Aloha Airlines Flight 243
Boeing 737-297 · Emergency landing following in-flight structural failure and explosive decompression due to maintenance error
From Hilo International Airport (ITO) to Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL)
Event
- NTSB case
- DCA88MA054
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- Event fatalities
- 1 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- 0
- Occupants
- 95
- Survivors
- 94
- InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
- 65
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Airline
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Boeing 737-297
- Flight
- AQ243
- Aircraft type
- Boeing 737
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N73711
- Operator
- Aloha Airlines
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Hilo International Airport (ITO), Hilo, HITo Daniel K. Inouye International Airport (HNL), Honolulu, HI
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 121: Air Carrier
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- En route · cruise
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Airframe, component or system failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Substantial
Cause areas
- Fuselage, attachment › Fatigue
- Fuselage, attachment › Separation
Approximate · Coordinates from the Wikipedia article; not checked against an investigation report.
From the Wikipedia article
Aloha Airlines Flight 243 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight flown by Aloha Airlines between Hilo and Honolulu in Hawaii. On April 28, 1988, the Boeing 737-200 airplane serving the flight suffered extensive damage after an explosive decompression in flight, caused by part of the fuselage breaking due to poor maintenance and metal fatigue. The plane was able to land safely at Kahului Airport on Maui. The one fatality, flight attendant Clarabelle "C.B." Lansing, was ejected from the airplane. Sixty-five passengers and crew were injured. The substantial damage inflicted by the decompression, the loss of one cabin crew member, and the safe landing of the aircraft established the accident as a significant event in the history of aviation, with far-reaching effects on aviation safety policies and procedures.
Accident
Flight 243 departed from Hilo International Airport at 13:25 HST on April 28, 1988, with 5 crew members and 90 passengers on board (including an air traffic controller travelling on the cockpit jumpseat), bound for Honolulu. Nothing unusual was noted during the pre-departure inspection of the aircraft, which had already completed three uneventful round-trip flights between Honolulu and Hilo, Maui, and Kauai earlier that day. Meteorological conditions were checked, but no advisories for weather phenomena were reported along the air route, per AIRMETs or SIGMETs.
After a routine takeoff and ascent, just as the aircraft had reached its normal flight altitude of 24000 ft, at 13:46, about 23 nmi south-southeast of Kahului on Maui, a section on the left side of the roof ruptured with a "whooshing" sound. The captain felt the aircraft roll to the left and right, and the controls went loose; the first officer noticed pieces of gray insulation "floating in the cockpit". The cockpit door had broken away and the captain could see "blue sky where the first-class ceiling had been." A large section of the roof had torn off, consisting of the entire top half of the aircraft skin extending from just behind the cockpit to the fore-wing area, a length of about 18 ft.
The only fatality was 58-year-old chief flight attendant Clarabelle "C.B." Lansing, a veteran of 37 years, who was swept out of the airplane while standing near the fifth-row seats; her body was never found. Eight other people, including one flight attendant, suffered serious injuries; 57 passengers suffered minor injuries. All passengers had been seated and were wearing their seat belts during the depressurization.
First Officer Tompkins was the pilot flying at the time of the accident; Captain Schornstheimer took over controls and performed an immediate emergency descent. The crew declared an emergency and diverted to Kahului Airport for an emergency landing. During the approach to the airport, the left engine failed, and the flight crew was unsure if the nose gear were lowered correctly. Nevertheless, they landed normally on Runway 2, thirteen minutes after the accident. Upon landing, the aircraft's emergency evacuation slides were deployed and passengers quickly evacuated from the aircraft. Sixty-five people were reported injured, eight of them seriously. At the time, Maui had no plan in place for such an emergency. The injured were taken to the hospital in tour vans belonging to Akamai Tours, driven by office personnel and mechanics, as the island only had two ambulances. Air traffic control radioed Akamai and requested as many of their 15-passenger vans as they could spare to go to the airport (which was 3 mi from their base) to transport the injured. Two of the Akamai drivers were former paramedics and established a triage on the runway.
Investigation and cause
Conclusion
The NTSB investigation determined that the quality of inspection and maintenance programs was deficient. Fuselage examinations were scheduled during the night, which made carrying out an adequate inspection of the aircraft's outer skin more difficult.
The fuselage failure initiated in the lap joint along S-10L; the failure mechanism was a result of multiple-site fatigue cracking of the skin adjacent to rivet holes along the lap joint upper rivet row and tear strap disbond, which negated the fail-safe characteristics of the fuselage. The fatigue cracking initiated from the knife edge associated with the countersunk lap joint rivet holes; the knife edge concentrated stresses that were transferred through the rivets because of lap joint disbonding.
The NTSB concluded in its final report that
the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the Aloha Airlines maintenance program to detect the presence of significant disbonding and fatigue damage which ultimately led to failure of the lap joint at S-10L and the separation of the fuselage upper lobe. Contributing to the accident were the failure of Aloha Airlines management to supervise properly its maintenance force; the failure of the FAA to require Airworthiness Directive 87-21-08 inspection of all the lap joints proposed by Boeing Alert Service Bulletin SB 737-53A1039; and the lack of a complete terminating action (neither generated by Boeing nor required by the FAA) after the discovery of early production difficulties in the B-737 cold-bond lap joint, which resulted in low bond durability, corrosion, and premature fatigue cracking.
One of five board members dissented, arguing that "undetected fatigue cracking" was clearly the probable cause, but that Aloha Airlines maintenance should not be singled out within it because the accident could not be "reasonably foreseen" and a "system failure" by the FAA, Boeing, and Aloha each were merely contributing factors.
Text from the Wikipedia article “Aloha Airlines Flight 243” (revision 1364910875, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article
NTSB narrative
The Safety Board's full report on this investigation is provided as Aviation Accident Report number AAR-89/03. To obtain a copy of this report, or to view the executive summary online, please see the Web site at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm
FLT 243 EXPERIENCED AN EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION AND STRUCTURAL FAILURE AT FL240 WHILE ENROUTE FROM HILO, HI, TO HONOLULU, HI. APRX 18 FT OF CABIN SKIN AND STRUCTURE AFT OF THE CABIN ENTRANCE DOOR AND ABOVE THE PASSENGER FLOORLINE SEPARATED FROM THE ACFT. ONE FLT ATTENDANT WHO WAS STANDING IN THE AISLE WAS SWEPT OVERBOARD. THE FLT DIVERTED TO MAUI AND A LANDING WAS ACCOMPLISHED. EXAMINATION OF THE ACFT REVEALED DISBONDING AND FATIGUE DAMAGE WHICH LED TO THE FAILURE OF THE LAP JOINT AT S-10L AND THE SEPARATION OF THE FUSELAGE UPPER SKIN BETWEEN STATIONS 360 AND 540. (SEE NTSB/AAR-89/03)
Verbatim NTSB analysis from the NTSB dataset
Sources
Wikipedia article: Aloha Airlines Flight 243
- Article
- Aloha Airlines Flight 243
- Revision
- 1364910875 · 2026-07-19 · retrieved 2026-09-18
- Wikidata
- Q665566
- Licence
- Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
NTSB record DCA88MA054
- Event ID
- 20001213X25439
- Case number
- DCA88MA054
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Where each value comes from
- Record
- Wikipedia article "Aloha Airlines Flight 243" (page 478114, revision 1364910875); merged with NTSB case DCA88MA054 (events / aircraft)
- Date
- NTSB record DCA88MA054: NTSB API eventDate, eventTimeUtc and eventTimeUtcOffsetHours (local date)
- Place and country
- Wikipedia infobox: site; country from NTSB record DCA88MA054
- Map position
- Wikipedia: Wikipedia article coordinates
- Aircraft, operator and route
- NTSB record DCA88MA054: aircraft; gaps from Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
- Operation
- NTSB record DCA88MA054: operated under Part 121: Air Carrier
- Fatalities
- NTSB record DCA88MA054: NTSB API totalFatal
- Ground fatalities
- NTSB record DCA88MA054: NTSB API ongroundFatal
- Summary
- Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (3)
- One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "Aloha Airlines Flight 243" and NTSB case DCA88MA054, matched by the same aircraft registration and date. For this US event the NTSB's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date, which is the same as the UTC date the NTSB stores.