Med Flight Air Ambulance Learjet 35 A accident

While in cruise flight approaching the descent for landing, the crew received automated weather information that was about an hour old that reported wind from the northeast. The crew selected the precision approach to the airport, which landed toward the southeast. Unknown to the crew, the wind had shifted from the northeast to a tailwind from the northwest and had increased in velocity with gusts. They did not request current weather during the descent, and no weather information was provided by the tower controller. Recorded data for the approach revealed that the airplane had a 15-knot tailwind and a steep descent rate before the landing, which exceeded the company’s general operation manual’s criteria for a stabilized approach. Data showed the airplane touched down at 124 knots about halfway down runway 13, which was wet, with about 2,600 ft remaining. The captain applied the brakes and reported that they were unresponsive. The airplane overran the runway and traveled into a grass field. The nose landing gear separated from the airplane, resulting in substantial damage to the fuselage. The first officer (FO) stated that he perceived that the airplane had hydroplaned on landing. A performance study conducted for the accident flight using available airplane and weather information revealed the landing distance for the airplane on a wet/contaminated runway was 4,550 ft; runway 13 was 5,601 ft. The calculated landing reference speed to included “half the gust factor” was 125 knots. The manufacturer’s flight manual lists the maximum tailwind component as 10 knots. The landing data for the flight could not be calculated since the actual tailwind component at the time of the landing exceeded 10 knots.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset