MIA03LA163 · Beech 400A

The copilot who had 60.4 hours total time in make and model, was seated in the left seat and was flying pilot for the part 91 positioning flight. An intersection departure was performed which provided 6,300 feet of usable runway for takeoff. The copilot was unsure how to release the parking brake before the flight was cleared for takeoff; the PIC had to instruct him how to do so. During the takeoff roll on runway 31 with a 4-knot wind from 240 degrees, the CVR recorded the PIC to state "V1", followed one second later by "rotate." Approximately 1 second later, the CVR recorded the copilot to state "whoa", followed by the cockpit area microphone recording an unidentified squealing sound. The PIC stated that the airplane turned abruptly 30 degrees to the left, and he initiated the aborted takeoff. He applied the brakes, reduced thrust, and applied both thrust reversers. In an attempt to maintain directional control, he and the copilot applied right rudder input and pumped the right brake, but the airplane departed the left side of the runway about 2,000 feet from the departure end of the runway. One of the main landing gears contacted an arresting cable, and the airplane continued onto grass. The anti-skid system tested OK before takeoff; and was on for takeoff. The PIC further stated the left main landing gear tire had good tread remaining prior to the flight. The left main landing gear tire was flat spotted. A 2,000 foot-long skid mark to the left of the runway centerline began approximately 1,850 feet from the point where the takeoff roll began. Examination of the left brake, both brake mixing valves, left and right wheelspeed transducers, power brake valve, control unit, and both parking brake valves revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction that would have resulted in left brake application. The company pilots are trained to utilize challenge/response to checklist items. Review of the CVR and the procedures listed in the airplane's "Before Starting Engines", "Starting Engines", "Before Taxi", "Taxi", and "Before Takeoff" checklists revealed none of the 5 checklists were verbally completed, and none of the checklists were completed at all with respect to challenge/response. Approximately 8 seconds elapsed from the time a squealing sound was heard on the CVR to the time when the copilot advised the PIC to "power off", which clarified his previous comment "hit it, hit it."

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset