TWA Flight 843

Investigation

The captain told the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) that the aircraft's engines stalled after takeoff and felt that the aircraft was unsafe to fly as a result. In addition, two L-1011s had experienced engine fires in the past two years, the first at Boston in 1990, and the second occurring three months earlier at JFK. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey stated that the fire on Flight 843 was the result of a fuel line rupturing, and that the aircraft leaked fuel on the runway. However, the NTSB did not find any evidence of a ruptured fuel line, nor was there any spilled fuel on the runway.

The NTSB attributed the crash to Human Factors (Crew Resource Management) and TWA training, procedural, maintenance and Quality Assurance failures. The Angle of Attack sensor (AOA) that had caused the erroneous stall warning had been found unserviceable on nine previous occasions, had received some checks and was then put back into the parts pool and fitted to the accident aircraft. It was found that it had an intermittent fault that was not able to be detected by the crew during pre-start procedures. According to the report, the first officer handed over control to the captain shortly after take-off at an altitude of 14 ft without a clear transfer of command, due to the erroneous activation of the stick shaker stall warning device. The first officer makes an exclamation of surprise and then says "Gettin' a stall" and then, two seconds later, "You got it".

The captain said "OK" and simultaneously experienced a feeling of the aircraft 'sinking' that may have been due to the relaxation of the controls by the First Officer who believed they were stalling. (A normal procedure for a stall recovery is to lower the nose.) This may have had the effect of confirming that the aircraft was not climbing normally. In fact, the aircraft was performing normally and could have climbed safely away.

The NTSB found that contributing factors included TWA not requiring crew pre-briefings denoting responsibility each crew member had at what stages of the take off (these are standard procedures currently), nor were handover techniques clearly defined. It also noted that "The TWA procedure that allows the flight crews to initiate takeoffs without a predeparture briefing, does not adequately

prepare the flight crews for coordination of potential abnormal circumstances during takeoff."

It goes on to say: "The Captain made a split second decision to abort the takeoff believing that there was sufficient runway remaining." The extremely hard landing caused damage to the right wing, spilling fuel that was then ingested into the engines and started the fire. The NTSB praised Captain Kinkead for bringing the aircraft to a safe stop, the rest of the crew (including the off-duty flight attendants) for safely evacuating the aircraft, and the airport rescue and fire fighting services for responding in a timely and adequate manner. At the same time however, the NTSB also criticized the flight crew for deciding to abort the takeoff after VR and their response to the stick-shaker activation, both of which were inappropriate.