Ju-52 overflight of the USSR incident

The Ju-52 overflight of the USSR incident was an occurrence on 15 May 1941, when a non-scheduled Junkers Ju 52 multi-purpose aircraft purchased by the USSR in Germany made an unhindered non-stop flight on the Königsberg — Moscow route. The flight had been agreed in advance with the Soviet authorities, but the aircraft's crew did not inform the Soviet side in good time of the time and date of departure. Nevertheless, the Soviet side not only did not force the aircraft to land, but also assisted its flight. Following the incident, an extrajudicial investigation was carried out in the USSR, as a result of which a number of officials were subjected to disciplinary action, and some were arrested and shot.

In the 1990s the incident became the basis for Igor Bunich's journalistic theory that the aircraft delivered some urgent personal letter from Hitler to Stalin.

Description of the incident

On 15 May 1941, a German non-scheduled Ju-52 aircraft crossed the state border from the German side and headed east over the territory of the Soviet Union. VNOS (air observation, warning and communications) posts detected the aircraft almost immediately. But the flight proceeded unhindered. The Soviet air defence services took no action to counter the intruder, assisted its flight to Moscow by permitting it to land at the Moscow airfield and by instructing the air defence service to ensure the flight, and the headquarters of the 1st Air Defence Corps of Moscow received notification from a Civil Air Fleet dispatcher that this was a non-scheduled aircraft. In a conversation with a Soviet official, the German pilot said that he had departed without notifying Moscow or the Soviet trade mission, since he "had not received any written instructions".

Times of passing Soviet cities (according to Lev Mekhlis's memorandum sent to Stalin on 20 May 1941):

Moscow (arrival) — 18:55.

Investigation of the incident in the USSR

On the instructions of the Council of People's Commissars, the People's Commissariat of State Control conducted an investigation of the incident. Already on 20 May 1941, Lev Mekhlis sent Stalin memorandum No. 2743ss, which reported that on 9 — 15 May 1941 the USSR embassy and trade mission in Berlin and the manufacturer "Junkers Flugzeug- und Motorenwerke AG" had concluded an agreement which stipulated:

"the aircraft must follow the route established by the Directorate of International Air Lines of the Civil Air Fleet of the USSR for the Berlin — Königsberg — Moscow line and cross the state border of the USSR in the area of the 'Belostok' checkpoint";

departure deadline — by 15 May 1941;

the aircraft could not land en route, although the company asked for permission for an intermediate landing at least in the Smolensk area.

On the day of departure at 14:10 (Moscow time) a radiogram about the aircraft's departure was sent from Königsberg, which Belostok airport received at 14:13. The radiogram was transmitted by the Belostok airport radio station to Minsk at 12:48 (Central European Time), and from Minsk it was transmitted to Moscow, where it was received at 13:18 Central European Time. At 14:36 the aircraft established radio contact with Belostok airport and during the flight maintained radio contact with the Minsk and Smolensk airports. The aircraft requested permission to land in Belostok and Minsk, but this was refused.

The dispatcher of the International Air Lines of the Civil Military Fleet of the USSR, Khobryakova, received at 15:18 a radiogram from Minsk about the flight of the "Junkers", which she reported to the duty officer of the 1st Air Defence Corps and to the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry. At 16:35 the assistant head of the flight-technical group of the People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry, Anishchenkov, telephoned the duty officer of the Red Army Air Force headquarters, Yakovlev, and reported "the departure without permission at 13:53 of one German ac Ju-52 from Königsberg to Moscow, that the ac passed Belostok at 15:02". Yakovlev reported this to the air defence and to the deputy head of the 1st Department of the Air Force headquarters, Dmitry Grendal, who ordered to "ensure the flight". Then Anishchenkov informed Yakovlev that "the aircraft is requesting landing in Moscow". In response, Anishchenkov received an order to instruct the head of the Central Airfield, Kombrig S. G. Kurilov, to "provide parking", which was done.

Mekhlis's memorandum concluded that the German aircraft had crossed the border without authorisation, since the pilots were supposed to obtain permission for the departure time and the route so that air defence means would not be used against them. Mekhlis also criticised in the memorandum the work of the Soviet VNOS service in the area of the 4th Air Defence Brigade of the Western Military District:

Several posts did not see the aircraft;

Two posts saw the aircraft but took it for a scheduled DS-3 aircraft, although the Ju-52 had three engines and the DS-3 only two engines;

The aircraft was first noticed by post NP-1031 when the Ju-52 had penetrated 29 kilometres into Soviet territory.

Mekhlis's memorandum also stated that Belostok airport, having learned of the Ju-52's departure, instead of reporting this to the air defence and Soviet aviation, assisted the Ju-52's flight by giving it bearings. The Minsk and Smolensk airports also assisted the Ju-52. In addition, Mekhlis reported that since 9 April 1941 between Belostok airport and …