United Express Flight 7512
Embraer EMB-170 · Accident: airframe, component or system failure during initial climb
From George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) to Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD)
Event
- NTSB case
- NYC06FA128
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Airline
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Embraer EMB-170
- Aircraft type
- Embraer EMB-170
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N651RW
- Operator
- United Express
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH), Houston, TXTo Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD), Dulles, VA
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 121: Air Carrier
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Initial climb
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Airframe, component or system failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Company maintenance personnel › Maintenance, service of aircraft/equipment, improper
- Landing gear, main gear strut › Improperly serviced
Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
After departure, the first officer was unable to raise the landing gear handle to retract the landing gear. The flight crew discussed the situation and did not believe they had a landing gear malfunction, as they did not receive an Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) message. They decided to press the "Downlock Release" button to raise the gear, the landing gear subsequently retracted, and the flight continued to the destination airport area uneventfully. As the flight crew attempted to extend the landing gear for landing, the nose landing gear (NLG) did not extend. They prepared for an emergency landing, and touched down "normally" on the main landing gear. The airplane came to rest on the runway, and during the evacuation, one passenger was seriously injured. Three days prior to the accident, the airplane had its NLG strut serviced as part of its approved maintenance program. The following day, a pilot reported that the NLG was "low" and "sounded like it was bottoming out." The NLG strut was checked by maintenance personnel, and found to be within limits. Additionally, during the day prior to the accident, a pilot reported that the landing gear did not retract after takeoff. Maintenance personnel believed the problem to be the landing gear control lever, and replaced it. Examination of the NLG, after the accident, revealed the NLG fluid volume was approximately two-fifths of what a normally serviced NLG should contain. Disassembly of the NLG revealed evidence of "bottoming," or under-service operation. A review of the operator's maintenance job card titled "Servicing NLG Shock Strut," revealed discrepancies when compared to the manufacturers Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM). The operator's maintenance job card did not contain a procedure to fill the shock strut with the final volume of hydraulic fluid. The accident airplane was equipped with Proximity Sensor Electronics Modules (PSEMs), which relayed the position of the landing gear to the EICAS. The model of PSEM, which was installed on the airplane, was not the most current model, and by design, would not generate an EICAS message ("LG WOW SYS FAIL") if the nose gear did not retract or extend. Examination of the operator's "Gear Lever Cannot Be Moved Up" checklist revealed discrepancies when compared to the airplane manufacturer's checklist. The operator's checklist began with the condition: "LG WOW SYS FAIL message displayed," and the manufacturer's checklist did not. Since the crew did not receive a "LG WOW SYS FAIL" message, they did not have clear written guidance on what action to take when the landing gear handle could not be moved to the retracted position.
Probable cause
Improper servicing of the nose landing gear strut and the operator's inadequate maintenance procedure. A factor was the inadequate checklist provided to the flight crew by the operator.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record NYC06FA128
- Event ID
- 20060618X00758
- Case number
- NYC06FA128
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (5)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: local date, investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date; the NTSB stores the UTC date 2006-05-31.
- API snapshot SHA-256: 8d5a9935723c8adaccfdf6bd86fbd802b39920db6c5805b5417a68029391a624; retrieved 2026-09-18T14:52:57.068Z.
- The NTSB's operator name is blank for N651RW; the operator shown is the name the NTSB records it doing business as.