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1991 Interflug A310 incident

11 Feb 1991 · over Sheremetyevo International Airport, Moscow, Soviet Union

Airbus A310-304 · Loss of control and stalling

From Berlin Brandenburg Airport (BER) to Sheremetyevo International Airport (SVO)

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Event

Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Occurrence
Event fatalities
0 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
Occupants
109
Survivors
109
InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
0
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline

Airbus A310-304

Aircraft type
Airbus A310
Category
Airplane · from aircraft type
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
D-AOAC
Operator
Interflug
Onboard fatalities
0
Route
From Berlin Brandenburg Airport (BER)To Sheremetyevo International Airport (SVO)

Cause areas

  • Personnel issues › Experience/knowledge
  • Personnel issues › Psychological
  • Personnel issues › Miscellaneous
  • Personnel issues › Task performance

From the investigation findings the Wikipedia article reports, sorted into the NTSB's cause areas with AI assistance.

Not plotted · Not plotted: the Wikipedia article gives no coordinates, and its site names no town or airport that matches exactly.

From the Wikipedia article

On February 11, 1991, an Interflug Airbus A310 operating a flight from Berlin to Moscow completely lost the crew's control for a short time due to a conflict between the pilots' actions and the autopilot's logic. For over six minutes, the airliner performed uncontrolled, sharp climbs and dives, stalling into a steep bank four times, before the pilots managed to regain control and land the plane safely. No one was injured.

Incident

On the morning of February 11, 1991, the plane departed from Berlin Schönefeld Airport bound for Sheremetyevo Airport in Moscow. A few minutes before 11:00 AM, the Airbus A310 began its approach to land on runway 25L at Sheremetyevo Airport. The approach was being conducted automatically under air traffic control guidance. The crew was routinely preparing the aircraft for landing, and the first officer had set the prescribed go-around altitude of 3,580 feet on the autopilot. With flaps and slats extended, the plane was nearing the touchdown point when, at an altitude of 1,550 feet, the controller instructed them to go around due to the runway being occupied. At 10:56, the pilots activated the go-around mode by pressing the corresponding buttons on the thrust levers, retracted the landing gear, adjusted the flap setting, and changed the selected go-around altitude to 1,640 feet as instructed by the controller.

As later revealed by flight recorder data, the automatics began a standard climb. However, 41 seconds later, the captain felt the pitch-up angle was too steep. Believing he was disengaging the autopilot, he attempted to lower the aircraft's nose by pushing the control stick forward. In reality, the autopilot remained engaged and interpreted the force on the stick as a command to trim the stabilizer, consequently driving the trim tab in the opposite direction. After the selected go-around altitude was reached, the autopilot automatically disconnected due to the sustained force on the stick, but the pilots did not notice this. Continuing their attempts to correct the aircraft's attitude, they ignored the visual and aural alerts in the cockpit. The aircraft entered an uncontrolled regime: with engines running at takeoff thrust, it began to climb almost vertically at an alarming rate. At 10:57:17, having reached 5,580 feet, the aircraft lost speed and stalled, banking left before entering a steep dive. At 10:57:46, at 1,487 feet, it transitioned back to a climb, reaching 5,787 feet 29 seconds later before stalling again, this time banking left. At 10:58:40, at 1,775 feet, the nose pitched up once more, surging to 7,355 feet in 31 seconds, then stalling into a right bank. In total, over six minutes and ten seconds, the aircraft stalled four times, coming close to inverting. Only after the pilots intuitively reduced engine thrust and inadvertently changed the trim setting did they regain control. At 11:03, the aircraft was once again responsive to the crew's inputs, and at 11:05:58, the pilots took full manual control and landed the plane safely at Sheremetyevo. As all passengers and crew were buckled in, no one was injured.

Investigation and cause

Investigation

The investigation into the incident was conducted by the German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation. The event was classified as an operational violation; no technical malfunctions with the aircraft were found. Due to the extreme maneuvers and operations outside the design envelope, some automatic control subsystems had disconnected. The report concluded that the incident was caused by a breakdown in interaction between the crew and the automatics. The pilots did not understand the autopilot's logic in go-around mode and were unaware that disengaging it required pressing a specific button on the sidestick, not simply applying force to the controls. They missed the warning signals in the cockpit and failed to recognize the escalating danger caused by the runaway stabilizer trim. It was particularly emphasized that the crew, despite their vast experience flying older aircraft types, was unprepared to manage the complex automation of a modern airliner. The report stated that the pilots failed to adhere to principles of crew coordination and cockpit resource management and were simply unable to cope with controlling an aircraft equipped with a glass cockpit and designed for a two-person crew. The lead investigator, graduate engineer Johann Reuss, summarized that the incident occurred due to disrupted communication between the machine and the humans; the crew, who were supposed to merely monitor the automatics, actively intervened in the controls and failed to understand the consequences of their actions.

Text from the Wikipedia article “1991 Interflug A310 incident” (revision 1374553473, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article

Sources

Wikipedia article: 1991 Interflug A310 incident
Article
1991 Interflug A310 incident
Revision
1374553473 · 2026-09-12 · retrieved 2026-09-18
Wikidata
Q138296736
Licence
Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
Where each value comes from
Record
Wikipedia article "1991 Interflug A310 incident" (page 82412538, revision 1374553473)
Date
Wikipedia infobox: date
Place and country
Wikipedia infobox: site
Map position
none
Aircraft, operator and route
Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
Operation
operator is an airline according to Wikidata
Fatalities
Wikipedia infobox: aircraft fatalities
Ground fatalities
not stated in the Wikipedia infobox
Summary
Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (1)
  • Wikipedia · Facts from the Wikipedia article's infobox and coordinates, not checked against an investigation report. Independent review pending.