CEN19LA074 · Cessna 172 S
Skymates Flight Academy Cessna 172 S and Skymates Flight Academy Cessna 172 S · Accident: midair collision en route
Event
- NTSB case
- CEN19LA074
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- General aviation
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Aircraft 1 · Cessna 172 S
- Aircraft type
- Cessna 172
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N565SP
- Operator
- Skymates Flight Academy
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Grand Prairie Municipal Airport (GPM), Grand Prairie, TXTo Grand Prairie Municipal Airport (GPM), Grand Prairie, TX
- Aircraft age
- About 19 years (built 2000)
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- En route · cruise
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Midair collision
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Aircraft 2 · Cessna 172 S
- Aircraft type
- Cessna 172
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N52243
- Operator
- Skymates Flight Academy
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Grand Prairie Municipal Airport (GPM), Grand Prairie, TXTo Grand Prairie Municipal Airport (GPM), Grand Prairie, TX
- Aircraft age
- About 17 years (built 2002)
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- En route · cruise
- Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Midair collision
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Personnel issues › Psychological
Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
The flight instructors/student pilots of two Cessna airplanes, N565SP and N52243, were each returning from local instructional flights. The N565SP pilot contacted the tower and reported being near the southern tip of a lake, about 10 miles south of the airport; the tower controller instructed the pilot to enter a left downwind for runway 17. About 45 seconds later, the N52243 pilot contacted the tower and reported being 7 miles south of the airport; the tower controller also instructed that pilot to enter a left downwind for runway 17. Radar data indicated that, about this time, the airplanes were within about 0.1 nautical mile laterally and 100 ft vertically of each other. The flightpaths of the airplanes remained in close proximity for about the next 58 seconds (1.6 miles), with the airplanes' altitudes remaining within 100 ft of each other.
About 30 seconds after the N52243 pilot contacted the tower, the N565SP pilot requested verification of the assigned transponder code. During the tower controller's transmission response, an audible conflict alert could be heard in the control tower cab. The controller did not issue a safety alert or advise either airplane's pilots that another airplane was in the same proximity. About 20 seconds later, the controller instructed the N52243 pilot to start a turn toward the northeast corner of the lake. The airplanes then collided, and the N52243 pilot declared an emergency. The N565SP pilot subsequently transmitted that an airplane had "hit us from the back" and that there had been a collision. The pilots of both airplanes maintained control of the airplanes and landed; both airplanes sustained substantial damage during the collision.
Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed. Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.113 requires that, when weather conditions permit, "vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft." The pilots of both airplanes did not maintain an effective traffic scan as they entered the traffic pattern, nor did they exercise the vigilance necessary to see and avoid the other airplane. In addition, Federal Aviation Administration Joint Order 7110.65 indicates that a controller should give first priority to "separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts." The tower controller did not recognize the proximity of the airplanes to each other, provide a safety alert to the pilots of either airplane, or establish a landing sequence that provided proper airplane spacing to the runway.
Probable cause
The failure of the pilots of both airplanes to see and avoid the other airplane while entering the airport traffic pattern in visual meteorological conditions. Contributing to the accident was the tower controller's failure to recognize the proximity of the airplanes to each other, to issue a safety alert to the pilots of either airplane, and to establish a landing sequence for the airplanes.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record CEN19LA074
- Event ID
- 20190130X94528
- Case number
- CEN19LA074
- Dataset
- full-current
- Source SHA-256
- 5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: d1bc7ef7ad2f1026fcbda0443162810cc1f9036b4900205aed664f1752b0d4a6; retrieved 2026-09-13T18:32:00.749Z.