ADC Airlines Flight 053

ADC Airlines Flight 053 (ADK053) was a scheduled passenger flight operated by ADC Airlines from Nigeria's capital of Abuja to Sokoto. On 29 October 2006, the Boeing 737-200 crashed onto a corn field shortly after take-off from Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport in Abuja, killing 96 out of 105 people on board.

The investigation of the crash, conducted by Nigeria's Accident Investigation Bureau, blamed the pilot's decision to take off in unsuitable weather as the primary cause of the crash, as presence of windshear at the time posed serious risk to the aircraft's ability to fly. Further investigation revealed inadequate company oversights on windshear recovery training and lack of teamwork among the pilots of Flight 053.

The crash killed several prominent figures in Nigeria, particularly the Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammadu Maccido, the leader of Sokoto and spiritual leader of Nigeria's 70 million Muslims, and his son, Senator Badamasi Maccido. It highlighted Nigeria's poor aviation safety record as it was the third major aviation disaster in less than a year, after Bellview Airlines Flight 210 and Sosoliso Airlines Flight 1145 in 2005, with a combined death toll of 321 people. The crash led to the creation of an independent aviation regulatory body of the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority. Since then, the nation's aviation safety has significantly improved. There were no more major aviation accidents in Nigeria until Dana Air Flight 992.

Flight

Flight 053 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight from Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport in the country's capital of Abuja to Sadiq Abubakar III International Airport in Sokoto. The aircraft was refueled in Lagos, carrying more than 11,000 liters of fuel. The aircraft was carrying 100 passengers and 5 crew members, consisting of 2 flight crew and 3 cabin crew. The aircraft was flown by Captain Atanda with First Officer Okonneh as his co-pilot.

The flight crew received start-up clearance at 11:15 a.m and later received the taxiing permit at 11:21 a.m. Immediately after, the flight crew asked the ATC about the wind condition. The control tower stated that the recorded wind speed was eight knots with varying wind direction. The controller later warned the flight crew that wind gusts were present in the vicinity. The wind started to intensify, as the speed increased to 15 kn and 35 kn, before it slowed down a bit to 28 kn.

As the aircraft arrived on the runway, the controller stated that the wind was blowing at 15 kn. A pilot of a Virgin Nigeria Airways stated that he would wait for the weather to improve as he stated that the wind was actually closer to 35 kn. Flight 053, however, decided to request a take-off clearance from the airport. The controller re-emphasized the deteriorating weather condition and gave the latest wind check, which the flight crew acknowledged. The flight was cleared for take-off and the crew began the take-off roll.

Flight 053 took off from Abuja at 11:29 a.m. Immediately after takeoff from Runway 22, the Boeing 737 entered into a headwind-shift to-tailwind windshear. Captain Atanda added a small amount of power and pulled up the yoke while First Officer Okonneh kept asking Captain Atanda to pull up. Thus, the nose rose further, reaching an angle of 30-35 degrees. As the nose was pulled up with a high pitch, airflow to the engines was disrupted, causing both engines to experience compressor stall. Following the compressor stall, the aircraft lost its thrust, causing it to enter an aerodynamic stall, followed by a roll to the left of over 90 degrees and a steep descent into the ground. The GPWS warning sounded and the aircraft's left wing struck a tree. It then crashed into a corn field with its nose hitting the ground and with a violent left roll. The aircraft's 11,000 kg of fuel then ignited, causing a massive explosion. Flight 053 crashed just 76 seconds after it had taken off from Runway 22.

After three unsuccessful attempts to contact the aircraft, the controller advised the Approach Control to call Flight 053. Other aircraft on the apron were also asked to assist in contacting the aircraft but all attempts were unsuccessful. Kano and Lagos Area Controls were requested to contact Flight 053, but there was no response from the aircraft. Abuja Flight Communication Centre was then advised to inform National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in Kano about the loss of contact with Flight 053.

At 11:38 a.m, Flight Communication Centre called the controller that someone came from a nearby village near the radar site where Flight 053 was last seen and reported that a plane had crashed in their village. A search party from the airport was dispatched and they confirmed that the plane had crashed shortly after takeoff. The front and middle part were obliterated by the impact and post-crash fire that followed, while a portion of the back of the plane managed to stay intact, saving the lives of a flight attendant and 8 passengers. The other 96 people were killed in the crash.

Flight recorder analysis

The flight recorders were recovered in good condition and were sent to the NTSB for further analysis. The FDR recorded a total of 18 parameters, of which 14 were able to be converted into "usable engineering units". According to the FDR data, rotation was initiated at 143 kn. The aircraft then reached a peak speed of 162 kn before it started to decay. The aircraft had been struck by a horizontal and vertical wind shear. A nose-down input was initially applied by the flight crew, recovering the airspeed. However, four seconds later the flight crew applied a nose-up input. The aircraft reached a very high angle of attack and the altitude of the aircraft became erratic.

According to the CVR, just before takeoff the flight crew had acknowledged the presence of windshear in the area, as Captain Atanda had warned his First Officer to "be ready for windshear". The landing gear was retracted and the V2 callout was given by the first officer. Two seconds after the V2 callout, a wind shear warning was triggered, as the aircraft experienced a rapid change in wind direction. The crew then pitched the nose up to between 30° and 35°, thereby greatly exceeding the critical angle of attack, activating the stick-shaker. As a result of the high pitch attitude, the airflow to the engines was disrupted, causing both engines to experience compressor stall. Flight control inputs by the crew resulted in an aerodynamic stall, altitude loss, and subsequent ground impact.

Flight crews error

According to Boeing's Flight Crew Operation Manual (FCOM), in order to recover from a wind shear the crew should have applied maximum thrust, levelled the wings and pulled the aircraft's nose to an initial pitch of 15 degrees. Analysis of the pilot's reaction, however, proved that the flight crew had not followed the correct procedures on FCOM. Although bad weather created the situation to which the pilots reacted, their reaction was not in accordance with wind shear recovery procedure as the crews made a nose up input and didn't try to level the wings.

The airline's Standard Operations Procedures, which had been approved by the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority, did not include any procedures for handling an aircraft during adverse or dangerous weather conditions (the page was left blank).

The simulator training the crew undertook at Sabena Flight Academy in Brussels, Belgium did not adequately prepare them to handle the situation in which they found themselves, even though the aircraft appeared to have enough energy to fly through the adverse weather conditions. Captain Atanda received wind shear training but it was not applicable as the simulator was not the same as the actual aircraft, while wind shear recognition and recovery were not part of the simulator training that First Officer Okonneh received. Throughout the crucial period of Flight 053, from the first wind shear warning to the ground impact, the responses from First Officer Okonneh were not in accordance with the wind shear recovery procedures. The CVR revealed that First Officer Okonneh even asked Captain Atanda to pull up the nose of the aircraft, which took the aircraft out of safe flight regime.

The investigation further revealed multiple discrepancies on First Officer's Okonneh hour logs and his flying license was scrutinized as he was operating with a Nigerian Commercial Pilot License that was issued by the Ghanaian Civil Aviation Authority.