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MIA03IA110 · Cessna 402C

22 May 2003 · Miami, FL, United States

Cessna 402C · Incident: airframe, component or system failure during landing

From Miami Executive Airport (KTMB) to Miami Executive Airport (KTMB)

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Event

NTSB case
MIA03IA110
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Incident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

Cessna 402C

Aircraft type
Cessna 402
Category
Airplane
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N402DD
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Miami Executive Airport (KTMB), Miami, FLTo Miami Executive Airport (KTMB), Miami, FL
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Landing · landing roll
First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Airframe, component or system failure
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
None

Cause areas

  • Other maintenance personnel › Maintenance, annual inspection, inadequate

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

The pilot reported that on the morning of the incident he was asked by the owner of the airplane to perform a maintenance test flight due to the airplane being in maintenance for "a month." He along with the pilot-rated right front seat occupant, and another individual performed a complete preflight inspection of the airplane. The flight departed, and remained in the traffic pattern. The approach and landing were normal until during the landing roll, when the airplane pulled sharply to the left. He brought the airplane to a stop on the runway and advised the control tower that he and the occupants were safe and they had a braking problem. One of the occupants who is the president of the facility that had just completed the annual inspection exited the airplane and noted that the left main landing gear torque links were separated and the main landing gear tire was rotated. The airplane was raised on jacks, the torque links were reconnected, and the airplane was towed to the ramp. The president of the facility that had just completed the annual inspection of the airplane who was on-board at the time of the incident reported that to him, the approach appeared to be a little "...short, but it looked ok, due to the storm that was coming in fast he wanted to land before it closed the airport in." The right front seat occupant commented several times that the flight was high and fast. Full flaps were extended, and the airplane was landed "...a bit hard to what I'm used to, the pilot said simultaneously when landing that 'the aircraft was pulling to the left like if the brake had locked up.'" The right front seat occupant helped to maintain directional control of the airplane until it came to rest. He got out of the airplane and noted the left main landing gear wheel assembly was rotated 15-20 degrees to the left from the normally installed position, and the upper and lower link assemblies (p/n 5141005-7 and 5141005-9, respectively), were not connected to each other. Additionally, the upper and lower link assemblies securing bolt, bushing, two AN washers, castellated nut, cotter pin, and clamp securing the flexible hydraulic hose remained installed in the upper link assembly. He further stated that following recovery of the airplane, a hard landing inspection of the landing gear was performed and no damage was noted. The airplane was towed to the ramp where the landing gear was repaired before NTSB and FAA could examine the airplane. NTSB examination of one of the incident washers revealed the outside diameter measured approximately .570 inch, and the thickness was approximately .061 inch. The specified washer P/N is 5045018-1 (-1), and when exhausted use 5045018-2 (-2). The outside diameter for the -1 and -2 washers is .750 inch, while the inside diameter for both is .313 inch + .031 inch. The -1 washer is .032 i nch thick while the -2 washer is .063 inch thick. Cessna Service Kit SK 421-118 (Service Kit), dated November 23, 1983, calls for installation of a -2 washer under the bolt head and nut that secure the torque links, and inspection of the torque links. The Service Kit also specifies that washer P/N S1450-5H12-063 will be incorporated into the next Service Kit revision. The airplane was last inspected on May 16, 2003, in accordance with an annual inspection using 14 CFR Part 43 appendix D, and the "Inspection Time Limits" specified in the airplane maintenance manual. Review of the "Inspection Time Limits" guide related to the main landing gear revealed the torque links are inspected for condition and security, then serviced. Review of the discrepancy sheets for the last annual inspection revealed both main landing gears were removed and installed into another airplane, with the corrective action reading, "reinstalled right and left main landing gear on N402DD." According to the hour meter, the airplane had been operated for .25 hour at the time of the incident since the annual inspection was completed. At the time of the incident, Safe Air International, Inc., dba Island Express Airlines was leasing the airplane from the registered owner. The Director of Operations for Island Express reported that the incident pilot did not have permission to operate the airplane, and he was not a pilot nor employee of Safe Air International, Inc. He also reported that Island Express did not authorize the test flight and they were first made aware of the test flight after the incident had occurred. The owner of the airplane reported that 2 days before the incident, a letter was sent from an attorney on his behalf to Island Express advising that he (airplane owner) had taken possession of the incident airplane and the lease was, "...in default."

Probable cause

The inadequate annual inspection of the airplane by other maintenance personnel for failure to note an incorrect washer was installed securing the upper and lower torque links, resulting in separation of the upper and lower links and subsequent rotation of the landing gear tire during the landing roll.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record MIA03IA110
Event ID
20030528X00732
Case number
MIA03IA110
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates, damage. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: 1981a40707160ccb15b6552d227e96d65a6986ab874751f7f5c694af44f16d48; retrieved 2026-09-22T09:16:08.074Z.