WPR22FA298 · Cirrus Design Corp SR22
Cirrus Design Corp SR22 · Accident: VFR encounter with IMC while maneuvering
From Friday Harbor Airport (FHR) to Olympia Regional Airport (OLM)
Event
- NTSB case
- WPR22FA298
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 1 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- General aviation
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Instrument Meteorological Cond
Cirrus Design Corp SR22
- Aircraft type
- Cirrus SR22
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N379DH
- Operator
- Unknown
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Friday Harbor Airport (FHR), Friday Harbor, WATo Olympia Regional Airport (OLM), Olympia, WA
- Aircraft age
- About 17 years (built 2005)
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Maneuvering
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- VFR encounter with IMC
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems
- Environmental issues › Conditions/weather/phenomena
- Personnel issues › Action/decision
- Personnel issues › Task performance
Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
The instrument-rated pilot was conducting a personal, cross-country, visual-flight-rules (VFR) flight and there was no record of the pilot having a formal weather briefing before departing. Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) data and data recovered from the airplane’s multi-function display (MFD) showed that, after departure, the airplane proceeded direct toward its destination on a southerly heading and climbed to an altitude of about 1,100 ft mean sea level (msl). About 13 minutes later, the data showed that the airplane had turned to an easterly heading and then back to a southerly heading as it descended to about 900 ft msl. The data then showed the airplane turning back to the west as it climbed to about 1,460 ft msl. The last recorded data point indicated that the airplane was about 1,363 ft msl located about 930 ft northeast of the accident site. The airplane impacted wooded terrain about 1,286 ft msl and came to rest upright. The wreckage debris path was about 300 ft in length. The impact signatures observed on the trees and wreckage indicated that the airplane impacted trees and terrain in a slightly nose-low attitude. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation. Recorded engine operating data from the MFD showed that during the last 36 seconds of recorded data, the engine was operating at 2,680 rpm and 25.8 inches of manifold pressure. Recorded weather at the departure airport showed that VFR conditions existed at the time the airplane departed. However, VFR to marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) conditions existed throughout the area, with an area of instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions near the accident site, which included an overcast cloud layer at 900 ft msl. Law enforcement reported that when they arrived at the accident site, they observed a fog bank about 700 ft above the ground and about ¼ mile north of the accident site. A pre-purchase report supplied by a maintenance facility about 2 years before the accident stated in part that “PFD [primary flight display] & MFD Screens showing signs of possible failures.” Another maintenance facility reported that about a month before the accident, the pilot/owner had brought the airplane to their facility for issues involving the PFD and MFD. The representative stated that neither display was working, and that the PFD had a magenta backdrop that indicated “an internal power fail” and the MFD was operative, but the back lighting of the display was not functioning, which made it “virtually impossible to see.” Neither the engine or propeller logbook contained entries pertaining to the repair or replacement of the PFD or MFD, thus it’s likely that neither display was replaced or repaired prior to the accident flight.
It’s likely that while en route, the pilot encountered an area of deteriorating instrument meteorological weather conditions (IMC) that obscured terrain and reduced visibility, and as the pilot attempted to turn around and exit the deteriorating weather conditions, the airplane struck trees and the terrain. It’s also likely that the pilot was operating the airplane with known mechanical issues with both the PFD and MFD, which would decrease the pilot’s ability to maintain situational awareness. The pilot's autopsy identified dilated cardiomyopathy, which could result in a sudden impairing or incapacitating cardiac arrhythmia. However, based on ADS-B data and physical evidence, a sudden incapacitating medical event is unlikely to have occurred. The pilot had a history of high blood sugar, and his postmortem urine glucose was consistent with high blood sugar. The absence of detected glucose in his vitreous fluid indicates it is unlikely he was experiencing any severe metabolic disturbance related to high blood sugar at the time of the crash. Both cardiomyopathy and diabetes/prediabetes may be associated with fatigue, but whether such effects were significant for the pilot is unknown. The pilot's toxicology testing indicated that he had used doxepin. The measured levels of doxepin and nordoxepin in heart blood indicate a possibility that he may have been experiencing sedating effects from the medication, but no more-specific conclusion can be drawn, particularly after accounting for the possibility of postmortem redistribution. Whether impairing effects of the pilot's medical conditions or use of medications contributed to the accident could not be determined.
Probable cause
The pilot’s continued operation of the airplane with known mechanical malfunctions with the flight displays, and his continued flight into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in an inflight collision with terrain while maneuvering.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record WPR22FA298
- Event ID
- 20220811105713
- Case number
- WPR22FA298
- Dataset
- full-current
- Source SHA-256
- 5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates, cause areas. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: 33c826261cb1bdbb091919da7707a789918fa30136aa612ea6814bbb8e565b18; retrieved 2026-09-15T07:48:57.668Z.