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ERA24LA263 · Rotorway EXEC 162F

14 Jun 2024 · Alva, FL, United States

Rotorway EXEC 162F · Accident: flight control system malfunction/failure on approach

From Alva, FL (private airstrip) to an unrecorded destination

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Event

NTSB case
ERA24LA263
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
0
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Rotorway EXEC 162F

Aircraft type
Rotorway EXEC
Category
Helicopter
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N99TE
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Alva, FL (private airstrip)To not recorded
Aircraft age
About 25 years (built 1999)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Approach · VFR pattern final
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Flight control system malfunction/failure
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability
  • Aircraft › Aircraft propeller/rotor

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The pilot of the experimental amateur-built helicopter stated that, as a part of the preflight inspection, he checked the tail rotor drive belt tension with a spring scale and it was within limits. Shortly after departing on the accident flight, while flying at an altitude between 200 and 300 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot-rated passenger took over the controls. As they approached an airstrip for landing, at an altitude about 150 ft above ground level (agl) with an airspeed of 20-30 mph, which was just below effective translational lift (ETL), the helicopter made an uncommanded yaw to the left. The passenger was unable to maintain directional control with the application of right anti-torque pedal input. The pilot took over the controls from the passenger and applied forward cyclic in combination with full input of the right anti-torque pedal to correct the yaw. However, the helicopter descended in a sweeping left turn and the pilot was unable to regain full directional yaw control before the helicopter contacted the edge of an irrigation ditch. The helicopter rolled over to the right and came to rest, resulting in substantial damage to the airframe and rotor blades. Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed that the tail rotor tensioner assembly was not secured. The right side of the tail rotor drive belt jam nut and the self-locking nylon nut were loose. The nuts, when properly secured, placed tension on the tail rotor drive belt. Even though the preflight tail rotor tension test was accomplished and within limits, there was no access to physically view these nuts during preflight inspection. Based on the available information, it is likely that the nuts loosened in flight, which would have allowed slack in the drive belt that prevented full tail rotor drive control

Probable cause

A loss of tail rotor control as a result of unsecured tail rotor drive belt tensioner bolts.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record ERA24LA263
Event ID
20240617194479
Case number
ERA24LA263
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates, cause areas. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 291da11aed99dec2ce8c3af775dc7b88e73d822be63ca1a043436abf6091a5b7; retrieved 2026-09-16T18:54:18.686Z.