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LAX01FA277 · MD HELICOPTERS, INC. 600N

14 Aug 2001 · Fountain Hills, AZ, United States

MD HELICOPTERS, INC. 600N · Accident: loss of control in flight while maneuvering

From Falcon Field (FFZ) to an unrecorded destination

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Event

NTSB case
LAX01FA277
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Completed
API-reported fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
General aviation
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Visual Meteorological Cond

MD HELICOPTERS, INC. 600N

Aircraft type
MD Helicopters 600
Category
Helicopter
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
N70457
Operator
Unknown
Onboard fatalities
Unknown
Route
From Falcon Field (FFZ), Falcon Field, AZTo not recorded
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Part 91: General Aviation
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Maneuvering · aerial application
First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Loss of control in flight
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Substantial

Cause areas

  • Copilot/second pilot › Rotorcraft flight controls, improper use of
  • Pilot in command › Directional control, not maintained
  • Pilot in command › Rotor RPM, not maintained
  • Pilot in command › Supervision, inadequate

Approximate · Coordinates from the NTSB case API, which marks them as estimated or does not say; no uncertainty radius is established.

NTSB narrative

A staff pilot for the manufacturer was providing a sales demonstration flight to a potential customer's pilot when yaw control of the helicopter was lost, it entered a spin, collided with the ground, and rolled over. During the flight the customer's typical aerial application pest control flight profile was to be flown. The customer pilot flew Bell 206's currently in the mission and had no experience in the NOTAR anti-torque system. The maneuver was a simulated aerial application pass followed by a turn around. The manufacturer's pilot said the maneuver was very docile and consisted of a pass down a creek bed at 60 knots and 50 feet. The customer pilot initiated a gentle cyclic pull-up to a 10- to 15-degree nose up attitude while entering a right turn as the helicopter decelerated. At the 90 degree point in the turn, the helicopter was at 40 to 50 knots with a 30-degree or less bank angle to the right. As the nose came around in the turn, the nose tucked down to about 20 degrees below the horizon. The manufacturer's pilot took over the controls and added near full aft cyclic to level the nose; at this point, he received a low rotor warning horn (indicating a rotor droop at 95 percent or lower). Coincident with the low rotor warning, the helicopter began a right yaw rate. He added full left pedal, but the yaw rate continued at what he described as a "slow pedal turn rate," eventually completing 4 to 6 complete revolutions. At this point the helicopter began descending and he added collective. He immediately got a "power" audio warning, indicating that he was exceeding the upper power limit of the engine. The right yaw rate also increased with collective input. The pilot then modulated the collective between the low rotor warning and the excessive power warning in an attempt to both control the yaw and stop the descent. As he lowered the collective and the rotor speed began to build, the yaw would slow, but the helicopter then began descending faster. As he added collective to slow the descent, the yaw rate would increase. As the helicopter neared the ground, the yaw finally stopped; however, the helicopter was translating sideways toward a berm. The helicopter touched down on the right skid against the berm and it rolled over. The manufacturer's pilot said his hands were following on the controls as the customer pilot flew and he did not perceive any unusual control inputs. He further stated that his feet were about 1 inch from the anti-torque pedals and he did not feel any inputs from the customer pilot on the pedals. Based on his extensive flight test experience in this helicopter, the manufacturer's pilot believes that the aft cyclic input to correct the nose down pitching moment induced a rotor droop, and that the droop was the initiating event in the yaw rate onset. He does not know how low the rotor speed went, but the warning is triggered at 95 percent Nr. The lower limit of the Nr green arc is at 90 percent. The NOTAR anti-torque control system uses air from a pedal controlled jet thruster nozzle on the end of the tail boom to provide anti-torque control. Additional yaw control is provided by vertical stabilizers, which are largely effective only above 20 to 30 knots. Air is supplied to the thruster by a fan driven by a power takeoff shaft from the main transmission. There is a direct relationship between the speed of the main rotor and the speed of the fan. The pilot said he believes that the initial yaw onset was because the rotor drooped low enough to slow the fan below the speed which could supply the necessary air volume to the thruster to control the yaw and they were not fast enough for the vertical stabilizers to have any effect. After the occupants had extricated themselves from the wreckage, the customer pilot asked the pilot what had happened. He replied to them that he didn't know what happened and added, "Maybe we should have turned to the left instead." The helicopter's FAA approved Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) contains several warnings about low speed maneuvering. Under the heading "Unanticipated Right Yaw", the RFM section notes that an unanticipated right yaw can occur when operating at low altitude and airspeeds below 60 knots when a pilot's attention is distracted by events outside the helicopter and sufficient control inputs are not made to adjust for changing aerodynamic conditions. The paragraph states, "If no directional or cyclic control inputs are made, a nose down pitch and a right roll may follow the right yaw." The section notes that this is most likely to occur at speeds below 60 knots in uncoordinated right turns, while flying out of trim with too much right pedal, or right turns to a downwind condition. Examination of the helicopter revealed no evidence of a preimpact malfunction or failure of the control system.

Probable cause

the manufacturer's pilot's failure to maintain yaw control and main rotor speed while recovering from an unusual attitude induced by the customer pilot's inadequate control inputs while maneuvering at low altitude. The manufacturer's pilot's inadequate supervision of the flight is also causal. A factor in the accident was the customer pilot's lack a familiarity with the NOTAR yaw control system.

Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset

Sources

NTSB record LAX01FA277
Event ID
20010821X01741
Case number
LAX01FA277
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Source notes (4)
  • Unreviewed is an editorial label, not an investigation status. API-sourced is not report-checked or human-reviewed. Explicit event totals are used without summing aircraft injury tables; onboard allocation is withheld. Unknown values remain unknown. The operation category is mapped from the NTSB-reported FAR part and has not been reviewed.
  • Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status, coordinates. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
  • The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.
  • API snapshot SHA-256: c795ce31f79f600729f4aeff90789492d7f8a93d4cb87ccd2c023b82c79b9852; retrieved 2026-09-21T19:52:14.142Z.