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CEN26FA147 · Experimental Homebuilt Airshark

25 Mar 2026 · Statesboro, GA, United States

Experimental Homebuilt Airshark · Accident

From Statesboro Bulloch County Airport (KTBR) to West Georgia Regional Airport / O V Gray Field (KCTJ)

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Event

NTSB case
CEN26FA147
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Ongoing
API-reported fatalities
1 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Experimental Homebuilt Airshark

Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N220AS
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Statesboro Bulloch County Airport (KTBR), Statesboro, GATo West Georgia Regional Airport / O V Gray Field (KCTJ), Carrollton, GA
Aircraft age
About 33 years (built 1993)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Unknown
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Unknown or undetermined
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

No findings designated as a cause are recorded in the NTSB data yet.

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

On March 25, 2026, about 1453 eastern daylight time, an experimental homebuilt Airshark airplane, N220AS, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Statesboro, Georgia. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91personal flight. The airplane was being prepared for a ferry flight from Statesboro, Georgia, to Carrollton, Georgia, when one of the pilots decided to conduct a local flight to verify the airplane was performing normally before beginning the cross-country flight. Local authorities received a cell phone crash alert at 1453. First responders located the wreckage in a wheat field where it came to rest inverted.

Figure 1. N220AS before the accident.

The airplane struck a tree in about a 14° right wing low attitude about 42 feet above the ground on a 062° magnetic heading. A ground scar at 215 feet forward from the tree appeared to have been created by a propeller strike. At 218 feet from the tree, a large ground scar led up to the airplane which came to rest inverted 245 feet from the tree. An impression in the soil to the left of the large groundscar was consistent with the right wing as evidenced by the green position light lens found at the outer end of the impression. An on site examination of the wreckage revealed no anomalies were found with the flight control system or flight control surfaces. Flight control continuity was verified for the ailerons, rudder, and elevators. The airplane was reported to have been fueled to capacity (118 gallons) before the accident flight. The fuel selector in the cockpit was in the left fuel tank position. Both fuel tanks were breached, and the surrounding vegetation was yellow in the field where the wreckage came to rest. The right fuel cap and its receptacle were separated from the wing but present in the debris field next to the airplane. Both fuel caps were present and secure in their receptacles. To facilitate viewing the fuel tank finger screens with a borescope, access holes were made in the wings near the wing root in the top wing skin. The right fuel tank finger screen was free of obstructions. The left fuel tank finger screen was corroded and appeared to be 30 to 40% obstructed. The obstruction’s appearance was consistent with solder used to manufacture the finger screen’s seam and end cap and did not appear to be foreign object debris from the fuel tank. Both fuel tanks were clean and free of debris in the area around the finger screens. The airplane was equipped with a bail type gascolator and an inline paper element style fuel filter. The bail type gascolator bowl was sampled and blue liquid with an odor consistent with 100LL aviation fuel was collected in a container. When water-indicating paste was applied to the fuel, there was a small amount of water present (a tiny portion of the paste turned bright red). The gascolator bowl was removed and there was about a ½ teaspoon of water present. There was no filtering element or screen present in the gascolator bowl, and rust was present in the bottom of the bowl. The paper style fuel filter was removed from its mount. It contained blue liquid consistent with the appearance and odor of 100LL aviation fuel. Water-indicating paste was added to the fuel. It did not indicate any water was present. The paper filter element was generally clean. Some rust and corrosion were present in the metal housing. No leaks or anomalies were noted along the fuel lines in the airframe. Fuel was present in the engine compartment fuel lines and all the engine fuel system components examined. The fuel injector servo and fuel flow divider were disassembled and no anomalies were noted. The engine driven fuel pump was removed from the engine and produced air at the outlet port when it was actuated by hand. The unit was disassembled and no anomalies were noted. The engine valve covers were removed and crankshaft continuity to the rear gears and to the valvetrain was confirmed. Compression and suction were observed from all six cylinders. A wire screen covered the fuel injector servo; corrosion and some trapped debris were present. No other induction air filtration system was present for this installation. Both magnetos exhibited impact damage. The left magneto did not produce spark when rotated by hand. The right magneto produced spark when it was rotated with a drill. The spark plug electrodes exhibited dark grey coloration and normal wear signatures. The No. 3 bottom spark plug electrodes were oil soaked. The ignition harness was secure and no damage was noted. Oil was observed in the engine. The oil suction screen contained about ¼ teaspoon of dark granular material. The oil filter was not examined due to impact damage. The propeller remained attached to the engine. One blade was bent aft about 20° about 10 inches from its tip. One blade was curved aft about 50° about 12 inches from its tip. One blade was curved aft about 80° about 12 inches from its tip. All three blades were twisted in varying amounts towards their respective blade faces. A Levil Flight Aviation broadcasting outer module (BOM) was found on the ground next to the airplane, which had been attached to one of the wing’s lower wing skin access covers. The unit is capable of providing flight data wirelessly to a phone or tablet in the cockpit when properly configured. The unit was reported to have been installed the day of the accident flight, but the contracted ferry flight pilot declined to configure the device due to time constraints. According to the manufacturer’s website, the unit may contain a flash memory card. The unit was retained for further examination.

Verbatim NTSB factual narrative from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record CEN26FA147
Event ID
20260325202696
Case number
CEN26FA147
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: de68af83823e51f40abc6b0daa0e5755eec3e078d91fff80e2b7f98df6b99daa; retrieved 2026-09-15T09:14:39.838Z.