ERA13LA252 · Beech A36

The pilot reported that, before the flight, he checked the weather and obtained a full weather briefing from flight service. After he boarded the passengers and loaded the luggage into the airplane, the pilot conducted a preflight inspection and noted that everything was "good." During taxi, he asked the air traffic controller if he could take off from runway 3R because it was the longest runway. He then conducted an engine run-up and noted that everything was normal. While holding short of the runway, the pilot heard another pilot ask the controller for a wind check, and the controller replied that the wind was from 300 degrees. Because that would result in a direct crosswind for runway 3R, the pilot asked if runway 34 was available, and the controller replied that it was closed. While waiting for departure, the pilot noted that the windsock seemed to be indicating a slight quartering tailwind. During the takeoff, he applied left aileron because of the crosswind. As he rotated the airplane, "something didn't feel right." The stall warning horn then started "chirping," and the airplane turned into the wind and did not take off with "its usual vigor." He leveled off to stop the stall horn and stated that the engine didn't sound right. He decided to abort the takeoff when the airplane was about 30 ft above ground level (agl). He reduced power and tried to glide the airplane to land. However, shortly thereafter, the stall warning horn "blared," and the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall and impacted the runway. Examination of the wreckage and recorded engine monitor data revealed no evidence of failures or malfunctions.

One of the passengers recorded the takeoff and accident sequence on his cell phone. The video showed that, after the pilot rotated the airplane for takeoff, the stall warning horn sounded; the airplane was in a nose-high attitude and had reached an altitude of between 50 and 100 feet agl when the pilot reduced the power. The video then showed the airplane descending until the sound of impact was heard. During the takeoff, the engine sounded constant and normal.

The reported wind about the time of the accident was 290 degrees at 13 knots gusting to 18 knots. According to the Aircraft Flight Manual/Pilot's Operating Handbook (AFM/POH), these conditions would have resulted in a crosswind component that, during portions of the takeoff and initial climb, would have exceeded the airplane's maximum demonstrated crosswind of 17 knots and would have resulted in a 2- to 4-knot tailwind component. Further, two pilots reported low-level windshear at the airport about the time of the accident. No convective echoes existed in the local area about the time of the accident; therefore, a microburst event did not occur at the airport at the time of the accident. High-density altitude conditions existed around the time of the accident, which would also have degraded the airplane's performance and increased the distance needed for the takeoff roll. The pilot should have accounted for the crosswind, the tailwind, and the high-density altitude conditions in his preflight planning, but he did not do so.

A review of the pilot's weight and balance calculations revealed that he underestimated the occupant and baggage weights in his calculations and used an inaccurate airplane empty weight. Recalculations using accurate weights revealed that the airplane was operating at least 100 pounds over the published maximum takeoff weight at the time of the accident and that the center of gravity (CG) was farther aft than the pilot had calculated. The AFM/POH performance charts only provide data for operating up to the airplane's maximum takeoff weight; it cautions that if loaded above the maximum takeoff weight, the takeoff distance will be longer, the stall speed will be higher, and the climb rate will be lower than that shown in the performance charts.

Pilots are expected to perform airplane performance calculations and determine takeoff distances using accurate weight and balance information and taking into account other important factors, such as wind and pressure conditions, that can affect climb performance and takeoff distance. However, the accident pilot did not properly calculate the airplane's weight and balance during his preflight calculations, and he overloaded the airplane at an aft CG, which would have degraded the airplane's performance. Further, he did not account for the high-density altitude or wind conditions at the airport at the time of the accident, which would have further degraded the airplane's performance. Therefore, it is likely that the airplane was not able to achieve a positive climb rate and that its nose was pitched up due to the combined effects of these conditions, which led it to exceed its critical angle-of-attack and subsequently stall.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset