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WPR18LA269 · Robinson R44

18 Sept 2018 · Wahiawa, HI, United States

Novictor Aviation Robinson R44 · Accident: pressurization/environmental system malfunction/failure en route

From Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL) to Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL)

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Event

NTSB case
WPR18LA269
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Robinson R44

Aircraft type
Robinson R44
Category
Helicopter
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N632NV
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL), Honolulu, HITo Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL), Honolulu, HI
Aircraft age
About 2 years (built 2016)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
En route · cruise
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Pressurization/environmental system malfunction/failure
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft power plant

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The pilot and two passengers were in cruise flight in the helicopter when the engine oil light illuminated. The pilot initiated an immediate descent to land and confirmed that the engine continued to produce power (the oil pressure light is one of the indications of an engine failure). As the helicopter approached the ground, the pilot slightly manipulated collective to maintain rotor rpm within limits. The helicopter impacted terrain with some forward speed and slid about 40 ft before coming to a stop. During his postflight examination of the helicopter, the pilot noted oil on the outside of both lower engine inspection panels and on the inside of the engine inspection panel on the pilot's side. The oil level dipstick indicated oil at about the 1/8-inch mark. Review of video from the onboard camera indicated that the red "oil" warning light illuminated in flight, and the oil pressure gauge indicated that the oil pressure had dropped to zero. It also revealed that during the deceleration/flare sequence, the engine rpm dropped to about 80%; however, once the helicopter stabilized on the ground, the engine rpm increased and returned to 102%. According to the R44 Pilot’s Operating Handbook, engine rpm is maintained by a governor, but only above 80%. For the engine rpm to drop to 80% and below, the pilot must manually rotate the throttle. Manual manipulation is not typically required except during start up, shut down, autorotation practice, and emergencies. The handbook also states that the emergency procedure in response to an illuminated oil light is to "land immediately," which the pilot proceeded to do. However, the helicopter did not lose engine power; therefore, there was no need for the pilot to manipulate the throttle. It is possible that, without throttle manipulation, the pilot could have performed a normal landing to a suitable landing area and landed safely under power without damage to the helicopter. A postaccident engine functionality check did not reveal any anomalies; the engine ran for 8 minutes without any apparent oil leaks. However, the next day, fresh oil was noted under the engine oil filter. Further examination revealed that the torque required to rotate the oil filter was significantly less than normal. In addition, the threaded fitting that the filter threads onto the adapter was about 2 threads in, and the filter cavity was empty of any oil. The loss of oil in flight was likely a result of the loose oil filter adapter.

Probable cause

Loss of oil in flight as a result of a loose oil filter adapter which resulted in the pilot initiating an immediate landing to an open field. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's manipulation of the throttle that led to a reduction in rotor rpm, which resulted in his inability to perform a normal landing.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record WPR18LA269
Event ID
20180919X15343
Case number
WPR18LA269
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 871bc7ebdd092116a8e28f09d20c83927aa05320269177900ebc17c0379947b1; retrieved 2026-09-16T08:15:31.751Z.