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UTA Flight 141

25 Dec 2003 · Cotonou Airport, Cotonou, Benin

Union des Transports Africains de Guinée (UTA) Boeing 727-223 · Failure to take off due to aircraft overload as a result of poor management

From Ahmed Sékou Touré International Airport (CKY) to Dubai International Airport (DXB)

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Event

NTSB case
WAS04RA010
Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
Accident
InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
Unknown · led by another country; figures from NTSB notifications
Event fatalities
141 · all aircraft and ground
Ground fatalities
Unknown
Occupants
160
Survivors
19
InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
18
OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
Airline
WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
Not recorded

Boeing 727-223

Flight
GIH141
Aircraft type
Boeing 727
Category
Airplane · from aircraft type
RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
3X-GDO
Onboard fatalities
141
Route
From Ahmed Sékou Touré International Airport (CKY)To Dubai International Airport (DXB)
Aircraft age
Not recorded
Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
Non-U.S., Commercial
Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
Not recorded
Defining eventThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
Not recorded
DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
Not recorded

Cause areas

  • Aircraft › Aircraft oper/perf/capability
  • Organizational issues › Management
  • Organizational issues › Support/oversight/monitoring

From the investigation findings the Wikipedia article reports, sorted into the NTSB's cause areas with AI assistance.

Approximate · Coordinates from the Wikipedia article; not checked against an investigation report.

From the Wikipedia article

UTA Flight 141 was a scheduled international passenger flight operated by Guinean regional airline Union des Transports Africains de Guinée (UTA), flying from Conakry to Dubai with stopovers in Benin, Libya and Lebanon. On Christmas Day 2003, the Boeing 727–223 operating the flight struck a building and crashed into the Bight of Benin while rolling for take off from Cotonou, killing 141 people. The crash of Flight 141 is the deadliest crash in Benin's aviation history.

The investigation concluded that the crash was primarily caused by overloading. However, it also subsequently revealed massive incompetence within the airline, particularly on its dangerous safety culture. The issue had gone unnoticed following lapses between authorities and further incompetence in management oversight led to the aircraft's overloaded state. Multiple factors, including the short runway at Cotonou and the high demand of passengers for the route, had also contributed to the crash.

In regards to the result of the investigation, the Guinean government was urged to create reforms and regulations on the civil aviation authorities in the country. The BEA, the commission responsible for the investigation, had also urged ICAO to examine provisions related to safety oversight and the FAA and the European EASA were asked to support the creation of an autonomous weight and balance calculation system on board every airliner.

Background

In the 20th century, most countries in West Africa did not have the capability to create and maintain a national airline. For decades, flight routes in West Africa were mainly served by Air Afrique, a transnational airline for Francophone West and Central Africa. It was once considered one of the largest airlines in Africa and one of the most reputable. However, after reports of mismanagement, corruption and the fallout of the aviation industry following the September 11 attacks, Air Afrique declared bankruptcy in 2002.

In the aftermath of Air Afrique's demise, there were no more routes connecting major cities in West Africa and to other regions. The bankruptcy of Air Afrique caused isolation between the countries, despite their close geographical location. While Air Afrique's routes were immediately taken over by Air France, most of the flights were perceived as inconvenient. Such an example was a flight from Conakry to Cotonou, in which passengers had to fly to Paris first before they could continue to Cotonou. Immediately, there was high demand for new airlines to open more direct routes.

In an attempt to fill the void left by Air Afrique, multiple existing small airlines began to offer services to these major routes. Among them was Union des Transports Africains de Guinée, or UTA, a regional airline that was operated by Lebanese people in Guinea. Although it shared an abbreviation, this UTA had no relation to the more well-known French airline Union de Transports Aériens, which operated from 1963 to 1992 and served many African destinations.

For years, the Lebanese diaspora was part of the backbone of the economic activity in multiple West African countries. Many Lebanese businessmen had forged robust relationships with government officials to sign contracts within West Africa's public infrastructure sectors, and many Lebanese owned large businesses in West Africa. An example was cited on a CIA document from 1988, with the following quote explaining the economic situation in one of the West African countries:

However, the lack of direct flights to Lebanon caused dozens of Lebanese to board transit flights between multiple cities in West Africa. Lebanon's flag carrier, Middle East Airlines, previously had operated flight routes in West Africa and later decided to terminate the service.

On 23 July 2003, the government of Benin granted temporary authorization for UTA to operate charter flights for Conakry – Cotonou – Beirut – Cotonou – Conakry route. The airline later requested clearance to operate another extension flight to Dubai, known for its duty-free shopping, possibly to amplify profitability. The request was granted in November 2003.

Flight

Flight 141 was a chartered passenger flight from the Guinean capital of Conakry, Benin's largest city of Cotonou and the Lebanese capital of Beirut with the final destination in Dubai. A stopover was included in the flight plan with the Libyan town of Kufra as a refueling stop. It was a weekly scheduled flight with one round trip flight per week.

The aircraft had been chartered by 2 Lebanese men. Many of those on board were Lebanese diaspora who had been living in multiple West African countries for years. As it was Christmas Day, many of those on board were travelling home to spend the holidays with families. Dozens of passengers could be seen carrying hand baggage filled with Christmas gifts. The situation was chaotic as the check-in staff at the airport had not allocated seats for the passengers. A boarding pass was also not needed at the airport. Passengers could sell their respective seats at last-minute to someone else who were not booked on the flight as their names were not written on the boarding pass.

The aircraft was full with passengers. A total of 86 people had boarded the aircraft in Conakry and 9 people had disembarked in Cotonou. The aircraft had also received another 10 passengers from an aircraft that had flown from Togo. The boarding was disorderly. Many passengers tried to sit beside their friends and even occupied the cabin jump seats and the cabin crew were overwhelmed. Meanwhile, the flight crew were involved in an argument inside the cockpit as they had not received the basic information on the aircraft's load.

While the cockpit crew were engaged in an argument on the weight and balance, the ground baggage handler was loading the baggage at the aft of the aircraft. One of UTA's agents then asked the handler to load the baggage at the forward hold, which was already filled with baggage. Subsequently, the forward hold was full with baggage. Back in the cockpit, the crew continued to discuss the weight of the baggage. They became more frustrated as there were no information regarding the number of passengers that had boarded the aircraft in Cotonou. It was a tense situation as all the flight crew were unable to determine the exact weight of the baggage of each passengers.

As the Captain decided to discuss the matter with the flight engineer, the First Officer became angry and yelled at the Director General of UTA, who was sitting at the cockpit jump seat across him, due to the absence of information. The UTA executive, however, tried to reason with the First Officer on the matter.

The UTA executive immediately apologized to the crew. He stated that he would tell the management off as soon as the aircraft arrived in Beirut, later added that he would send messages to not allow anymore baggage or luggage weighing more than 30 kilograms. By this time, all passengers had already boarded the aircraft. Fuel was added to both tanks and the flight plan had been filed by the captain. The Captain then configured the aircraft with flaps at 25 degrees. The elevator was set at 6¾ and full power with brakes on would be applied for the take-off, followed by a three-degree maximum for take-off climb. The First Officer was the pilot flying.

The air conditioner was shut down. The weather was hot and dry. Weather report stated that there were cirrus clouds covering the sky and that there were some stratocumulus at an altitude of 1500 ft. The visibility was about 8 km and the humidity was at 75%.

As everything was set, the crew began the take-off roll. However, several passengers were still reluctant to sit down and decided to stand near their friends. This led the chief flight attendant to inform the cockpit crew on the situation. Order was finally restored after the Directorate General of UTA had called for order and the passengers finally decided to sit down on the floor.

At 13:58 local time, the flight crew applied take-off thrust. A few seconds later, the brakes were released. The First Officer was pushing the nose down and the captain was observing the airspeed. The aircraft then reached V1 and subsequently reached its VR speed. An input from 5-degree nose down to 10-degree nose up was made by the First Officer in a span of two seconds. The nose of the aircraft, however, remained constant and the speed continued to increase.

The Captain became anxious as the aircraft's wheel had not lifted off the runway. He then called for rotation at least twice. The First Officer then pulled the yoke even harder so the aircraft could take-off. The angle of attack then changed from −1.2-degree to a maximum of +9-degree, at a speed of 1 degree per second.

The aircraft finally managed to lift off at 13:59:07 for a negligible altitude. Realizing that they were going to run out of runway, the captain urged the first officer to pull harder.

At 13:59:11, the aircraft struck the localizer antennas at the end of the runway. The aircraft's main landing gears then impacted the localizer building, causing the roof to fly for approximately 9 meters from the point of impact. The right main landing gear then detached. The impact subsequently caused small parts of the tail and the aircraft's stair to detach as well. The aircraft then impacted the airport's concrete boundary fence, scraping the lower part of the fuselage and caused some parts of the flaps to separate from the wings.

The aircraft then slid and struck a rainwater drainage canal located right after the perimeter fence. The collision damaged the aircraft's landing gears and parts of its wings. The leading edge and the outer aileron from the right wing then separated from the airframe. A survivor who was seated at the rear of the aircraft stated that people flew off their seats and, at the moment of impact, "fly around the cabin". According to testimonies, some passengers had not attached their seatbelts.

After it had struck the drainage canal, the aircraft broke up into three parts; the cockpit section, the fuselage, and the tail of the aircraft, all of which ended up in the sea. The majority of the fuselage managed to stay intact however, the fuselage became upside down due to the impact, drowning the occupants inside. Those who were seated near the breaks were able to get out of the sinking wreckage.

Investigation and cause

Investigation

The crash was the deadliest civil airliner crash in the history of Benin. It was also the first major aircraft accident in the country. Thus, the country did not have the experience to investigate the crash. While the government had set up a special commission to investigate the cause of the crash, the government requested the French BEA to carry out the probe. The investigation also invited representatives from Boeing and the FAA.

According to the final report, the investigation team faced great difficulties during their attempts to obtain adequate data and documentations from UTA. The team had to rely to direct testimonies from the surviving crew members, reasoning, and calculations made from the available recorded parameters.

Conclusion

The final report was published in 2004. The crash was mainly caused by overloading and the improper baggage loading of the Boeing 727. However, the investigation team also listed the structural causes that eventually enabled the overloading condition of the aircraft. The BEA listed the cause as the following:

Following the accident, BEA issued recommendations to multiple international aviation bodies for better oversight of airliners within their scope of operation. The report also asked the United States FAA and Europe EASA to create an autonomous system for measuring weight and balance. Subsequently, all aircraft should be retrofitted with said system.

Text from the Wikipedia article “UTA Flight 141” (revision 1374887016, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article

Sources

Wikipedia article: UTA Flight 141
Article
UTA Flight 141
Revision
1374887016 · 2026-09-14 · retrieved 2026-09-18
Wikidata
Q4189392
Licence
Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
NTSB record WAS04RA010
Event ID
20040128X00121
Case number
WAS04RA010
Dataset
historical-pre2008
Source SHA-256
89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Where each value comes from
Record
Wikipedia article "UTA Flight 141" (page 414388, revision 1374887016); merged with NTSB case WAS04RA010 (events / aircraft)
Date
Wikipedia infobox: date
Place and country
Wikipedia infobox: site
Map position
Wikipedia: Wikipedia article coordinates
Aircraft, operator and route
Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports); gaps and aircraft details from NTSB record WAS04RA010
Operation
airline flight number in the infobox
Fatalities
Wikipedia: Wikipedia infobox: aircraft fatalities
Ground fatalities
Wikipedia: not stated in the Wikipedia infobox
Summary
Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (2)
  • One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "UTA Flight 141" and NTSB case WAS04RA010, matched by the same aircraft registration and date. For this event outside the United States Wikipedia's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
  • No bulk values were replaced by the NTSB case API.