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WPR18LA012 · Cirrus Design Corp SR22T GTS

20 Oct 2017 · San Carlos, CA, United States

Cirrus Design Corp SR22T GTS · Accident during takeoff

From San Carlos Airport (SQL) to Santa Monica Municipal Airport (SMO)

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Event

NTSB case
WPR18LA012
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Cirrus Design Corp SR22T GTS

Aircraft type
Cirrus SR22
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N3636E
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From San Carlos Airport (SQL), San Carlos, CATo Santa Monica Municipal Airport (SMO), Santa Monica, CA
Aircraft age
Built the same year (2017)
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Takeoff
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Miscellaneous/other
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability
  • Personnel issues › Action/decision
  • Personnel issues › Task performance

Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The private pilot departed for a cross-country flight in the high-performance single-engine airplane. Immediately after the airplane became airborne, it remained in ground effect longer than usual, and he perceived a change in engine power, and the airplane did not climb as expected. The pilot then chose to abort the takeoff; however, with limited runway available, the airplane overran the end of the runway and then struck a ditch and came to rest on the perimeter road.

Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal any evidence of preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation, and review of data from the airplane's data recording system revealed that the engine was operating normally and accelerating appropriately. However, the data also indicated that the flaps were fully retracted during takeoff, rather than set to 50%, as recommended in the Pilot's Operating Handbook. The data further revealed that the pilot checked the operation of the flaps during the preflight check but failed to move them to the takeoff setting as required by the Before-Takeoff checklist. Although takeoff with fully retracted flaps is permissible, the airplane manufacturer does not provide performance data for that configuration, and the pilot was likely not used to the airplane's altered handling characteristics under such conditions.

Although an accurate assessment of whether the pilot could have stopped the airplane after rotation could not be made due to the lack of performance data for a retracted flaps takeoff, it is likely that, with prompt recognition of the reduced performance, the pilot could have stopped the airplane before it overran the runway; however, surveillance video, recorded data, and the pilot's recollection indicated that he did not reduce the engine power and subsequently apply the brakes until the airplane reached the end of the runway.

The pilot had recently been issued his private pilot certificate and had purchased the high-performance single-engine airplane about 1 month before the accident. He had accrued just over 22 hours of solo flight time, all in the accident make and model. It is likely that the pilot's lack of experience in the high-performance airplane led to his failure to respond to the airplane's altered flight characteristics due to the incorrect flaps setting.

Probable cause

The pilot's failure to follow the Before-Takeoff checklist and properly set the flaps before takeoff, which altered the airplane’s flight characteristics, and the pilot’s failure to recognize the problem and abort the takeoff in a timely manner, which resulted in a runway overrun. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s lack of experience in the high-performance airplane.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record WPR18LA012
Event ID
20171021X11648
Case number
WPR18LA012
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: local date, investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date; the NTSB stores the UTC date 2017-10-21.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 8e1af77eceb98705e2f5c02872b0eb6f89abfb315cde637fb2cfec144fc0b3ac; retrieved 2026-09-16T05:57:01.164Z.