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Air Methods Airbus Helicopters EC 130 T2 accident

22 Feb 2026 · Evergreen, AL, United States

Airbus Helicopters EC 130 T2 · Accident during landing

From Pensacola International Airport (PNS) to an unrecorded destination

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Event

NTSB case
ERA26FA120
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Ongoing
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
0
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Charter & commuter
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Airbus Helicopters EC 130 T2

Aircraft type
Airbus EC-130
Category
Helicopter
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N237SH
Operator
Air Methods
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Pensacola International Airport (PNS), Pensacola, FLTo not recorded
Aircraft age
About 12 years (built 2014)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Landing
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Unknown or undetermined
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

No findings designated as a cause are recorded in the NTSB data yet.

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

On February 22, 2026, at 1510 central standard time, an Airbus EC130 T2 helicopter, N237SH, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Evergreen, Alabama. The commercial pilot and two medical crewmembers were seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 positioning flight. According to the operator, following a patient transport, the pilot flew the helicopter to Pensacola International Airport (PNS), Pensacola, Florida and refueled. Following the refueling, the pilot departed PNS and began the flight back to the helicopter’s home base at Evergreen Medical Center helipad, Evergreen, Alabama. The pilot reported that while on approach to the helipad, the helicopter began an uncommanded yaw to the left. In response to the uncommanded yaw, the pilot lowered the collective, and pitched the nose forward in an attempt to gain airspeed to try to “fly out.” The pilot continued that, despite the attempted remediation, the yaw continued and that, when the helicopter was about 10 to 20 feet above the ground, it impacted an object. Surveillance video captured a portion of the accident sequence. The helicopter entered the frame as it began its approach to the helipad. The helicopter then began to slow, and subsequently began to spin into a leftward yaw. The helicopter descended behind trees, and the impact could be heard. The main wreckage site was located about 0.2 miles from the helipad. The first identified impact point was the roof of a residential home; there were two large dents in the roof’s ridge as well as a large gouge in a panel of the metal roof. The main wreckage came to rest in the home’s southern yard. The main wreckage site contained the helicopter’s fuselage, tail boom, main rotor blades, and portions of the fenestron. The furthest piece of wreckage was a portion of the fenestron rotor support and was located about 300 ft northwest of the main wreckage location. Three of the fenestron’s blades and other portions of the fenestron hub were located between the main wreckage location and the furthest piece of wreckage. The airframe sustained substantial damage during the accident sequence to the fuselage, tail boom, fenestron, main rotor assembly, and both horizontal stabilizers. The fuselage displayed impact damage signatures with most of the damage occurring to the forward and left side. The tail boom was found separated from the fuselage. The fenestron had mostly separated from the tail boom and portions of the composite vertical stabilizer and the fenestron shroud were found throughout the accident site. Most of the fenestron rotor assembly was found about 30 ft from the main wreckage location. It contained most of the fenestron rotor hub, gearbox, 5 complete rotor blades and a portion of a 6th rotor blade. The rest of the 6th rotor blade was found a few feet away. Three of the other rotor blades were found between the fenestron rotor assembly and the furthest piece of wreckage (which was also part of the fenestron rotor assembly). Only a small portion of the 10th rotor blade was found; the rest of the blade was unable to be located at the time of the on scene examination. Several of the fenestron stators had separated and were located within the accident site. The fenestron drive shaft had separated into multiple pieces, all of the fractures were consistent with impact damage. The drive shaft was rotated manually, and the fenestron rotor hub rotated without signs of binding. The anti-torque pedals remained attached to the airframe and were jammed, consistent with the observed impact damage. The anti-torque control cable rod end remained attached to the pedals, the cable was fractured and bent near the separated tail boom. The rod end at the fenestron end had separated from the cable and its attach point on the fenestron rotor hub control attach point. The rod end was not located at the time of the on scene examination. All three main rotor blades were destroyed. There was a large trench in the dirt underneath the Starflex and mast area. Control continuity from the cyclic and collective was observed from the cockpit to the rotor mast hydraulic actuators. All of the hydraulic servos and control link components sustained impact damage. The collective twist-grip was found in the "Flight" gate. Some attenuation damage was observed on the pilot's seat, the middle rear seat, and the far right seat. All four seats were equipped with 4-point restraints; the center seat's lap belt showed fraying in the webbing. The crash-resistant fuel system remained relatively undamaged with approximately 50 gallons of fuel on board. The engine remained attached to the engine deck by its forward and rear mounts. The bellmouth was broken away, leaving the axial compressor visible. The gas generator could be rotated by hand, and there was no visible foreign object damage on the axial compressor blades. The free turbine could be rotated by hand, and continuity was confirmed from the free turbine to the main rotor head. Proper freewheel operation was also confirmed. All fuel, oil, air and electrical connections were found properly connected and saftied. The Module 1 and 5 magnetic plugs were found clean as well as the electric chip detector. The fuel filter delta P was found not activated (no bypass). The module 5 reduction gearbox was removed for input pinion slippage mark examination. The slippage mark was found to have moved by approximately 2mm. The emergency backup control ancillary unit was removed, and the key was in the 12 o’clock position. The wreckage was recovered and retained for further examination.

Verbatim NTSB factual narrative from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record ERA26FA120
Event ID
20260222202478
Case number
ERA26FA120
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 7b9c410d85ea5084d482b35b94965322241a262d7858206fc88938bf0af1e535; retrieved 2026-09-16T20:48:27.501Z.