DEN05FA100 · CGS Aviation Hawk Two Place Arrow
CGS Aviation Hawk Two Place Arrow · Accident: loss of control in flight on approach
From Jackson Hole Airport (JAC) to Jackson Hole Airport (JAC)
Event
- NTSB case
- DEN05FA100
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 1 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- General aviation
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
CGS Aviation Hawk Two Place Arrow
- Aircraft type
- CGS HAWK TWO PLACE ARROW
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- UNREG
- Operator
- John T. Walton · private individual
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Jackson Hole Airport (JAC), Jackson, WYTo Jackson Hole Airport (JAC)
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 91: General Aviation
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- Approach · VFR pattern base
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Loss of control in flight
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Destroyed
Cause areas
- Flt control syst, elevator control cable/rod › Loose
- Owner/builder › Maintenance, installation, improper
- Pilot in command › Aircraft control, not possible
Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
Several witnesses reported that the airplane departed runway 19, and immediately climbed to approximately 500 feet above ground level (agl), while maintaining runway heading. The airplane then turned left onto the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern and maintained a slight climb. One witness, who was in a vehicle, observed the airplane in normal flight on a left downwind for runway 19 at an altitude of 800 to 1,000 feet. The witness observed the airplane turn left (west) onto the base leg for runway 19 "in normal flight and was descending but not what appeared to be abnormal." The airplane continued its nose-low descent toward the terrain until approximately 200 feet agl, the airplane began a "steeper" nose-low descent toward terrain. The airplane then impacted terrain in a wings level attitude, bounced, nosed over, and came to rest inverted. During the descent, the witness did not noticed any movement of the elevator or other flight control surfaces, or any in-flight structural failure of the airplane. The accident flight was the third flight conducted by the pilot since he had completed repairs after sustaining a hard landing with the airplane. In order to complete the repairs to the airplane, the pilot had to removed the elevator and aileron controls located in the boom tube. NTSB materials laboratory examination of the aileron and elevator controls revealed no features or marks were found at a location of approximately 5/16-inch forward of the original location of the rear locking collar on the torque tube surface, with the exception of two distinct circumferential marks. The featureless surface, confirmed by testing, indicated that the locking collar was slightly torqued and that the torque tube had moved relatively slowly over this distance, possibly with two stops. The torque required to loosen the rear locking collar screw was measured at 3-inch pounds, representing a minimal snugging of the collar bolt and collar on the torque tube. According to the manufacturer, a 3/16-inch aft movement of the torque tube would be enough to lose any tension in the elevator control cables. The rear edge of the cutout on the boom tube for the rear control stick displayed three locations where paint had been removed, but there was no material deformation. The lack of deformation is consistent with light contact by the control stick, which would be expected if the control stick had been pulled rearwards manually. A lightly rubbed area on the aileron crank revealed laterally orientated arced lines on the surface and corresponding laterally orientated smeared surface on the upper front bulkhead tube. No evidence was found to indicate that an inspection mirror had been trapped in the boom tube.
Probable cause
The loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the pilot/owner's improper reinstallation of the rear locking collar on the elevator control torque tube, which allowed the torque tube to move rearward during flight and loosen the elevator control cable tension.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record DEN05FA100
- Event ID
- 20050705X00921
- Case number
- DEN05FA100
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: be3037283633822c721eaed077988d1630f3feb8b675749bc03e3ff5dd36c6b2; retrieved 2026-09-20T18:00:04.606Z.