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DEN05FA100 · CGS Aviation Hawk Two Place Arrow

27 Jun 2005 · Jackson, WY, United States

CGS Aviation Hawk Two Place Arrow · Accident: loss of control in flight on approach

From Jackson Hole Airport (JAC) to Jackson Hole Airport (JAC)

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Event

NTSB case
DEN05FA100
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
1 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

CGS Aviation Hawk Two Place Arrow

Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
UNREG
Operator
John T. Walton · private individual
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Jackson Hole Airport (JAC), Jackson, WYTo Jackson Hole Airport (JAC)
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Approach · VFR pattern base
First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Loss of control in flight
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Destroyed

Cause areas

  • Flt control syst, elevator control cable/rod › Loose
  • Owner/builder › Maintenance, installation, improper
  • Pilot in command › Aircraft control, not possible

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

Several witnesses reported that the airplane departed runway 19, and immediately climbed to approximately 500 feet above ground level (agl), while maintaining runway heading. The airplane then turned left onto the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern and maintained a slight climb. One witness, who was in a vehicle, observed the airplane in normal flight on a left downwind for runway 19 at an altitude of 800 to 1,000 feet. The witness observed the airplane turn left (west) onto the base leg for runway 19 "in normal flight and was descending but not what appeared to be abnormal." The airplane continued its nose-low descent toward the terrain until approximately 200 feet agl, the airplane began a "steeper" nose-low descent toward terrain. The airplane then impacted terrain in a wings level attitude, bounced, nosed over, and came to rest inverted. During the descent, the witness did not noticed any movement of the elevator or other flight control surfaces, or any in-flight structural failure of the airplane. The accident flight was the third flight conducted by the pilot since he had completed repairs after sustaining a hard landing with the airplane. In order to complete the repairs to the airplane, the pilot had to removed the elevator and aileron controls located in the boom tube. NTSB materials laboratory examination of the aileron and elevator controls revealed no features or marks were found at a location of approximately 5/16-inch forward of the original location of the rear locking collar on the torque tube surface, with the exception of two distinct circumferential marks. The featureless surface, confirmed by testing, indicated that the locking collar was slightly torqued and that the torque tube had moved relatively slowly over this distance, possibly with two stops. The torque required to loosen the rear locking collar screw was measured at 3-inch pounds, representing a minimal snugging of the collar bolt and collar on the torque tube. According to the manufacturer, a 3/16-inch aft movement of the torque tube would be enough to lose any tension in the elevator control cables. The rear edge of the cutout on the boom tube for the rear control stick displayed three locations where paint had been removed, but there was no material deformation. The lack of deformation is consistent with light contact by the control stick, which would be expected if the control stick had been pulled rearwards manually. A lightly rubbed area on the aileron crank revealed laterally orientated arced lines on the surface and corresponding laterally orientated smeared surface on the upper front bulkhead tube. No evidence was found to indicate that an inspection mirror had been trapped in the boom tube.

Probable cause

The loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the pilot/owner's improper reinstallation of the rear locking collar on the elevator control torque tube, which allowed the torque tube to move rearward during flight and loosen the elevator control cable tension.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record DEN05FA100
Event ID
20050705X00921
Case number
DEN05FA100
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: be3037283633822c721eaed077988d1630f3feb8b675749bc03e3ff5dd36c6b2; retrieved 2026-09-20T18:00:04.606Z.