KLM Flight 543

Investigation

The Dutch Civil Aviation Authority conducted an investigation into the incident and determined that the landing had been carried out with considerable negligence. There were multiple course deviations, the prescribed approach speed was exceeded, and due to an excessively steep right-hand turn, the aircraft lost altitude. Flight engineer De Koning testified that Kroon had instructed him to extend the flaps, but he had to inform Kroon that the command could not be executed because the aircraft's speed at that moment was unacceptably high.

Kroon had initially assumed he would be landing on runway 05 and was surprised when runway 34 was assigned instead. The right-hand turn required for this approach, combined with his position in the left-hand seat, made the landing more challenging. He did not begin preparing for an approach to runway 34 with the appropriate chart until after completing the turn.

It was concluded that the crash resulted from inadequate approach planning by the co-pilot and a lack of sufficient oversight by the captain. The crew had descended below a safe altitude during final approach, possibly due to misjudgment of terrain and poor visibility at night. The downward slope of the runway may also have contributed to the misperception of the aircraft's altitude.

Investigators concluded that the accident would not have occurred if the aircraft had flown just one meter higher. Conversely, it was noted that had the aircraft flown one meter lower, the consequences could have been catastrophic. The investigation commission commended Captain Musselman for his rapid and effective response after the aircraft struck the terrain. His performance in safely landing the damaged aircraft was described as exceptional. However, the commission also found that Musselman shared partial responsibility for the collision with the terrain, citing insufficient supervision of the third pilot Kroon and inadequate monitoring of the altimeter readings.

The investigation further revealed that runway 34 at Cairo-Almaza Airport had a downward slope. While the elevation at the threshold was approximately 311 feet (95 meters), the elevation at the opposite end was only 194 feet (59 meters). This slope created the illusion of a shorter runway when viewed from approach altitude, potentially causing pilots, even when at the correct altitude, to perceive themselves as flying lower than they actually were.

On 6 February 1959, the Dutch aviation safety authority published its final report on the accident. It concluded that a poorly executed approach procedure, insufficient preparation by Kroon, and inadequate vigilance and oversight by Musselman contributed to the accident. Both pilots were criticized for not paying enough attention to the altimeter readings and the elevation of the surrounding terrain.