NOT HOLD LONGER THAN 5 MIN, THAT IT WAS RUNNING OUT OF FUEL, AND THAT IT COULD NOT REACH ITS ALTERNATE ARPT, BOSTON-LOGAN INTL. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE FLIGHTCREW EXECUTED A MISSED APCH TO JOHN F KENNEDY INTL ARPT. WHILE TRYING TO RTRN TO THE ARPT, THE ACFT EXPERIENCED A LOSS OF POWER TO ALL 4 ENGS & CRASHED APRX 16 MI FROM THE ARPT. (SEE NTSB/AAR-91/04 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION)

Probable cause

THE FAILURE OF THE FLIGHTCREW TO ADEQUATELY MANAGE THE AIRPLANE'S FUEL LOAD, AND THEIR FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE AN EMERGENCY FUEL SITUATION TO AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL BEFORE FUEL EXHAUSTION OCCURRED. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE FLIGHTCREW'S FAILURE TO USE AN AIRLINE OPERATIONAL CONTROL DISPATCH SYSTEM TO ASSIST THEM DURING THE INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT INTO A HIGH-DENSITY AIRPORT IN POOR WEATHER. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS INADEQUATE TRAFFIC FLOW MANAGEMENT BY THE FAA AND THE LACK OF STANDARDIZED UNDERSTANDABLE TERMINOLOGY FOR PILOTS AND CONTROLLERS FOR MINIMUM AND EMERGENCY FUEL STATES. THE SAFETY BOARD ALSO DETERMINES THAT WINDSHEAR, CREW FATIGUE AND STRESS WERE FACTORS THAT LED TO THE UNSUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE FIRST APPROACH AND THUS CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

Wikipedia article: Avianca Flight 052

Article: Avianca Flight 052
Revision: 1361070104 · 2026-06-25 · retrieved 2026-09-18
Wikidata: Q783193
Licence: Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)

NTSB record DCA90MA019

Event ID: 20001212X22401
Case number: DCA90MA019
Dataset: historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256: 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74

Where each value comes from

Record: Wikipedia article "Avianca Flight 052" (page 1042218, revision 1361070104); merged with NTSB case DCA90MA019 (events / aircraft)
Date: NTSB record DCA90MA019: NTSB API eventDate, eventTimeUtc and eventTimeUtcOffsetHours (local date)
Place and country: Wikipedia infobox: site; country from NTSB record DCA90MA019
Map position: Wikipedia: Wikipedia article coordinates
Aircraft, operator and route: NTSB record DCA90MA019: aircraft; gaps from Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
Operation: NTSB record DCA90MA019: operated under Part 129: Foreign
Fatalities: NTSB record DCA90MA019: NTSB API totalFatal
Ground fatalities: NTSB record DCA90MA019: NTSB API ongroundFatal
Summary: Wikipedia infobox: summary

Source notes (3)

One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "Avianca Flight 052" and NTSB case DCA90MA019, matched by the same aircraft maker and place and date. For this US event the NTSB's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: local date, investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
The date is the local date; the NTSB stores the UTC date 1990-01-26.