Alitalia Airlines Flight 604
McDonnell Douglas MD-11-C · Incident: airframe, component or system failure en route
From Milan Malpensa International Airport (LIMC) to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK)
Event
- NTSB case
- NYC03IA042
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Incident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- API-reported fatalities
- 0 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- Unknown
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Airline
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
McDonnell Douglas MD-11-C
- Aircraft type
- McDonnell Douglas MD-11
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- I-DUPA
- Operator
- Alitalia Airlines
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Milan Malpensa International Airport (LIMC), MilanoTo John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, NY
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 129: Foreign
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- En route · cruise
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Airframe, component or system failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- None
Cause areas
- Company maintenance personnel › Maintenance, improper
- Manufacturer › Information insufficient
- Water and waste system › Leak
Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.
NTSB narrative
The flight was at cruise altitude when the flight crew discovered that they were unable to move the control wheel for lateral (aileron) control. The rudder and elevator flight controls remained free for movement. As the flight neared its destination, the crew tried to extend with wing flaps. The leading edge slats extended, but they were unable to extend the trailing edge wing flaps. The flight landed in that condition. Post flight examination of the airplane revealed ice accumulations in all three wheel wells. The ice had accumulated on the aileron control cables, and flap extension cables, and prevented cable movement. The ice was traced to a water leak in the potable water system where a rubber hose attached to a water line fitting, under the floorboard, near the 3R door. When the floorboard in the area was lifted, upward movement of the floorboard was restricted by the rubber hose water line that was attached to the underside of the floor board. Water was observed misting from the line where it attached to the fitting. When the floorboard was lifted further, the water line pulled loose from the fitting, and water flowed out. Examination of the rubber water hose revealed it failure was due to excessive load applied to the crimped joint between the flexible hose and it end fitting. The airplane manufacturer had attached water lines to the underside of the floorboards. The airplane maintenance manuals did not contain any information about how to know if a water line was connected to the underside of a floorboard, or for disconnecting water lines attached to the underside of the floorboards prior to lifting them. There was no jammed flight control checklist in effect at the time of the incident. QAR data revealed the pilots had limited movement with the of the ailerons with the auto-pilot engaged or disengaged through roll control wheel steering (RCWS), a customer selected option for the airplane.
Probable cause
A leak of potable water onto the lateral (aileron) flight control cables, and flap extension cables, which subsequently froze them in place. An additional cause was the improper procedures used by mechanics for floorboard removal which stretched the rubber hose, and led to the leak, all due to the manufacturer's lack of guidance in the maintenance manuals on floorboard removal.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
NTSB record NYC03IA042
- Event ID
- 20030207X00179
- Case number
- NYC03IA042
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (5)
- Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates, damage. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
- API snapshot SHA-256: 6f3a4fddec42c23906d99a3b0d0b81758df943ab6a1a84a78e0926e5377d64f0; retrieved 2026-09-18T15:56:01.464Z.
- The NTSB's operator name is blank for I-DUPA; the operator shown is the name the NTSB records it doing business as.