ERA21LA201 · Beech A36

The pilot under instruction, who owned the airplane, and the flight instructor flew four flight legs on the day of the accident, totaling about 1 hour 17 minutes. The pilot under instruction stated that the airplane departed on the first flight leg with full fuel tanks and the fuel selector positioned to the left tank. Although he recalled moving the fuel selector to the right tank about 30 minutes into the flight, the actual flight duration based on ADS-B data was less than 30 minutes. The pilot under instruction reported that the fuel selector was positioned to the right tank during the second leg, then moved to the left tank position where it remained for the remainder of that flight and the accident flight.

During the accident flight when the airplane was close to the destination airport, the engine suddenly quit. Airplane control was transferred to the flight instructor while the pilot under instruction attempted to restore power. Among the actions that the pilot under instruction took was to move the fuel selector from the left to right tank position (in accordance with emergency checklist procedures) and then back to the left tank position, but the engine did not start.

While the flight instructor was maneuvering the airplane for an off-airport forced landing, the left wing struck a palm tree separating the outboard 5 ft of wing, which was followed by contact with the ground, contact with another tree, and a trailer before the airplane came to rest. A postcrash fire ensued.

Postaccident examination of the powertrain, air induction, ignition, and exhaust systems of the engine revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. No discrepancies were found with the airframe fuel supply, vent systems, or flight controls.

Although no fuel was found in the left fuel tank; the engine fuel supply and fuel return lines from and to the fuel selector valve were fractured in multiple areas consistent with impact. Therefore, it is likely that any remaining fuel in the left fuel tank leaked from the open fuel lines. Additionally, based on the airplane departing on the first leg with full fuel tanks, adequate fuel should have been available in either the left or right fuel tank to complete the accident flight.

The tested fuel metering components showed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The inability to rotate the throttle lever was likely the result of impact damage to the throttle lever and throttle shaft of the metering valve and was likely not a factor in the loss of engine power. Therefore, the reason for the reported sudden and total loss of engine power could not be determined based on the available evidence for this investigation.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset