CEN22LA153 · Piper Aircraft Inc PA-46-600TP
Piper Aircraft Inc PA-46-600TP · Accident: loss of control on ground during landing
From Jacksonville Executive at Craig Airport (CRG) to an unrecorded destination
Event
- NTSB case
- CEN22LA153
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- Event fatalities
- Unknown
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- General aviation
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Piper Aircraft Inc PA-46-600TP
- Aircraft type
- Piper PA-46
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N627PR
- Operator
- Unknown
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Jacksonville Executive at Craig Airport (CRG), Jacksonville, FLTo not recorded
- Aircraft age
- About 1 year (built 2021)
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Landing · landing roll
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Loss of control on ground
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability
- Aircraft › Aircraft systems
Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
**This report was modified on July 22, 2026. Please see the public docket for this accident to view the original report.** The pilot was landing the airplane with a right quartering headwind, resulting in a right crosswind component of about 10 to 14 kts, which was less than but near the airplane’s maximum demonstrated crosswind component of 17 kts. The airplane touched down left of runway centerline. After touchdown, the pilot attempted to correct to the right toward the centerline with rudder inputs. As the airplane decelerated through about 68 kts and approached the runway centerline, the airplane entered a 45° hard right turn, and the pilot reported that he was unable to control the turn with left rudder input. The airplane departed the right side of the runway, about 1,330 ft from the threshold and about 570 ft after touchdown, and the nose landing gear (NLG) collapsed. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the engine mount. Postaccident examination of the runway surface revealed rubber transfer markings consistent with the NLG, right main landing gear (RMLG), and left main landing gear (LMLG). The NLG transfer mark began about 900 ft from the threshold and about 10 ft left of the centerline, with light intensity and its tread pattern evident, consistent with a rolling, non-skidding tire. The rolling tire marking continued until the right veering began, at which point it was of moderate intensity with tread pattern evident and transitioned to heavy intensity and no tread pattern, consistent with a skidding tire. A review of the airplane’s avionics data revealed that the RMLG touched down first, followed by the LMLG about 1 second later, consistent with a right crosswind landing. The NLG touched down about 1 to 2 seconds after the RMLG. Starting about 2 seconds after LMLG touchdown, the heading and track diverged, with the nose to the right of the track, until near the runway departure location, indicating that the airplane was in a skid. The maximum divergence occurred about 1 second before the runway excursion, when the heading was about 223° and the track was about 195°. At the same time, the lateral acceleration increased, also consistent with the airplane being in a left skid. The airplane departed the runway with the heading and track mostly aligned. Postaccident examination of the NLG assembly did not reveal anomalies that would have affected its operation or steering. However, damage precluded examination of the rake angle, NLG steering adjustments, and main landing gear (MLG) alignment. The rake angle of the NLG was designed to be 90° from the airplane longitudinal axis with a very tight tolerance of +0.5°/-0.0°, which equated to a 0.0° to 0.5° forward caster angle. For NLG to be directionally stable when rolling, they must have positive dynamic trail. However, because the M600 NLG was designed with zero caster angle and zero offset (and thus zero mechanical trail), positive dynamic trail was dependent on positive pneumatic trail. Pneumatic trail varies according to tire inflation pressure, tire speed, runway friction, and tire slip angle. In a 2008 customer information letter, the manufacturer cautioned operators that low tire pressure, excessive clearance between the steering arm and steering horn rollers, and low rudder cable tension could each result in the NLG pointing in a different direction than commanded by rudder pedal inputs, even if a pilot uses proper crosswind landing technique. In a 2020 service letter, the manufacturer directed operators to perform inspection and adjustment, as necessary, of NLG steering components at 100-hour intervals. The NTSB’s investigation compared the PA-46 series (including the M600) to airplane types with similar weight and power and found it to be unique in having NLG with zero caster angle and in requiring stringent NLG maintenance. When normalized for the number of airplanes produced, the PA-46 had the highest rate of veer events investigated by the NTSB among the compared airplane types. For this event, runway markings and simulation results indicated that the NLG was initially aligned with the runway upon touchdown, in accordance with proper crosswind landing technique for an airplane with steerable NLG, and then became fully deflected to the right within a few seconds. The investigation was unable to determine with certainty the source of the NLG steering inputs (that is, whether they were commanded by the pilot via the rudder pedals, the result of ground reaction forces on the tire, or a combination). However, the pilot’s description of the event, the design of the NLG that depended on variable pneumatic trail for directional stability, and the known behavior of the NLG when operated outside of tight maintenance tolerances all support an adverse airplane-pilot coupling event, in which a change in control forces or directional stability of the NLG steering system likely led to an unexpected response to control inputs and a loss of directional control. The manufacturer redesigned the lower NLG fork to move the axle 0.5 inches aft of the steering axis. This is equivalent to raking the NLG forward 5°, increasing directional stability. To the NTSB’s knowledge, no veer events have been reported with the new NLG design.
Probable cause
The airplane’s hard right turn during landing in crosswind conditions and a subsequent loss of directional control due to adverse airplane-pilot coupling attributable to the design of the nose landing gear, whose directional stability was sensitive to operational conditions and compliance with precise maintenance tolerances.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record CEN22LA153
- Event ID
- 20220328104834
- Case number
- CEN22LA153
- Dataset
- full-current
- Source SHA-256
- 5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, cause areas. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: e1f5bffef2579e375fb11e93f5172b87896823c08cb4d89bbd32df318bcf1e47; retrieved 2026-09-16T15:04:05.553Z.