Air France Airbus A380 accident

Information provided by Airbus indicates that the view from the A380 cockpit looking sideways to the left was limited to about 121 degrees that did not allow the pilot to see the wingtip. Interviews with the Air France accident pilots indicated that they did not receive any guidance or training on wingtip clearance in the airplane. The pilots indicated that, during simulator training, forward visual lines were projected, cuing where the wingtips would pass but there was nothing in the airplane to provide an indication of wingtip clearance. The pilots did receive information about the A380 wingspan, restrictions on certain taxiways, and were advised to use caution during taxi. When the Comair crew contacted the ground controller, they were given a clearance to their ramp. Upon contacting their ramp controller, they were advised to hold at the Diamond 2 spot. This was due to ramp traffic that blocked access to their gate. When stopped at the Diamond 2 spot, the CRJ701's tail extended out of the ramp onto taxiway M. Neither the accident flight crew nor the Comair ramp controller advised ATC that a portion of the airplane was extended onto an active taxiway. The area where the CRJ701 was stopped was not visible from the JFK control tower. The AIM advises that a pilot "promptly complies with an air traffic clearance upon receipt except as necessary to cope with an emergency" and "advises ATC as soon as possible and obtains an amended clearance, if deviation is necessary". Therefore, the CRJ701 did not complete its clearance to the Comair ramp and should have advised ATC of this fact, which allowed a portion of the airplane to remain on an active taxiway. Although having a portion of the stopped airplane remain on an active taxiway was a factor in this accident, the primary responsibility to see and avoid contact between the two airplanes was with the A380. The CRJ captain stated that he saw the A380 approaching and moved his airplane forward to try to give the A380 more clearance. Examination of the A380 Flight Crew binocular vision chart and the relative positions of the airplanes show that as the Air France A380 airplane was making the turn onto taxiway A, a 10 degree cone of vision obstruction may have momentarily blocked the left seat pilot's vision of the CRJ. However, once the A380 was established on taxiway A, the view of the CRJ should have been within the binocular vision of both the Air France left seat and right seat pilots, however, the two A380 pilots stated that they did not notice the CRJ on M taxiway. The A380 captain in the right seat may have been momentarily distracted when he checked his taxi map for an intersection shortly before the collision occurred. The A380 pilot in the jumpseat said that he saw the CRJ but did not think there was a danger of collision with it.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset