Alaska Airlines Flight 261
Douglas MD-83 · Loss of control following jackscrew failure due to improper maintenance
From Puerto Vallarta International Airport (PVR) to Seattle–Tacoma International Airport (SFO)
Event
- NTSB case
- DCA00MA023
- Event typeAccident: someone killed or seriously injured, or the aircraft substantially damaged (NTSB definition). Incident: an occurrence that affected or could have affected safety, short of that. Glossary
- Accident
- InvestigationHow far the investigation had got when the record was published: preliminary, ongoing, final or completed. Unknown where the source does not say. Glossary
- Completed
- Event fatalities
- 88 · all aircraft and ground
- Ground fatalities
- 0
- Occupants
- 88
- Survivors
- 0
- InjuriesFatal: death within 30 days. Serious: over 48 hours in hospital within a week, most broken bones, severe bleeding, nerve or organ damage, or serious burns. Minor: anything less. Glossary
- 0 serious · 0 minor (NTSB)
- OperationWhat kind of flying it was, grouped by the rules it flew under: airline (US Part 121), air taxi and commuter (Part 135), general aviation (Part 91 and similar), military or government. Glossary
- Airline
- WeatherVisual meteorological conditions (VMC): good enough to fly by looking outside. Instrument conditions (IMC): cloud or low visibility, flying by instruments. Glossary
- Visual Meteorological Cond
Douglas MD-83
- Flight
- AS261
- Aircraft type
- Douglas MD-83
- Category
- Airplane
- RegistrationThe aircraft's tail number, such as N12345 or G-ABCD. Registrations are reissued, so the same one years apart can be a different aircraft. Glossary
- N963AS
- Operator
- Alaska Airlines
- Onboard fatalities
- Unknown
- Route
- From Puerto Vallarta International Airport (PVR), Puerto VallartaTo Seattle–Tacoma International Airport (SFO), San Francisco, CA
- Aircraft age
- Not recorded
- Flight rulesThe regulations the flight operated under: in the US, Part 91 (general aviation), Part 121 (airlines), Part 135 (air taxi and commuter) and others; for flights abroad, the NTSB's coarser commercial or non-commercial code. Glossary
- Part 121: Air Carrier
- Phase of flightThe stage of the flight when things started to go wrong: standing, taxi, takeoff, initial climb, en route, maneuvering, approach or landing. Glossary
- En route · cruise
- First occurrenceThe single coded event the NTSB judges best describes what happened (records from 2008 on). Older records name the first occurrence in the sequence instead. Glossary
- Airframe, component or system failure
- DamageDestroyed: beyond practical repair. Substantial: damage that affects the structure, performance or handling and normally needs major repair. Minor: less than that. Glossary
- Destroyed
Cause areas
- Aircraft control › Not possible
- Company maintenance personnel › Maintenance, inspection, inadequate
- Company maintenance personnel › Maintenance, lubrication, inadequate
- Flt control syst, horiz stab drive › Worn
- Lubricant, grease › Inadequate
Approximate · Coordinates as recorded by the NTSB; no uncertainty radius is established.
From the Wikipedia article
Alaska Airlines Flight 261 was a scheduled international passenger flight from Licenciado Gustavo Díaz Ordaz International Airport in Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco, Mexico, to Seattle–Tacoma International Airport near Seattle, Washington, United States, with an intermediate stop at San Francisco International Airport in San Francisco, California. On January 31, 2000, the McDonnell Douglas MD-83 operating the flight crashed into the Pacific Ocean roughly 2.7 miles (4.3 km; 2.3 nmi) north of Anacapa Island, California, following a catastrophic loss of pitch control, while attempting to divert to Los Angeles International Airport. The accident killed all 88 on board – two pilots, three cabin crew members, and 83 passengers.
The subsequent investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that inadequate maintenance led to excessive wear and eventual failure of a critical flight control system during flight. The probable cause was stated to be "a loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly's Acme nut threads." For their efforts to save the plane, both pilots were posthumously awarded the Air Line Pilots Association Gold Medal for Heroism.
Accident flight
Alaska Airlines Flight 261 departed from Puerto Vallarta's Licenciado Gustavo Díaz Ordaz International Airport at 13:37 PST (21:37 UTC), and climbed to its intended cruising altitude of flight level 310 (31000 ft). The plane was scheduled to land at San Francisco International Airport (SFO) less than 4 hours later. Sometime before 15:49 (23:49 UTC), the flight crew contacted the airline's dispatch and maintenance-control facilities in SeaTac, Washington, on a company radio frequency shared with operations and maintenance facilities at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), to discuss a jammed horizontal stabilizer and a possible diversion to LAX. The jammed stabilizer prevented the operation of the trim system, which would normally make slight adjustments to the flight control surfaces to keep the plane stable in flight. At their cruising altitude and speed, the position of the jammed stabilizer required the pilots to pull on their yokes with about 10 lbf of force to keep level. Neither the flight crew nor company maintenance could determine the cause of the jam. Repeated attempts to overcome the jam with the primary and alternate trim systems were unsuccessful.
During this time, the flight crew had several discussions with the company dispatcher about whether to divert to LAX or continue on as planned to SFO. Ultimately, the pilots chose to divert. Later, the NTSB found that while "the flight crew's decision to divert the flight to Los Angeles... was prudent and appropriate," "Alaska Airlines dispatch personnel appear to have attempted to influence the flight crew to continue to San Francisco... instead of diverting to Los Angeles." Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcripts indicate that the dispatcher was concerned about the effect on the schedule ("flow"), should the flight divert.
At 16:09 (00:09 UTC), the flight crew successfully used the primary trim system to unjam the stuck horizontal stabilizer. Upon being freed, however, it quickly moved to an extreme "nose-down" position, forcing the aircraft into a nosedive. The plane dropped from about 31,050 ft to between 23,000 and 24,000 ft in around 80 seconds. Both pilots struggled together to regain control of the aircraft, and only by pulling with 130 to 140 lbf on the controls did the flight crew stop the 6,000 ft/min descent of the aircraft, and stabilize the MD-83 at roughly 24,400 ft.
Alaska 261 informed air traffic control (ATC) of their control problems. After the flight crew stated their intention to land at LAX, ATC asked whether they wanted to proceed to a lower altitude in preparation for the approach. The captain replied: "I need to get down to about ten, change my configuration, make sure I can control the jet, and I'd like to do that out here over the bay, if I may." Later, during the public hearings into the accident, the request by the pilot not to fly over populated areas was mentioned. During this time, the flight crew considered, and rejected, any further attempts to correct the runaway trim. They descended to a lower altitude, and started to configure the aircraft for landing at LAX.
Beginning at 16:19 (00:19 UTC), the CVR recorded the sounds of at least four distinct "thumps," followed 17 seconds later by an "extremely loud noise," as the overstrained jackscrew assembly failed completely, and the jackscrew separated from the Acme nut holding it in place. As a result, the horizontal stabilizer failed at 17800 ft, and the aircraft rapidly pitched over into a dive while rolling to the left. The crippled plane had been given a block altitude, and several aircraft in the vicinity had been alerted by ATC to maintain visual contact with the stricken jet. These aircraft immediately contacted the controller. One pilot radioed, "That plane has just started to do a big huge plunge." Another reported, "Yes sir, ah, I concur. He is, uh, definitely in a nose down, uh, position, descending quite rapidly." ATC then tried to contact the plane. The crew of a SkyWest airliner reported, "He's, uh, definitely out of control." Although the CVR captured the co-pilot saying "mayday," no radio communications were received from the flight crew during the final event.
The CVR transcript reveals the pilots' constant attempts for the duration of the dive to regain control of the aircraft. After the jackscrew failed, the plane pitched –70° and was rolling over to the left. Performing an upset recovery maneuver, the captain commanded to "push and roll, push and roll," managing to increase the pitch to –28°, he stated, "ok, we are inverted...and now we gotta get it." Over the next minute, completely inverted and still diving at a –9° pitch, the crew struggled to roll the plane, with the captain calling to "push push push...push the blue side [of the attitude indicator] up," "ok now let's kick rudder...left rudder left rudder," to which the copilot responded, "I can't reach it." The captain then replied, "ok right rudder...right rudder," followed 18 seconds later by: "gotta get it over again...at least upside down we're flying."
Despite the attempt to fly the plane inverted, which almost entirely arrested its descent, the aircraft had lost too much altitude in the dive, and was far beyond recovery. A few seconds before 16:21 (00:21 UTC), Flight 261 hit the Pacific Ocean at high speed between the coastal city of Port Hueneme, California, and Anacapa Island. At this time, pilots from aircraft flying in the vicinity reported in, with one pilot saying, "and he's just hit the water." Another reported, "Ah, yes sir, he, ah, he, ah, hit the water. He's, ah, down." The aircraft was destroyed by the impact forces, and all occupants were killed by blunt-force impact trauma.
Investigation and cause
Conclusions
In addition to the probable cause, the NTSB found these contributing factors:
Alaska Airlines extended its lubrication interval for its McDonnell Douglas MD-80 horizontal stabilizer components based on McDonnell Douglas's recommendation, and the FAA approved the extended schedule. This increased the likelihood that a missed or inadequate lubrication would result in the near complete deterioration of the jackscrew-assembly acme-nut threads. The extended lubrication interval was a direct cause of the excessive wear and contributed to the Alaska Airlines Flight 261 accident.
Alaska Airlines extended the end-play check interval and the FAA approved the change. This allowed the acme-nut threads to deteriorate to the point of failure without the opportunity for detection.
The absence on the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 of a fail-safe mechanism to prevent the catastrophic effects of total acme nut loss.
During the course of the investigation, and later in its final report, the NTSB issued 24 safety recommendations, covering maintenance, regulatory oversight, and aircraft design issues. More than half of these were directly related to jackscrew lubrication and end-play measurement. Also included was a recommendation that pilots were to be instructed that in the event of a flight-control system malfunction, they should not attempt corrective procedures beyond those specified in the checklist procedures, and in particular, in the event of a horizontal stabilizer trim-control system malfunction, the primary and alternate trim motors should not be activated, and if unable to correct the problem through the checklists, they should land at the nearest suitable airport.
In NTSB board member John J. Goglia's statement for the final report, with which the other three board members concurred, he wrote:
Text from the Wikipedia article “Alaska Airlines Flight 261” (revision 1375182928, retrieved 2026-09-18) by its authors, under CC BY-SA 4.0. Extracted as plain text: references, tables, images and some sections are left out. Read the article
NTSB narrative
The Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm.
On January 31, 2000, about 1621 Pacific standard time, Alaska Airlines, Inc., flight 261, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS, crashed into the Pacific Ocean about 2.7 miles north of Anacapa Island, California. The 2 pilots, 3 cabin crewmembers, and 83 passengers on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces. Flight 261 was operating as a scheduled international passenger flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Lic Gustavo Diaz Ordaz International Airport, Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, to Seattle?Tacoma International Airport, Seattle, Washington, with an intermediate stop planned at San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan.
Probable cause
A loss of airplane pitch control resulting from the in-flight failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly's acme nut threads. The thread failure was caused by excessive wear resulting from Alaska Airlines' insufficient lubrication of the jackscrew assembly. Contributing to the accident were Alaska Airlines' extended lubrication interval and the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) approval of that extension, which increased the likelihood that a missed or inadequate lubrication would result in excessive wear of the acme nut threads, and Alaska Airlines' extended end play check interval and the FAA's approval of that extension, which allowed the excessive wear of the acme nut threads to progress to failure without the opportunity for detection. Also contributing to the accident was the absence on the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 of a fail-safe mechanism to prevent the catastrophic effects of total acme nut thread loss.
Verbatim NTSB analysis and probable cause from the NTSB dataset
Sources
Wikipedia article: Alaska Airlines Flight 261
- Article
- Alaska Airlines Flight 261
- Revision
- 1375182928 · 2026-09-16 · retrieved 2026-09-18
- Wikidata
- Q770935
- Licence
- Text CC BY-SA 4.0, by the article's authors; Wikidata CC0; town positions GeoNames (CC BY 4.0)
NTSB record DCA00MA023
- Event ID
- 20001212X20339
- Case number
- DCA00MA023
- Dataset
- historical-pre2008
- Source SHA-256
- 89e2df6d848e7ab3b42e7d7c7a03ff403303057a26ca04c95b3ea67201c3ce74
Where each value comes from
- Record
- Wikipedia article "Alaska Airlines Flight 261" (page 410596, revision 1375182928); merged with NTSB case DCA00MA023 (events / aircraft)
- Date
- NTSB record DCA00MA023: NTSB narrative opening date, consistent with the API date and time (local date)
- Place and country
- Wikipedia infobox: site; country from NTSB record DCA00MA023
- Map position
- NTSB record DCA00MA023: events decimal coordinates
- Aircraft, operator and route
- NTSB record DCA00MA023: aircraft; gaps from Wikipedia infobox: aircraft type, registration, operator, origin and destination; route airports from the linked airport articles' Wikidata codes (OurAirports)
- Operation
- NTSB record DCA00MA023: operated under Part 121: Air Carrier
- Fatalities
- NTSB record DCA00MA023: NTSB API totalFatal
- Ground fatalities
- NTSB record DCA00MA023: NTSB API ongroundFatal
- Summary
- Wikipedia infobox: summary
Source notes (3)
- One occurrence in two sources, merged: the Wikipedia article "Alaska Airlines Flight 261" and NTSB case DCA00MA023, matched by the same aircraft registration and date. For this US event the NTSB's values are used where the two differ; each value names its source.
- Filled from the NTSB case API where the bulk record had no value: local date, investigation status. Values present in the bulk record are kept.
- The date is the local date; the NTSB stores the UTC date 2000-02-01.