FLIGHT FINDINGSAVIATION OCCURRENCE MAP
Back to map

Federal Express Douglas MD-10 accident

14 Jun 2008 · Raymond, PA, United States

Douglas MD-10 · Accident: aerodynamic stall/spin en route

From Frederick W. Smith International Airport (MEM) to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK)

Report a problem

Event

NTSB case
DCA08FA075
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Douglas MD-10

Aircraft type
Douglas MD-10
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N554FE
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Frederick W. Smith International Airport (MEM), Memphis, TNTo John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, NY
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 121: Air Carrier
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
En route · holding (IFR)
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Aerodynamic stall/spin
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Personnel issues › Action/decision

Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

According to the captain, the flight was uneventful until shortly before the airplane entered a holding pattern at FL330. The speed calculated by the flight management system (FMS) was 230 knots, 5 knots above the Vmin speed for the configuration and weight of the airplane. Both pilots expected the FMS to automatically default to the ICAO maximum holding speed of 265 knots, as described in the company flight manual. However, the captain decided to command the FMS to maintain 240 knots to increase the buffer between the holding speed and Vmin. Upon reaching the pattern fix, the airplane automatically banked left to enter holding and the captain noticed that the airspeed was lessening from 240 knots. He expected the airspeed to recover once the turn was completed. He also expected the bank to be limited to 15 degrees, but the autopilot actually commanded 23 degrees. Upon completing the turn, the airspeed was approximately 5 knots below Vmin. The captain expected the airspeed to recover now that the airplane was wings level. However, this did not occur, and when appropriate, the airplane started to automatically turn to the inbound holding heading. The crew then requested and was granted a clearance to descend to FL320 in the holding pattern. The captain then selected level change on the FMS to 320 and he also reduced the autobank controller to 15 degrees, from 23 degrees. During the descending turn, with the airspeed at about 220 knots, the first officer recommended extending the slats. The maximum slat extension speed at that juncture was 270 knots, according to the captain. When the slats extended, the maximum slat extension speed indicator on the airspeed indicator fell to below 220 knots. The captain then immediately ordered the first officer to retract the slats. He stated that at this point the airplane began to buffet, and an autoslat extension alert occurred. The first officer requested a further descent and was cleared to FL290. The captain then selected a level change on the FMS to 290. The buffeting ceased when the airplane was passing approximately FL300 during this descent. The flight landed uneventfully; however, the buffeting had caused substantial damage to both elevators and right horizontal stabilizer that was discovered during a post-flight inspection. According to the flight data recorder data and an analysis of that data by the airplane’s manufacturer, the slats were extended by the flight crew when the airspeed was 205 knots, well below the maximum slat extension speed of 260 knots. However the Mach number at that time was 0.59, well above the 0.51 Mach minimum slat extension speed. The target Mach then became 0.51, and the autothrottles reduced from 100% N1 rpm to about 50% N1 rpm. When the slats were retracted by the flight crew, the autothrottles advanced the thrust back to 100% N1 rpm. However, by the time the engine thrust had recovered, the airspeed had dropped to about 180 knots. The stick shakers activated about 5 seconds later and continued to operate for approximately one minute.

Probable cause

The flight crew's failure to adequately monitor the airplane's airspeed during the holding pattern, leading to the onset of an aerodynamic stall and subsequent structural damage to the tail from buffet.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record DCA08FA075
Event ID
20080703X00974
Case number
DCA08FA075
Dataset
full-current
Source SHA-256
5cf380f0061817c0331a6b2d8cc7e0ee3a79bea469a1001dc5c10e56f35f5ab3
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: ecf1809ad81f52f70609e934fda574ed3cc950546db65f081cc6f724429c7486; retrieved 2026-09-15T09:51:13.094Z.